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ABSTRACT
This article offers a comprehensive study of the merits of the legal practice of punishing 
accomplished crimes more severely than attempted crimes all other things being equal (Differential 
Punishment) vis-à-vis the alternative of punishing them with equal sanctions (Equal Punishment). 
Unlike the overwhelming majority of the literature on the issue—which focuses on which practice 
better mirrors the offenders’ relative moral deserts—the article evaluates both practices from a 
consequentialist, deterrence-based point of view. In particular, it shows first that traditional 
economic theories of the criminal law should yield the conclusion that differential punishment is not 
superior to equal punishment. The few arguments that the economic literature offers against such 
conclusion, the article shows, are mistaken. Secondly, drawing on social and psychological findings, 
the article advances three new arguments showing that, under some likely social and psychological 
conditions, differential punishment is in fact a superior alternative to equal punishment.
INTRODUCTION
Philosophers and criminal law theorists have long discussed whether the legal practice 
of punishing more severely accomplished crimes than attempted crimes, all other things 
being equal, is a justifiable practice—a practice that we have good reasons to maintain.1
The discussion however has focused on the relative deserts of successful offenders vis-à-
vis unsuccessful offenders who fail to accomplish their crimes just by chance (e.g., for 
the extraordinary intervention of an outstanding surgeon who miraculously saves the 
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1 See George P.  Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense 82-3 (1988) (“Generations of theorists have sought to 
explain why we punish actual homicide more severely than attempted homicide, the real spilling of blood 
more severely than the unrealized intent to do so.  Our combined philosophical work has yet to generate a 
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does”).
2victim).   The mere fact of success (or failure), the critics of the practice contend, may not 
make one agent more (or less) blameworthy than the other, or otherwise more (or less) 
deserving of punishment than the other. Hence, to the extent that legal punishment 
practices are to be responsive to offenders’ blameworthiness, the practice of punishing 
more leniently attempts than the corresponding accomplished crimes should be 
abolished—or so the critics claim.2 Defenders of the practice, in turn, have struggled to 
2
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3find an argument showing that successful offenders are actually more deserving of 
punishment than their unsuccessful counterparts despite the fact that what distinguishes 
one kind of offenders from the other is just a matter of sheer luck.3 From this point of 
view, intuitive though the practice may appear, its justification has proven elusive.4
But many would want to argue that, even if the critics are right, the relative blamewor-
thiness of successful and unsuccessful offenders is not the only consideration to take into 
account in assessing the correctness of the legal practice of punishing the former more 
harshly than the latter—a practice I will call, for simplicity’s sake, differential pun-
ishment.5 In this article I subject the practice of differential punishment to a detailed  
consequentialist evaluation of the sort deterrence-based theories of the criminal law are 
3
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 As opposed to the alternative practice of equal punishment—that is, the practice of punishing offenders 
equally, independently of whether their actions bring about the crime result or not.
4committed to, in order to see whether there are consequentialist, deterrence-based reasons 
militating in favor of the practice of differential punishment and against its alternative. 
Two things are necessary for such a consequentialist evaluation.  First, a normative 
theory that ranks states of affairs, so that we can tell when the consequences of any given 
institutional arrangement are better than the consequences of other competing arrange-
ments.  And, secondly, a positive theory that explains what are the mechanisms through 
which social institutions—like the criminal law in general, or individual criminal-law ar-
rangements, in particular—affect the world, so that we can both tell which are the fea-
tures of a social state of affairs that are due to a particular social institution, and predict 
the consequences that the adoption of a particular institution may bring about.  
Available consequentialist theories of the criminal law presuppose at least the follow-
ing simple normative theory to assess the relative value of the consequences of alternative 
criminal-law arrangements.  The theory states, roughly, that, all other things being equal, 
fewer crimes are better than more crimes.  Accordingly, a criminal-law institutional ar-
rangement is better than another, all other things being equal, if the number of crimes 
committed under the former is smaller than the number of crimes committed under the 
latter.  In turn, from a consequentialist point of view, less costly criminal-law arrange-
ments are by definition better than more costly arrangements.  Though it is controversial 
precisely what may count as a cost of a criminal-law arrangement, there are at least some 
monetary costs that any consequentialist theory of the criminal law should take into 
account, namely, the monetary cost society bears in apprehending, convicting, and 
punishing offenders—or, as I will often call them, the enforcement costs.  So, a criminal-
law institutional arrangement is better than another, all other things being equal, if the 
5enforcement costs the former requires are lower than the enforcement costs required by 
the latter.
On the other hand, among the possible positive theories a consequentialist account of 
the criminal law may rely upon, it is deterrence the mechanism that is worth considering 
in detail.6 According to the deterrence account, the criminal law affects people’s willing-
ness to engage in criminal activity, and therefore the aggregate number of crimes, by 
making criminal activity less profitable than it would otherwise be.  The prospect of be-
ing subjected to punitive treatment for acting in a criminal way is an unambiguous cost 
placed on the decision to act in such a way.  Since individuals’ behavior is sensitive to the 
prospects of gain and loss they face for the decisions they may make, criminal law influ-
6
 Along with deterrence, there are two other familiar accounts of how the criminal law may reduce crime: 
incapacitation and rehabilitationn.  Yet, besides other problems these accounts face—see e.g.  Moore, supra 
note 2, at 85-7 (opposing rehabilitation); and Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 
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or unsuccessful when they revealed such tendencies is of no importance whatsoever.
6ences individuals’ behavior by raising the costs of their possible decisions to engage in 
criminal activity.
In general, then, under this consequentialist, deterrence-based approach, justifying the 
practice of differential punishment requires an argument that shows that a criminal law 
that observes the practice of differential punishment is better than a criminal law that 
observes the practice of equal punishment, in the sense that it is more effective in 
deterring crimes for any given amount of enforcement costs, or that it saves enforcement 
costs for any given level of deterrence that both arrangements may equally achieve.  
Those two competing criminal laws will differ from each other only in what I shall call 
the schemes of sanctions established for every type of criminal action that may bring 
about a crime result.  A criminal law that observes the practice of differential punishment 
will arrange its sanctions so that, for any criminal action  that may bring about a crime 
result R,7 the agent who does  receives a harsher sanction if R ensues than if it does not 
ensue.  I shall call any arrangement of this sort a scheme of differential sanctions.  By a 
scheme of equal sanctions I shall designate any scheme of sanctions under which, for any 
criminal action  that may bring about a crime result R, the agent who does  receives the 
same sanction whether R ensues or not.  So, my argument will focus on the relative 
merits, in terms of deterrent efficacy and savings in enforcement costs, of these two 
schemes of sanctions, assuming all the other features of the competing criminal laws to 
be equal.
7
 For instance, if R designates the death of a person,  could stand for the shooting of a firearm aimed at a 
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7Notice that the scope of my inquiry exceeds the case of the relative punishment of 
what is defined in current criminal codes as attempts vis-à-vis the corresponding accom-
plished offenses.  My arguments address a more general practice of which the relative 
punishment of attempts and accomplished crimes is just one instance.  There are other, 
though perhaps less salient, criminal-law rules and doctrines that follow the same pat-
tern.8 For example, negligent or reckless behavior that actually brings about harm may 
amount to a serious crime such as manslaughter9 or even murder,10 whereas no offense 
whatsoever would be committed if the same kind of behavior happened to result in no 
harm11—or at most, depending on the kind of result that the action risked (e.g., death, 
bodily injuries, damage to property, etc.), or the way in which it created risk (driving a 
motor vehicle, handling firearms, keeping wild animals, selling food, etc.) it may amount 
to a relatively minor endangerment offense, like driving while intoxicated, or recklessly 
endangering another person.12 Thus, the justification of such general legal practice—that 
is, letting the crime result an action actually causes influence the amount of punishment 
to be imposed for that action—is what I shall be concerned with in this article.  As it is 
8 See Schulhofer, supra note 2 at 1498-1502; and J. C. Smith, supra note 2 (both finding that the same 
problem that manifests itself in the law of attempts also obtains in other criminal-law doctrines).
9 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 210.3 (a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (henceforth MPC).
10 See, e.g., United States v.  Fleming, 739 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.  1984) (affirming conviction of second degree 
murder under 18 USC § 1111(a)).
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12 See, e.g., MPC § 211.2 (“A person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which 
places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury”).  I borrow the expression 
“endangerment offense” from R.  A.  Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, La.  L.  Rev.  (forthcoming 
2005).
8normally the case in the relevant literature, I will often phrase the issue in terms of the 
justification of the relative punishment for attempts and accomplished crimes, all other 
things being equal—rather than in more general terms like the relative punishment for 
successful and unsuccessful offenses.  But the reader should be aware that it is the gen-
eral practice of differential punishment what will always be at stake.
The right place to begin with my inquiry is the economic analysis of the criminal law.  
Economic theories of the criminal law offer the simplest consequentialist, deterrence-
based theory of the criminal law in general, and of particular criminal-law arrangements 
in particular.  Under this economic approach, a criminal-law rule, such as a particular 
scheme of sanctions, is appropriate if it is a policy implication of the following two more 
general propositions.  First, that the goal of the criminal law ought to be the minimization 
of costs of crime—i.e., both the direct costs offenders impose on their victims through 
their criminal behavior, and the indirect costs of crime or enforcement costs.  And, 
second, that, as a matter of fact, the criminal law provides individuals with effective 
incentives not to engage in criminal behavior—i.e., that the threat of being punished 
deters would-be offenders—because individuals behave as well-informed, rational agents 
who seek to maximize their expected utility.13 All other plausible consequentialist 
13
 The seminal piece in the modern economic analysis of the criminal law is Gary S.  Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.  Pol.  Econ.  169 (1968).  Still, the roots of this approach may 
be traced to Beccaria and Bentham—see Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, in Cesare Beccaria, 
On Crimes and Punishments, and Other Writings 1 (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies trans., Cam-
bridge University Press 1995) (1764); and Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation (J.  H.  Burns & H.L.A.  Hart eds., Clarendon Press 1996) (1789), esp.  chapters XIII & 
XIV.  Valuable surveys of the economic literature that followed Becker’s 1968 essay may be found in Al-
9theories of the criminal law may be seen as somehow adjusting the core theses of this 
economic account.  
In Part I, I show that evaluating the practice of differential punishment with the 
theoretical tools that the economic approach offers leads to the conclusion that there are 
no reasons for adopting schemes of differential sanctions rather than schemes of equal 
sanctions.  After sketching what I will call the basic model of deterrence, I focus on the 
arguments that deterrence scholars have advanced in defense of differential punishment. I 
show that none of them survive a close scrutiny. In particular, I refute the argument, that 
deterrence theorists often raise,14 that once considerations of marginal deterrence are 
properly factored in, the theory warrants the prescription that failed attempts should be 
punished less severely than accomplished crimes.  I demonstrate that the same marginal 
incentives that may be created by a practice of differential punishment may also be 
created by a practice of equal punishment.
The economic literature on the criminal law offers another argument that is worth 
considering in detail. According to this argument, the choice between differential and 
equal punishment would affect the set of incentives potential victims have to invest in 
self-protective measures against crime in a way that makes the former socially more 
vin K.  Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, Nomos XXVII: Criminal Justice 289, 290-7 (J.  Ro-
land Pennock & John W.  Chapman eds., 1985); and, more recently, Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and 
the Market for Offenses, 10 J.  Econ.  Persp.  49 (1996); and A.  Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The 
Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J.  Econ.  Lit.  45 (2000).
14
 Most notably Richard Posner—see Richard A.  Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 
Colum.  l.  Rev.  1193, 1217-8 (1985).
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desirable than the latter.15 I conclude Part I deploying an argument that proves that it is 
simply not the case that under criminal laws that observe the practice differential 
punishment potential victims have different incentives than under criminal laws that 
observe an alternative practice of equal punishment. 
Now, empirical confirmation of the predictions of deterrence effects based on the 
economic theory of the criminal law has been elusive.16 A convincing explanation of this 
apparent failure is that the economic account is too thin: the mechanisms through which 
criminal-law practices may influence people’s behavior are richer than the simple story 
depicted by the economic theory.17 Recent deterrence scholarship has endeavored to find 
theoretical strategies to amend or adjust the traditional economic approach in order to get 
a sufficiently richer account.  Two basic approaches have arisen.  According to one of 
these approaches, criminal-law variables interact with other non-legal mechanisms of be-
havioral control—like standing social norms and individuals’ moral commitments—in 
ways that can be predicted and therefore factored into a deterrence model.18 According to 
15
 The argument is due to Omri Ben-Shahar and Alon Harel—see Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The 
Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145 U.  Pa.  L.  Rev.  299 
(1996) [Victim-Centered Perspective]; also, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private 
Precautions against Crime, 11 J.  L., Econ.  & Org.  434, 449 (1995) [Blaming the Victim].
16
 For the most recent review of available empirical evidence, see Paul H.  Robinson & John M.  Darley, 
Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 Oxford J.  Legal Stud.  173 (2004).
17 See, e.g., Dan M.  Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 Mich.  L.  
Rev.  2477 (1997).
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Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.  Chi.  L.  Rev.  943, 968-72 (1995).  According to Les-
sig’s account, statutes banning dueling by threat of punishment were largely ineffective.  The reason was 
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the other approach, individuals’ perceptions of the relevant criminal-law variables often 
diverge from the assumptions of perfect rationality and full information due to robust and 
systematic psychological processes that bias people’s cognitive and judgmental abilities.  
A properly enriched deterrence model should then pay heed to these biases.19 In Parts II 
that the same moral commitments that led elite men to dueling, led them to disregarding the threat of pun-
ishment as a relevant reason for avoiding dueling—avoiding dueling for fear of being punished was a sign 
of cowardice, such as avoiding dueling for fear of being defeated by the other combatant was.  In contrast, 
statutes that instead of prohibiting dueling, made duelers ineligible for public office were (or could have 
been if duly enforced) more effective.  For the same elite men that felt obliged by a duty to defend their 
honor through dueling also felt obliged by a duty to “serve their states” by holding public office.  As a con-
sequence of such norm of public service, statutes excluding duelers from public office—unlike criminal 
statutes banning dueling by threat of punishment—did give elite men a reason to avoid duel ing: “The 
state’s action here served to ambiguate a gentleman’s duty, and thereby facilitated the transformation of the 
social meaning of dueling itself.  Against the background that the state has reconstructed, to choose to duel 
would be to choose to serve private interests over collective duty” (ibid., at 972).  For useful overviews of 
the relevant literature on law and social norms, see Robert C.  Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers 
Social Norms, 27 J.  Legal Stud.  537 (1998) and, more recently, Robert E.  Scott, The Limits of Behavioral 
Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 Va.  L.  Rev.  1603 (2000).
19
 That is very much in the way of what has been called “Behavioral Law and Economics.” Behavioral law 
and economics seeks to enrich traditional economic models of the law by adjusting the assumptions of 
human behavior these models rely upon—basically, rational choice accounts of decision making—with the 
findings of experimental behavioral sciences.  For a useful overview of the behavioral law and economics 
research agenda, see Christine Jolls, Cass R.  Sunstein & Richard H.  Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, in Behavioral Law & Economics 13 (Cass R.  Sunstein ed.  2000); see also, Scott, su-
pra note 18, at 1639-46 (reviewing recent work in behavioral law and economics and underscoring some 
reasons to be cautious about some of its generalizations).  For an example of this approach in the criminal 
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and III I explore the paths these two approaches have opened and see whether, once we 
adjust the deterrence account along those lines, a justification of the practice of 
differential punishment arises.  And it does. 
Drawing on social and psychological research I propose three new arguments for 
differential punishment and against equal punishment. Part II explores how people’s 
intuitive judgments on how the criminal law should be may impact on the effects of 
alternative schemes of sanctions. I develop an account that shows that, when people’s 
normative intuitions are that successful crimes should be punished more severely than 
unsuccessful crimes, the scheme of sanctions that maximizes deterrence is a scheme of 
differential sanctions.
Then, in Part III, I show how taking into account the effects of what psychologists call 
hindsight-bias effects, and other phenomena affecting how people perceive, and retrieve 
from memory information about crime and criminal-law responses to crime may alter the 
prescriptions that traditional economic models yield under the assumption that there is no 
noise between the relevant legal rules and what individuals perceive of them. In 
particular, I argue that once those phenomena are duly taken into account, it may be 
observed that schemes of differential sanctions offer two advantages over schemes of 
equal sanctions. First, in an environment plagued with hindsight-bias effects, schemes of 
differential sanctions facilitate the perception that expected punishment rises with the 
probability of criminal actions causing harm—a desirable property of a scheme of 
sanctions. Second, when unsuccessful instances of a kind of criminal action are poorly 
law area, see Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on 
the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 Am.  L.  & Econ.  Rev.  276 (1999). 
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salient and later on hardly available from memory, punishing them would barely 
contribute to the achievement of deterrence effects. In those cases, the best policy would 
be to adopt schemes of sanctions whereby only accomplished instances of the relevant 
kind of criminal actions are subject to punishment.
Finally, I offer a brief conclusion.
I.  OPTIMAL DETERRENCE
A.  The Basic model of deterrence
According to the economic theory of the criminal law, we should design our criminal-
law practices assuming that individuals are well-informed rational beings who act in the 
way that maximizes their expected utility.  The assumption that agents are rational utility 
maximizers yields the prediction that they will engage in the commission of an act if, and 
only if, the gain they draw from it exceed its costs.  Using the criminal law to deter agents 
from committing such an act requires fixing an amount of punishment, f, such that the 
costs of so acting offset the gain agents would obtain from committing the act—and so 
depriving them of their utility-based reasons for committing it.  If society has an interest 
in deterring harmful acts through the criminal law, it may attach such a punishment to 
any act that actually causes harm.
Apprehending, prosecuting, convicting, and punishing offenders involve costs—so 
much that it is typically the case that the fraction of offenders being actually punished is 
rather low.20 But, even in the absence of budget restrictions, the fraction of offenders 
20
 Indeed, according to the F.B.I., Uniform Crime Reports 205 (2000), the national clearance rate for seven 
index crimes (murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny, and motor vehicle theft) was only 20.5 % in the year 2000.  Notice that not all cleared-up cases end 
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worth punishing will be less than one hundred percent.  Since, on the one hand, 
apprehending, prosecuting, convicting, and punishing more and more offenders involves 
increasing costs; and, on the other, the social benefits of achieving higher levels of crime 
reduction decrease as the crime rate shrinks, there will be a number of crimes worth 
tolerating—for the marginal costs of punishing them will exceed the marginal benefits of 
raising the probability of punishment up to that level.21 Thus, at the time t when the 
deterrent mechanism is to operate—that is, at the time when the agent decides to perform 
the act that causes harm—the probability of the agent being caught, prosecuted, and 
punished if she commits the crime will be less than unity.  (I will refer to this probability 
with the letter p.) Accordingly, for punishment to meet at t the gain the agent expects to 
obtain from the act, the amount of f must be fixed in such a value that, when discounted 
by p, the expected costs to the agent—a partial function of pf—equal her expected gain.
Let  stand for a kind of action we want to deter in virtue of the fact that  normally 
brings about a bad state of affairs R. Suppose we condition the imposition of punishment 
to the acts actually causing R—thus letting -ers go unpunished if their acts fail to cause 
R. Now, when agents decide to commit  they cannot tell with certainty whether R will 
obtain or not. Either because we are epistemically limited beings with limited knowledge 
about the world’s actual causal laws, or because the world’s actual causal laws are objec-
in a conviction, while some lead to more than one conviction.  The clearance rate, thus, does not necessarily 
coincide with the probability of being sanctioned, though it may offer some approximation.  Drawing on 
statistics of the early 1990’s, Paul Robinson and John Darley report that the overall conviction rate of those 
arrested for the same seven index crimes was as low as 1.5 %—see Paul H.  Robinson & John M.  Darley, 
The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw.  U.  L.  Rev.  453, 458-61 (1997).
21 See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 13 at 51-2.
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tively probabilistic, or both, the fact is that, realistically, we may only predict of any 
instance of  that it may cause R with such and such probability. (I will use the letter q to 
refer to this measure of the probability of the action causing R.) So, if the imposition of 
punishment is conditioned to the act actually causing R, then the value of the punishment 
at t will also be discounted by the probability of the act actually bringing about R (or q).  
Therefore, to achieve deterrence, the value of f must be set in such a level that, when 
discounted by p and q, it equals the agent’s expected gains.
That present discounted value of the possibility of a future sanction—or expected 
punishment—is the key piece of the deterrent mechanism.  If this expected punishment is 
(at least) equal to the expected gain the agent may assign to the act, then the utility 
maximizer agent will refrain from committing the act. As the agent’s expected gains from 
acting criminally increase, deterrence may be achieved by proportional increases of the 
expected punishment, which the government may achieve by manipulating the frequency 
with which offenders are caught and punished (and hence p), and the amount of 
punishment to be imposed (f). 
One way of increasing the variable p is to add sanctions for failed attempts (i.e., for 
instances of  that fail to cause R), thus dropping off the conditionality of punishment on 
the act actually causing R. Agents will thus face a sanction both in the probable event that 
the act succeeds in causing R (i.e., the sanction for the accomplished crime, fr) and in the 
complementarily probable event that the act fails to bring it about (i.e., the sanction for 
the attempt, fa).  The probability of an agent being punished for performing a particular 
action is higher under a scheme of sanctions whereby the action is punishable whatever 
its outcome (i.e., both if it fails and if succeeds in causing R), than under a scheme 
16
whereby the action is punishable only on the condition that it actually causes R.  For 
under the former, a sanction will be imposed on the agent with probability p, whereas 
under the latter the probability of punishment being imposed will be discounted by the 
probability of the action actually causing R, or q—and so, a sanction will be imposed 
with probability qp (which is, of course, lower than p).22
Suppose, then, that we choose to punish both successful and unsuccessful instances of 
:23 How should the sanction for the attempt (or fa) be as compared to the sanction for the 
accomplished crime (or fr)?
Under a scheme of sanctions whereby both attempts and accomplished crimes are 
punishable, the expected punishment for any particular action results from the sum of the 
value of the sanction for the event the action causes harm, discounted by the product of 
the probability of the action causing harm and the probability of such sanction being im-
posed on the agent, on the one hand, and the value of the sanction for the event the action 
fails, discounted by the product of the probability of the action not causing harm and the 
22 See Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 435, 436 (1990) 
(“Punishing attempts thus increases deterrence by expanding the set of circumstances in which sanctions 
are imposed”).
23
 All other things being equal, it would be irrational not to do it if, as Shavell argues, “the punishment of 
attempts is a socially inexpensive means of increasing the probability [of sanctions being imposed], since 
opportunities to punish attempts often arise as a byproduct of society’s investment in apprehending parties 
who actually do harm.” Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a 
Deterrent, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1232, 1250 (1985). See also Shavell, supra note 22 at 442.
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probability of this sanction being imposed on the agent, on the other.  Formally, this idea 
may be expressed in the following equation:24
Ef = qprfr + (1 – q)pafa
where Ef stands for “expected punishment,” pr and pa for the probabilities of the sanction 
being imposed if the act succeeds or fails in bringing about the harm, respectively (which 
are likely to be different), q for the probability of the action actually causing harm, (1 – q) 
for the complementary probability of the action not causing harm, and fr and fa for the 
sanctions for the accomplished offense and for the failed attempt, respectively.
The model’s deterrent mechanism, let us recall, relies on the expected punishment the 
agent faces at the time when she decides to commit the criminal act, and not on the actual
punishment eventually meted out to her.  Under the model, punishment influences be-
havior by adding costs to a kind of act, which costs the agent is expected to consider in 
deciding to engage in an act of that kind.  But when the agent makes her last decision to-
wards the act—e.g., when she pulls the trigger of the gun aimed at the victim—she can-
not know for sure whether her act will succeed in causing harm, and, in any event, 
whether she will be sanctioned.  The most she can know at that time is the value of the 
different possible outcomes discounted by the probability of their occurrence, which 
leads, through a simple probabilistic calculus, to the value of the expected punishment.  If 
punishment influences the decision of the rational utility maximizer agent, it could only 
be through the consideration of that probability-discounted value—or so the model as-
sumes.
24
 I draw the equation from Shavell’s model of punishment for attempts—see Shavell, supra note 22, at 
438-9.
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On the other hand, and crucially, the model yields that, for any probability of being 
sanctioned, and any probability of succeeding in bringing about R, the same amount of 
expected punishment may be achieved by different combinations of sanctions for 
attempts and accomplished crimes.  Attempts and accomplished crimes may be punished 
with equal sanctions, or with sanctions of different relative severity—and, in this case, 
attempts may be punished either more or less severely than accomplished crimes—
insofar as the sum of the products of the values of those sanctions by their corresponding 
probability of being sanctioned, and the probability of succeeding and failing, yields the 
required expected punishment.25
This indicates that, as far as the basic model of deterrence is concerned, the goal of 
deterrence does not seem to be the right place to look for a justification of the practice of 
differential punishment.  To ground the practice of differential punishment in the goal of 
deterrence as such is to demonstrate that, for any kind of action  that may cause crime 
result R with probability q, there are fewer instances of  (because  is more effectively 
25 See Shavell, ibid. at 441.  The point can be easily shown by a numerical example of the sort those Shavell 
relies upon.  Suppose an agent, A, engages in the commission of a criminal action, , with a probability of 
succeeding that equals 0.6.  Let us assume that the probability of A being punished if the act succeeds is 
0.5, and 0.3 if it fails.  Finally assume that an expected punishment of 42 units of disutility is both 
necessary and sufficient for deterring A from -ing.  Given the stated values, we can set a scheme of 
punishment according to which the accomplished crime is punished more severely than the attempt, 
punishing, e.g., the former with a sanction of 120, and the latter with a sanction of 50—for 0.6 x 0.5 x 120 
+ 0.4 x 0.3 x 50 = 42.  Alternatively, we can set a scheme of punishment whereby both the accomplished 
crime and the attempt are punished with equal sanctions of 100—for 0.6 x 0.5 x 100 + 0.4 x 0.3 x 100 = 42.  
We can even decide to punish less severely the accomplished crime than the attempt, attaching the former 
to a sanction of 50, and the latter to a sanction of 225—for 0.6 x 0.5 x 50 + 0.4 x 0.3 x 225 = 42.
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deterred) under a scheme of differential sanctions whereby -doers are punished more 
severely when R actually obtains than when it does not, than under any scheme of equal 
sanctions whereby -doers are punished with identical sanctions independently of 
whether R obtains or not.  Under the model, however, deterrence is a function of the 
expected punishment agents face in deciding to commit ; so that, in the aggregate, all 
other things being equal, the higher the expected punishment, the smaller the number of 
individuals who are willing to do .  In turn, any given level of expected punishment, and 
therefore any given level of deterrence, may be equally achieved by a scheme of 
differential sanctions or by a scheme of equal sanctions.  It follows that there is no level 
of deterrence that may be achieved through a scheme of differential sanctions that cannot 
be also achieved by a scheme of equal sanctions—which amounts to saying that we 
cannot justify the practice of differential punishment by pointing to the goal of 
deterrence.
Put another way, the upshot of this section goes as follows.  The point of my inquiry is 
to see whether we have reasons to adopt schemes of differential sanctions whereby suc-
cessful offenders are punished more severely than unsuccessful offenders, all other things 
being equal, rather than schemes of equal sanctions whereby both successful and unsuc-
cessful offenders receive identical punishment.  Deterrence-based theories of the criminal 
law state that it is a reason for favoring a criminal-law arrangement that it is more effec-
tive in deterring crimes than its alternatives.  The basic model of deterrence offers a sim-
ple account of the mechanism through which a criminal-law arrangement may produce 
deterrence (namely, expected punishment), which may be used to assess competing 
criminal-law arrangements—so, if an arrangement yields higher expected punishment 
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than its alternatives, there will be a reason based on deterrence to prefer it over the alter-
natives.  For any scheme of differential sanctions yielding a given amount of expected 
punishment there is a scheme of equal sanctions that yields an expected punishment of 
the same amount.  It follows that each of these two schemes is as good as the other as re-
gards its deterrent effectiveness; and so there are no deterrence-based reasons to prefer 
one to the other.26
26
 My argument follows the essentials of Shavell’s model of punishment for attempts—see supra note 22. 
Shavell rightly argues that the conclusion that the model yields—that is, that sanctions for attempts need 
not be different from the sanctions for all-else-equal accomplished crimes—holds if people (including 
courts) are able to gather all the relevant information. He then proves that if the courts are unable to 
ascertain the probability of actions causing harm (i.e., the variable q in the model), while offenders are not, 
the appropriate sanction for an attempt may be lower than the sanction for the corresponding accomplished 
crime—see supra note 22 at 442-4, 463-6.  Though correct, Shavell’s argument cannot amount to a defense 
of the legal practice of differential punishment.  Granted, if it were the case that courts are normally unable 
to ascertain the probability of actions causing harm, Shavell’s argument would have the advantage over 
traditional models of deterrence of building in a realistic assumption.  Disregarding such a fact—as the 
argument I presented in this section does—would deprive the analysis of normative force, rendering it 
unrealistic or unduly abstract.  However, courts do have sufficient information available to adequately infer 
the relevant probability of actions causing harm.  Certainly, courts (as well as offenders!) are normally 
unable to find out the true, objective probability of particular actions causing harm—if there is anything 
like that. Yet, that objective probability is not he relevant probability. What courts should be able to do 
according to the model is to replicate the estimation that a rational, well-informed individual could make as 
to the likelihood that an action like the one under judgment causes harm if performed under equivalent 
circumstances. See David Friedman, Impossibility, Subjective Probability, and Punishment for Attempts, 20 
J.  Legal Stud.  179 (1991) (arguing that it is this epistemic or subjective interpretation of probability that it 
is relevant). I see no principled way of maintaining that courts are normally not able to do that. If I am 
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A final remark is in order. In addition to the impact of a criminal-law arrangement on 
the aggregate number of crimes, there may be consequences of other sorts that the 
arrangement may bring about that could be relevant for a consequentialist assessment of 
it vis-à-vis other alternative arrangements.  For instance, if the costs of achieving any 
given level of expected punishment through a scheme of differential sanctions could be 
shown to be lower than the costs of achieving the same level of expected punishment 
through a scheme of equal sanctions, then there would be reasons for adopting the former 
rather than the latter. However, it does not seem to be such difference in favor of schemes 
of differential sanctions.27
right, then Shavell’s argument only amounts to a theoretical exercise with no policy implications—
whatever it proves, it does not serve the purpose of informing the choice regarding the scheme of sanctions 
we should adopt in the real world. 
27
 If the difference between the two competing schemes of sanctions is only who are the individuals 
selected to be actually punished—so that, under the scheme of differential sanctions all of the convicted are 
successful offenders, whereas under the scheme of equal sanctions some of them are unsuccessful ones—
there will be obviously no differences in enforcement costs. The issue is somewhat more opaque when the 
frequency of sanctions being imposed and the sanction severity differ from one scheme to the other. 
Consider two competing schemes of sanctions, Scheme D and Scheme E, established for a given type of 
criminal action, , which causes the crime result R with some probability. Scheme D is a scheme of 
differential sanctions whereby only consummated instances of  (i.e., those actually causing R) are 
punished, the sanction being imprisonment for a time representing the amount f of disutility. In turn, 
Scheme E is a scheme of equal sanctions whereby both consummated and unconsummated instances of 
are punished, and both with the same sanction: a prison term representing the amount f* of disutility. 
Scheme D and Scheme E yield the same amount of expected punishment (as measured in units of 
disutility), and hence, according to the predictions of the model, achieve the same level of deterrence. Now, 
under Scheme E sanctions are imposed relatively more often than under Scheme D, for there are some 
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opportunities to impose sanctions that are forgone under the latter (i.e., offenders who are let off just 
because their actions do not cause R), but not under the former, without the converse being the case. Since 
the probability of sanctions being imposed is thus higher under Scheme E than under Scheme D, it must be 
the case that the individual prison sentences imposed under Scheme E are shorter than those imposed under 
Scheme D—for both schemes yield the same expected punishment. Yet, the aggregate amount of sanctions 
actually administered (as measured in time units of imprisonment per person punished times the number of 
individuals punished) may be the same under both schemes. Indeed, it will be the same if the increase in 
sanction severity that Scheme D involves with respect to Scheme E (f rather than f*), which is proportional 
to the decrease in the frequency of sanction imposition, could be achieved through prison terms 
proportionally longer than those required to meet the level of severity of Scheme E’s sanctions. In such a 
case, the larger number of convictions under Scheme E will be offset by the proportionally larger sentences 
imposed under Scheme D. Provided the administrative costs of imprisonment are constant—i.e., the costs 
of keeping a person in prison are the same during the first year as during the nth year—there will then be no 
differences in costs between both competing schemes. However, if, more likely, the marginal disutility that 
prison sentences create decreases with the prison length, then any increase in the imposed disutility of n 
percent will necessitate a more than proportional (i.e., more than n percent) increase in the prison term. If 
so, the aggregate amount of sanctions imposed under Scheme D will be higher than under Scheme E, which 
implies that the latter is a cheaper alternative to the former. This argument is an application of a more 
general argument by Polinsky and Shavell addressing general issues regarding the tradeoffs between 
sanction severity and probability of sanction when the type of sanction at stake is imprisonment—see A.  
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of 
Deterrence, 28 J.  Legal Stud.  1 (1999). See also Posner, supra note 14, at 1213-4 (advancing a similar 
argument but focusing only on the criminal’s discount rate). On the hypothesis of the decreasing marginal 
disutility of imprisonment, see Michael K.  Block & Robert C.  Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes 
Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J.  Legal Stud.  479, 481 (1975) (stating the hypothesis and advancing 
several concurring explanations); John J.  DiIulio, Jr., Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public Policy, 
10 J.  Econ.  Persp.  3, 16-7 (1996) (discussing some empirical findings on “present-orientedness”); and 
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In sum, then, as far as the basic model of deterrence is concerned,  there is no reason 
to hold the practice of differential punishment rather than the practice of equal 
punishment. The model is neutral as to the issue of the relative punishment of successful 
and unsuccessful offenses.
B.  Marginal Deterrence
The basic model of deterrence I introduced in the previous section does not answer 
the question as to what is the proper level of expected punishment a scheme of sanctions 
for a particular kind of act should create.  (The model just explains how our practice of 
punishing offenders for actions of a given kind may affect the decision of prospective 
offenders of committing actions of that kind—under the model, their willingness to 
commit such acts is a decreasing function of the expected punishment that our criminal-
law practice yields for actions of that kind.) Theories of optimal deterrence provide such 
an answer.
In the economic literature there are two basic theories of optimal deterrence for the 
criminal law,28 which for convenience I dub the Becker model,29 and the Posner model.30
According to the Becker model, criminal-law policies ought to be set so that offenders 
Robinson & Darley, supra note 16 at 187-9 (reviewing empirical psychological literature on the so-called 
“hedonic adaptation” effect).
28 See Keith N.  Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law (Boston 
University School of Law, Working Paper Series, Law and Economics Working Paper No.  02-17, June 
2002) (distinguishing both approaches and developing a model that combines both accounts).
29
 After Gary Becker—see Becker, supra note 13.
30
 After Richard Posner—see supra note 14.
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internalize the social loss their criminal behavior creates.  So, the optimal sanction for a 
given crime is such that, when discounted by the probability of its imposition, it equals 
the expected social loss associated with the crime.  Thus, the crime will be committed 
whenever the offender draws from it an expected gain that exceeds the crime’s expected 
social loss.  In turn, under the Posner model, criminal-law policies ought to be set so as to 
eliminate offenders’ prospect of gain from criminal activity, and thus effect complete 
deterrence.  The optimal expected sanction for a given crime is such that it just outweighs 
the expected gain the offender draws from the offense.  My argument in the previous 
section is that, whatever the theory of optimal deterrence one may adopt, the level of 
expected punishment for a given kind of act that such a theory requires can be achieved 
either by a scheme of differential sanctions or by a scheme of equal sanctions.
Now, according to any plausible theory of optimal deterrence, if there is more than one 
single offense to be deterred, schemes of sanctions must be so devised as to provide 
offenders who have already decided to engage in criminal activity with incentives to 
minimize the harmful effects of their criminal actions by choosing less serious crimes 
rather than more serious ones, or fewer crimes rather than more crimes.  This idea may be 
expressed by the claim that criminal laws should provide prospective offenders with 
marginal incentives to minimize the number and seriousness of the crimes they commit, 
or effect marginal deterrence.31 It is sometimes claimed that, under this prescription that 
31
 On marginal deterrence, generally, see George J.  Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, in Essays 
in the Economics of Crime and Punishment 55, 56-8 (Gary S.  Becker & William M.  Landes eds., 1974) 
(introducing the problem of marginal deterrence after Becker’s seminal paper).  For a recent elaboration, 
see David Friedman & William Sjostrom, Hanged for a Sheep—The Economics of Marginal Deterrence, 
12 J.  Legal Stud.  345 (1993).  As it happens with several other insights of the economic approach to the 
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criminal laws should effect marginal deterrence, a deterrence-based theory of punishment 
could accommodate the practice of differential punishment.32 The purpose of this section 
is to explore this possibility.  I argue that bringing in considerations of marginal 
deterrence does not alter the conclusion arrived at in the previous section.  But before 
turning to the discussion of the relevant arguments, let me stress the following remark, 
which, I hope, will prevent possible misunderstandings.  
There seem to be good grounds for the claim that the prescription of effecting mar-
ginal deterrence requires punishing incomplete attempts33 less severely than accom-
criminal law, the central idea of marginal deterrence was already present in Bentham’s work—see supra 
note 13, at 165-74.
32 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 14, at 1217-8; Isaac Ehrlich, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws and the 
Concept of Justice: A Positive Analysis, 2 Int’l Rev.  L.  & Econ.  3, 7 (1982); Richard G.  Gervase, Jr., 
Grading Criminal Attempts—A Proposed Solution for Statutory Reform in Sentencing, 20 Rutgers L.J.  479 
(1989); Mark Perlman, Punishing Acts and Counting Consequences, 37 Ariz.  L.  Rev.  227, 230-1 (1995).  
However, see Shavell, supra note 23 at 1244-5 & 1251-2 (briefly contesting arguments of that sort); and 
supra note 22, at 455-6 (same).
33
 The distinction between complete and incomplete attempts is common among criminal law scholars—
see, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 347-8 (2d ed.  1995).  A complete attempt is an ac-
tion that falls short from meeting the corresponding accomplished crime legal definition only in that it 
failed to actually cause the crime result.  For example, if intentionally killing you by stabbing you in the 
chest is sufficient for meeting the requirements of the legal definition of accomplished murder, then stab-
bing you in the chest in the same way and with identical intentions but without actually killing you (say, 
because you are saved by an extraordinary medical intervention) would amount to a complete attempted 
murder.  In turn, an incomplete attempt is an action committed in the course of completing an attempt, that 
is sufficiently close to completing that attempt, but that falls short of being a complete attempt as illustrated 
in the following example.  Suppose, again, that intentionally killing you by stabbing you in the chest would 
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plished crimes.34 Indeed, once the agent engages in the perpetration of a crime by 
performing the first punishable step of an incomplete attempt, punishment must be so de-
vised as to provide her with incentives not to go on to the following step—and the same 
with every step until completion.  Of course, the specific deterrent device is not the actual 
amount of punishment eventually meted out to the agent, but the expected punishment the 
agent faces for each step within the attempt.  So, in order to meet the prescription of mar-
ginal deterrence, the scheme of sanctions must be such that the expected punishment ade-
quately increases with every step closer to the completion of the offense.35 (The precise 
distribution of punishment for the different steps of the incomplete attempt is, however, a 
contested matter.36) Likewise, in performing the last step of the attempt, that is, the step 
amount to an accomplished murder and that I plan to murder you in such a way.  If I act in furtherance of 
such a plan, and the applicable law of attempts makes incomplete attempts punishable, this means that I 
would be eligible for punishment under such law of attempts at some point before actually stabbing you in 
the chest.  Let us say that I would reach that point when I start following you on your way home with the 
intention to stab you in the chest, thereby killing you, as soon as I have the opportunity to do so—see e.g., 
MPC § 5.01 (1)(c) & (2).  Thus, under the applicable law of attempts, if I follow you with the intention to 
stab you in the chest on your way home, I commit an attempted murder under the applicable law of at-
tempts.  But this attempt of mine would be an attempt in a sense other than that in which complete attempts 
are attempts.  My attempt would be an incomplete attempt.
34
 The essentials of the argument may be found in Beccaria, supra note 13, ch.  37.
35 See also Shavell, supra note 22, at 455-6.  For an alternative account of the same conclusion, see ibid., at 
452-4.
36 Compare Gervase, supra note 32, at 484-90 (defending a direct function of the degree of completion of 
the attempt) with Samuel Kramer, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt: Marginal Deterrence and 
the Optimal Structure of Sanctions, 81 J.  Crim.  L.  & Criminology 398 (1990) (advocating for a “para-
bolic scheme”).
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completing the attempt, the agent must face a higher expected punishment than that that 
she faced in the previous step.  If the probability of being sanctioned is constant, then the 
actual sanction set for the incomplete attempt should be, at any step, lower than the actual 
sanction set for the accomplished crime.37 (Notice that such conclusion does not follow if 
the probability of being sanctioned shifts upward with the completion of the attempt or 
with the occurrence of harm, in which case the expected punishment will be higher even 
if the actual sanction remains constant.)
But the argument that achieving marginal deterrence requires incomplete attempts to 
be punished less severely than accomplished crimes does not give support to the practice 
of differential punishment.  Justifying the practice of differential punishment involves 
showing that the actual causation of a crime result as such properly calls for (increased) 
punishment.  Thus, differential punishment would be justified if and only if actions that 
amount to accomplished crimes because they actually bring about a crime result should 
be punished more severely than actions that are equal to those actions in every respect 
except in the fact that they do not bring about a crime result.  Hence, an argument show-
ing that accomplished crimes should be punished more severely than incomplete attempts 
does simply not suffice if the reason why incomplete attempts should be punished more 
leniently does not apply to complete attempts.  And it does not.  Let me explain.  As I ar-
gued in the previous paragraph, marginal deterrence requires that the criminal law policy 
variables be set in such a way that the expected punishment for every incomplete attempt 
is lower than the expected punishment for the corresponding accomplished crime, so that 
37 See, however, Ben-Shahar & Harel, Victim-Centered Perspective, supra note 15 at 334 (contesting that 
marginal-deterrence goals should lead to reduced sanctions for incomplete attempts).
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the agent has an incentive not to follow her plan up to the point where she may accom-
plish the attempted crime.  Suppose, then, that the optimal expected punishment for the 
corresponding accomplished crime is n—where n is higher than the expected punishment 
set for the incomplete attempt.  According to my argument in the previous section, such 
expected punishment of n may be produced through a scheme of equal sanctions—for 
any amount of expected punishment that may be required to deter a particular harmful act 
may be achieved both by a scheme of differential sanctions and by a scheme of equal 
sanctions.  Under the assumption that the probability of punishment being imposed is 
constant, it follows that a deterrence-based theory of punishment is consistent with a 
scheme of sanctions under which incomplete attempts are punished less severely than ac-
complished crimes, whereas complete attempts are punished as severely as accomplished 
crimes.
So, if an argument based on the prescription that the criminal laws effect marginal 
deterrence gives reason for holding the practice of differential punishment and rejecting 
the alternative practice of equal punishment, it must show that complete attempts should 
be punished less severely than accomplished crimes, all other things being equal.  This I 
deny.  I argue instead that for a scheme of sanctions to secure marginal deterrence it need 
not be a scheme of differential sanctions.
For the very question of marginal deterrence to arise, there must be, at least, two acts 
standing in such a relation to each other that the agent, given her beliefs, intentions, op-
portunities and capacities, may either complement one with the other (e.g., killing the 
victim of the robbery), or substitute one for the other (e.g., stealing my neighbor’s expen-
sive car instead of his lawnmower).  Marginal deterrence requires that the criminal-law 
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policy variables be set so that the agent has an incentive not to complement a crime with 
another, and not to substitute a more serious crime for a less serious one.
Alegedly, under a practice of equal punishment there would not be incentives not to 
complement attempts that turn out to be unsuccessful with further attempts.  Richard Pos-
ner puts the point in the following terms:
If the punishment for attempted murder were the same as for murder, one who shot and 
missed (and was not caught immediately) might as well try again, for if he succeeds, he will 
be punished no more severely than for his unsuccessful attempt.38
Of course, if that second shot carried no increase in the expected punishment the 
agent faces in virtue of his having fired the first shot, it would be true that the criminal 
law gives the agent no incentive not to shoot again.  It is also true that under a scheme of 
differential sanctions the agent will have an incentive not to try again—for by trying 
again he will face the risk of being punished with the harsher sanction for accomplished 
murder.  But it does not follow from that claim that under a scheme of sanctions that ob-
serves the principle of equal punishment the agent will not have a marginal incentive not 
to shoot again.  A scheme of equal sanctions need not have such an infelicitous conse-
quence.  Indeed, if shooting twice is punished more severely than shooting only once, the 
agent will have an incentive not to endeavor the second shot after missing the first one, 
even under a scheme of equal sanctions.39 Notice that this is not just an ad hoc response 
in defense of equal punishment.  Rather, under any plausible theory of optimal deterrence 
shooting more than once should be punished more severely than shooting just once (all 
38
 Posner, supra note 14, at 1218.
39
 As far as I know, a similar response is only suggested by Steven Shavell—see Shavell, supra note 23, at 
1252; also, supra note 22, at 455-6.
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other things being equal), independently of the issue of equal versus differential punish-
ment.  Let me explain.
Consider a slightly different case.  Suppose I shoot at you firing two guns at the same 
time.  The probability that you die as a consequence of these two shots is higher than the 
probability that would have resulted had I fired only one shot—for the probability of 
causing harm by firing n shots (where n > 1) is higher, all other things being equal, than 
the probability of causing harm by firing just one shot.  Under any plausible theory of op-
timal deterrence, expected punishment should rise along with the probability of actions 
causing harm—and so, the amount of punishment for firing at you the two guns at the 
same time should be higher than the amount of expected punishment for firing at you just 
one shot.  In effect, under the Becker model, let us recall, the optimal sanction for a given 
crime is such that, when discounted by the probability of its imposition, it equals the ex-
pected social loss associated with the crime.  One of the variables of the expected social 
loss function is the expected harm to the crime’s victim, so that the higher the expected 
harm to the victim, the higher the expected social loss.  Consequently, the higher the ex-
pected harm to the victim, the higher the expected sanction required for optimal deter-
rence purposes.  The victim’s expected harm, in turn, is an increasing function of the 
harm the criminal action is likely to bring about, or is aimed at producing (call it R), and 
the probability of the criminal action causing R (which I term q).  So, for any R, the 
higher the q, the higher the expected harm to the victim, and, therefore, the higher the re-
quired expected sanction to achieve optimal deterrence.
On the other hand, the Posner model of gain-eliminating sanctions yields, in this re-
spect, the same result.  In effect, it seems reasonable to assume that the gains offenders 
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draw from their criminal actions stem, at least in part, from the successful completion of 
those actions.  That is to say, actions that fail to harm the victim (i.e., failed attempts) are 
less profitable (if profitable at all) to the offender than actions that succeed in harming the 
victim (i.e., accomplished crimes), all other things being equal.  Assessed in prospect, 
then, criminal actions’ profitability to offenders will be responsive to the probability of 
the action causing harm to the victim (or q): all other things being equal, the higher the 
probability of the criminal action causing harm to the victim, the greater the expected 
gain to the offender.  Since, under the Posner model, proper schemes of sanctions are 
such that expected punishment rises with the expected gain prospective offenders draw 
from their criminal actions, then it should be the case that the higher the probability of the 
criminal action causing harm to the victim, the higher the expected sanction for commit-
ting that action.
The general goal of achieving marginal deterrence, finally, also leads to the same 
conclusion.  Criminal laws effect marginal deterrence if they provide incentives for those 
who have already decided to engage in criminal activity to minimize the harmfulness of 
their offenses.  Thus, whenever an agent may choose between more than one course of 
action to bring about a given crime result R, marginal deterrence is achieved if and only if 
the criminal law gives the agent an incentive to choose the course of action that makes R
less probable.  In general, then, sanctions should be such that, for any attempt to cause R¸ 
expected punishment rises along with the probability of the attempt causing R.  
These arguments show that the amount of expected punishment I should face for fir-
ing at you two shots at the same time should be higher than the amount of expected pun-
ishment I should face for firing only one shot—for the expected punishment should rise 
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in proportion to the criminal action’s probability of causing harm.  Now, since, as I ar-
gued above, any amount of expected punishment that might be required to deter a par-
ticular action may be achieved by a scheme of equal sanctions whereby the agent receives 
the same actual sanction whether she success or fails in bringing about the crime result 
her action risks, it follows that in order to produce the optimal amount of expected 
punishment actual sanctions need not be distributed in accordance to a scheme of differ-
ential sanctions.  To illustrate the point, suppose that a scheme of equal sanctions is in 
place, whereby accomplished and attempted murders, all other things being equal, are 
punished with equal sanctions; that the severity of the actual sanctions imposed under this 
scheme increases in proportion to the probability of the action causing the victim’s death; 
and that the probability of sanctions being imposed (or p) is constant.  If I attempt to kill 
you by firing just one shot, I will receive a sanction of a given severity (f) with probabil-
ity p, no matter whether you die as a consequence of my action or not.  If instead I choose 
the alternative course of action of firing two guns at the same time—which will increase 
the probability that you die—I will receive a sanction proportionally more severe (f*, 
where f* > f) with probability p, irrespective of whether I succeed in killing you or fail.  
Thus, under this scheme of equal sanctions, the expected punishment rises along with the 
probability of the action causing the crime result (i.e., pf if I fire only one shot, and pf* if 
I fire two shots at the same time), and so I have an incentive to choose the course of ac-
tion that makes the crime result less probable (i.e., firing only one shot).
Now, let us go back to Posner’s example.  Nothing of relevance should change in the 
foregoing analysis if the pertinent alternative to firing just one shot at you is not firing 
two shots at the same time but firing two consecutive shots, as in Posner’s example.  Con-
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sider the scheme of equal sanctions I have just discussed.  Under such a scheme, my at-
tempting to kill you by firing one shot carries a sanction of severity f, which is imposed 
with probability p, irrespective of whether the attempt succeeds or fails.  Suppose that I 
shoot at you and miss.  I will receive, in virtue of that failed attempt, a sanction of sever-
ity f with probability p.  Since I am not immediately caught, I consider trying again by 
firing a second shot.  I will have an incentive not to fire this second shot if I risk some 
punishment for this second shot in addition to the probability p of being imposed a sanc-
tion of severity f I already face in virtue of having fired the first shot.  And, of course, a 
scheme of equal sanctions may provide such an incentive.  Consider the following two 
possibilities.
The first possibility involves dealing with the second shot as though it were an of-
fense independent of the first.  Suppose that firing this second shot, individually consid-
ered, will impose on you the same risk of dying as the first shot, individually considered, 
imposed.  Under this first possibility, firing the second shot, individually considered, will 
also carry a sanction of severity f to be imposed with probability p, whatever the actual 
outcome of the attempt.  (For f is a function of the probability of the action causing the 
crime result, which is the same for each individual shot, and p is assumed to be constant.) 
So, if I fire the second shot, I will expose myself, in virtue of this second shot, to a prob-
ability p of receiving a sanction of severity f whatever the outcome of the shot, in addi-
tion to the probability p of receiving a sanction of severity f in virtue of my having fired 
the first shot.  The aggregate expected punishment for firing the two consecutive shots, 
under this possible scheme of equal sanctions, will thus be 2pf, which is twice as high as 
the expected punishment for firing only the first shot.
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The second possibility is to treat both consecutive shots as part of a single course of 
action—the course of action being attempting to kill you with two consecutive shots.  All 
other things being equal, the probability that you die if I attempt to kill you with two con-
secutive shots is higher that the probability that you die if I attempt to kill you with only 
one shot.  Suppose, to simplify, that the probability that you die if I attempt to kill you 
with two consecutive shots is as high as the probability that you die if I fired the two 
shots at the same time.40 This being so, the optimal sanction for attempting to kill you 
40
 Let A be the event of you dying as a consequence of shot number one, and B the event of you dying as a 
consequence of shot number two.  The probability that you die if I attempt to kill you with two consecutive 
shots would be as high as the probability that you die if I fire two concomitant shots if the probability that 
you die as a consequence of shot number one, or P(A), is independent of the probability that you die as a 
consequence of shot number two, or P(B) in both scenarios.  The relevant probability I create in the sce-
nario where both shots are fired concomitantly, and in the scenario where both shots are fired consecutively 
is the probability that you die as a consequence either of shot number one or of shot number two—or P(A 
or B).  In the first scenario, A and B are not mutually exclusive, for you may die as a consequence of both 
shot number one and shot number two (say, if both bullets hit your brain at the same time).  So, in such a 
scenario,
(1) P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B) – P(A & B) = P(A) + P(B) – P(A) x P(B)
In turn, in the scenario where I attempt to kill you by firing two consecutive shots, A and B are mutually 
exclusive—for I fire shot number two only if you did not die as a consequence of shot number one.  The 
probability that you die as a consequence of shot number two should then be discounted by the probability 
that you not die as a consequence of shot number one, or [1 – P(A)].  Thus, in this second scenario,
(2) P(A or B) = P(A) + [1 – P(A)] x P(B)
For any pair of probabilities P(A) and P(B), ecuation (1) and ecuation (2) yield equal results.  See, e.g., 
John A.  Rice, Mathematical Statistics and Data Analysis 4-6 (2d ed.  1995).  To illustrate, take the follow-
ing numerical example.  Suppose P(A) = 0.6, and P(B) = 0.6.  In the scenario of two concomitant shots, 
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with two consecutive shots should be the same as the optimal sanction for attempting to 
kill you by firing two shots at the same time.  I argued above that the optimal sanction for 
attempting to kill you by firing two concomitant shots is a sanction of severity f*, which 
is proportionally higher than the optimal sanction f for attempting to kill you by firing just 
one shot.  The same should hold for attempting to kill you with two consecutive shots.  
Thus, under this second possibility, by firing the second shot I will expose myself to the 
probability p of receiving a sanction of severity f* – f (i.e., the difference between the 
sanction for shooting twice and the sanction for shooting only once) whatever the out-
come of the shot, in addition to the probability p of receiving a sanction of severity f, to 
which I am already exposed in virtue of my having fired the first shot.  In other words, 
under this possible scheme of equal sanctions, the expected sanction for firing two con-
secutive shots will be pf*, which is higher than the expected punishment for firing just 
one shot, or pf.
In sum, as the foregoing examples illustrate, there is no need to adopt a scheme of dif-
ferential sanctions in order to create proper marginal incentives in repeated attempt cases 
like Posner’s example.  Marginal deterrence in such repeated attempt scenarios may be 
achieved by schemes of equal sanctions as well as by schemes of differential sanctions.  
Posner’s point, then, is a non sequitur.
A final note is in order.  My argument assumes that for any level f of required sanc-
tion severity, there is a possible treatment that we can impose on the convicted as a way 
of punishment, which treatment meets f.  And this assumption may not hold.  There may 
P(A or B) = 0.6 + 0.6 – 0.6 x 0.6 = 0.84.  In turn, in the scenario of two consecutive shots, P(A or B) = 0.6 
+ 0.4 x 0.6 = 0.84.  
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be—as indeed there are—constraints on how we can act on the convicted as a way of 
punishing them, which in turn may set an upper bound to the level of severity we may 
produce through punishment.  If we think of imprisonment, for instance, as the appropri-
ate kind of treatment, an upper bound will be set by the offender’s remaining lifetime—
for offenders cannot be imprisoned for a time longer than their remaining lifetime.  When 
a particular sanction reaches its upper bound, we say that the level of severity this sanc-
tion produces is maximal—or, to abbreviate, that the sanction is maximal.  That is, there 
is no higher level of severity we may produce through punishment.
Maximal sanctions pose an unsurmountable problem for the goal of marginal deter-
rence.  Once an offender becomes, in virtue of the crimes she has committed, eligible for 
a maximal sanction, by the same token she will become deterrence-proof for any further 
crime she might be willing to commit.41 Thus, if the sanction for, say, murder is maximal, 
then once an agent has murdered one person, she will have no incentive based on the 
criminal law not to go on and kill other people—or, by the way, commit any other crime 
she might want to commit.  It is an unavoidable, infelicitous byproduct of any maximal 
sanction that it makes marginal deterrence impossible.
Now, Posner’s example of consecutive shots would make sense under the assumption 
that punishment for accomplished murder must be maximal, and that a scheme of equal 
41
 I assume that the probability of sanctions being imposed is constant.  This is of course a simplifying as-
sumption.  The probability of sanctions being imposed may rise along with the number of crimes the agent 
performs.  If so, even though the actual sanction the agent risks by committing further crimes will be the 
same (i.e., the maximal sanction), the expected punishment will increase.  However, at some point the ex-
pected punishment will reach its maximal level—ideally, when the probability of the maximal sanction 
being imposed equals unity.  At that point, then, the offender will become deterrence-proof.
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sanctions for attempted and accomplished murder must then be a scheme of sanctions 
whereby offenders obtain a maximal sanction independently of whether they succeed in 
killing their victims, or not.  Given these assumptions, it follows that under such scheme 
of equal sanctions “one who shot and missed (and was not caught immediately) might as 
well try again, for if he succeeds, he will be punished no more severely than for his un-
successful attempt.” These assumptions may rescue Posner’s argument from the charge 
of fallacy, but at the cost of rendering it uninteresting and inconclusive.  Let me explain.
As I argued above, maximal sanctions make marginal deterrence impossible; so, un-
der any scheme of sanctions that includes maximal sanctions the same sort of problems 
will arise: once an agent performs the act in virtue of which she is eligible for the maxi-
mal sanction, she will become deterrence-proof.  The problem Posner’s example under-
scores, then, is not attributable to the fact that the relevant scheme of sanctions is a 
scheme of equal sanctions, but to the fact that it is a scheme that includes a maximal 
sanction for firing the first shot.  Since, in addition, there is no a priori reason why pun-
ishment for accomplished murder should be maximal, and therefore no reason why pun-
ishment under a scheme of equal sanctions for attempted and accomplished murder 
should be maximal, then taking this latter scheme of equal sanctions, rather than other 
possible scheme of equal sanctions, as the relevant example of equal punishment, renders 
the argument ad hoc.
One might still think that even though Posner’s argument does not prove the general 
proposition that successful offenders should be punished more severely than unsuccessful 
offenders, all other things being equal, it does prove that a scheme of differential sanc-
tions whereby the successful offender receives a maximal sanction and the unsuccessful 
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offender receives a less than maximal sanction is better than a scheme of sanctions 
whereby both successful and unsuccessful offenders equally receive the maximal sanc-
tion—for, as Posner stresses, under the latter there will be no marginal incentives not to 
try again after the first failed attempt.  So, if those were the only two alternatives, there 
will be a deterrence-based reason to choose the scheme of differential sanctions rather 
than the scheme of equal sanctions.  However, this is not necessarily true.  Assuming the 
probability of sanctions being imposed to be constant, the expected punishment that pro-
spective offenders would face for firing the first shot is higher under the scheme of equal 
sanctions (or Scheme E) than under the scheme of differential sanctions (or Scheme D).  
Since, on the one hand, the expected punishment results from the sum of the two alterna-
tive sanctions the offender can receive (the sanction for the attempt, and the sanction for 
the accomplished crime) discounted by the probability of each sanction being imposed on 
the offender, and, on the other, all the variables that contribute to the expected punish-
ment are equal under both Scheme E and Scheme D, except for the fact that the sanction 
for the attempt in Scheme E is higher than the sanction for the attempt in Scheme D—for 
the former is maximal, and the latter is less than maximal—it follows that the expected 
punishment for firing the first shot is higher under Scheme E than under Scheme D.  Un-
der Scheme E, prospective offenders face a probability p of receiving a maximal sanction 
whatever the outcome of their shot, whereas under Scheme D they face a probability p of 
receiving a maximal sanction if they succeed, and a probability p of receiving a less than 
maximal sanction if they fail.  It follows from the basic model of deterrence that ceteris 
paribus the higher the expected punishment for a particular type of act, the smaller the 
number of people that will decide to commit an act of that type.  Therefore, under 
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Scheme D the number of individuals who would fire the first shot will be larger than un-
der Scheme E.  Now, as Posner claims, offenders who did fire the first shot and failed are 
more likely to fire a second shot under Scheme E than under Scheme D.  So, the fraction
of the offenders who have fired and missed the first shot who will also fire a second shot 
will be larger under Scheme E than under Scheme D.  But since the pool of offenders 
who have fired and missed the first shot will be larger under Scheme D than under 
Scheme E, it is uncertain whether the actual number of offenders who fire the second shot 
will be larger under Scheme E than under Scheme D.  Hence my claim that it is not nec-
essarily true that Scheme D is better than Scheme E.  
To conclude, let me briefly state the upshot of this section: Considerations based on 
the goal of achieving marginal deterrence may not alter the conclusion arrived at in the 
previous section that, in order to design the proper incentives not to perform harmful acts, 
there is no need to set up a scheme of sanctions punishing more severely successful 
crimes than unsuccessful crimes.
 C.  Victim Incentives
Omri Ben-Shahar and Alon Harel defend the view that under a scheme of differential 
sanctions potential victims invest less in self-protective measures against crime than they 
do under a scheme of equal sanctions.  Since potential victims have independent 
incentives to overinvest in self-protection against crime—a socially inefficient out-
come—schemes of differential sanctions would be thus superior to schemes of equal 
40
sanctions.  Or so Ben-Shahar and Harel claim.42 I disagree. For, as I will contend, 
schemes of differential sanctions and schemes of equal sanctions are equivalent 
alternatives as incentive devices for both offenders and potential victims.
Let me concede that potential crime victims tend to overinvest in self-protective 
measures against crime and so that it is in the interest of efficiency to discourage such 
expenditures.43  Hence, if one of two otherwise equivalent criminal-law arrangements 
gives potential victims incentives to reduce investment in self-protection, this will be a 
reason to prefer that arrangement over the other.  That is the normative side of Ben-
Shahar and Harel’s argument in favor of schemes of different ial sanctions. For they claim 
that we ought to adopt schemes of differential sanctions, rather than otherwise equivalent 
schemes of equal sanctions, because the former, unlike the latter, provide potential 
victims with incentives to reduce expenditures in self-protective measures against crime.
42
 The argument was first advanced in Ben-Shahar & Harel, Blaming the Victim, supra note 15 at 449, and 
it was further elaborated in Ben-Shahar & Harel, Victim-Centered Perspective, supra note 15.
43
 The point appears well-supported by the relevant literature. On the economic account of potential 
victims’ behavior against crime see (besides Ben-Shahar and Harel’s articles) David Friedman, Efficient 
Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law, 13 J. Legal Stud. 379 (1984); Philip Cook, The Demand 
and Supply of Criminal Opportunities, 7 Crime & Just. 27 (1986); Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions 
to Prevent Theft: Private versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 123 (1991); David de 
Meza & J. R. Gould, The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Right, 100 J. Pol. 
Econ. 561 (1992); Koo Hui-Wen & I. P. L. Png, Private Security: Deterrent or Diversion?, 14 Int’l Rev. L. 
& Econ. 87 (1994); Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable 
Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 108 Q. J. Econ. 43 (1998); Matthew T. Clements, 
Precautionary Incentives for Privately Informed Victims (unpublished manuscript, May 21, 2002, on file 
with author).
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Now, let me state how it is that, according to Ben-Shahar and Harel, schemes of 
differential sanctions, unlike schemes of equal sanctions, produce those proper incentives 
to potential victims. Consider first how criminal law in general may induce potential 
victims’ behavior.  Take the group of potential victims of burglary in a given town, and 
any choice the members of this group face, for instance, whether to clean the sidewalks 
adjacent to their homes, or to leave them dirty.  Criminal law could induce a particular 
decision by setting the expected punishment variables so that the members of one group 
of victims (e.g., those who did not clean their sidewalks) become more attractive targets 
for burglars than the members of the other group (i.e., those who did clean their side-
walks).  If, say, criminal-law policy is such that burglarizing homes with clean sidewalks 
is punished more severely than burglarizing homes with dirty sidewalks, then (all other 
things being equal) homes with dirty sidewalks would be more often burglarized than 
homes with clean sidewalks.  Thus, by manipulating burglars’ incentives in this way, 
such policy imposes extra costs on the decision of potential victims to leave their 
sidewalks unclean, and correspondingly reduces the net costs of cleaning them.  
Generally, then, criminal-law policy decisions may create victim-centered behavioral 
incentives.44
Ben-Shahar and Harel’s approach mainly involves taking into account these kinds of 
effects on potential victims’ incentives for the evaluation of alternative criminal-law 
44
 Assumed in the previous example is, first, that the cleanness of the sidewalks is a feature burglars can ob-
serve and, therefore, that burglars can select their victims taking that feature into account; and secondly, 
that potential victims can infer the pattern according to which burglars select their victims—or, at least, that 
victims behave as if they knew such pattern.  Provided these two assumptions are met, one can extend this 
simple model to any other decision of the group of potential victims.
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policies—something that, they claim, is absent from traditional, offender-centered 
theories.  With respect to the issue of differential punishment, they argue that the choice 
between a scheme of differential sanctions and a scheme of equal sanctions influences 
potential victims’ decisions to adopt certain kinds of self-protective measures against 
crime.
Self-protective measures against crime make it more difficult, or simply less desirable, 
for offenders to commit a crime against the potential victims who have adopted them.  
Some of these measures, like deadbolt locks, fences, safes, bulletproof vests, etc., have 
preventive effects: they reduce the probability of successful completion of the crimes 
involving the things protected by such measures.45 That is, for example, an attempt to kill 
a person who wears a bulletproof vest by shooting a firearm will more likely fail than an 
otherwise equal attempt addressed to an unprotected person; an attempt to steal some 
valuables will more likely fail if the valuables are stored in a safe, than if they are kept in 
a cupboard; etc.  Generally, all other things being equal, “[t]he more potential victims in-
vest in precautions [of this, preventive kind], the more likely they are to be victims of un-
successful attempts rather than victims of completed crimes.”46
These preventive, self-protective measures not only have such preventive value for the 
victims adopting them—that is, not only reduce the probability of success of the crimes 
attempted against those victims—but they also have individual deterrent value—that is, 
45
 Other self-protective measures only have deterrent effects, either by making detection more likely (e.g., 
security cameras), or by directly reducing the benefit to offenders (e.g., marking property to make it more 
difficult to sell)—see, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Harel, Blaming the Victim, supra note 15, at 439; also, Clements, 
supra note 43, at 5.
46
 Ben-Shahar & Harel, Victim-Centered Perspective, supra note 15, at 336.
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they reduce the number of attempts against those victims. These deterrent effects of pre-
ventive measures are easy to account for.  Since preventive precautions raise the costs of 
victimizing the protected potential victims, all other things being equal, the more 
potential victims invest in this kind of precautions, the less likely they are to be victims of 
criminal attempts.  Put another way, the higher the level of preventive self-protection a 
victim adopts, the smaller the number of offenders who are willing to target that victim.
The core of Ben-Shahar and Harel’s defense of schemes of differential sanctions is 
that schemes of differential sanctions may counteract such deterrent value of preventive
self-protective measures.  The argument goes like this:
As the sanction for attempts decreases relative to the sanction for completed acts, the expected 
cost of sanctions facing criminals decreases, regardless of the type of victim they target 
[whether a high- or a low-precaution victim].  This expected cost of sanction decreases more if 
the criminal targets an overly cautious victim.  Consequently, as the sanction for attempts de-
creases, cautious victims become more attractive targets.  Thus, some criminals are likely, un-
der a rule that exculpates or mitigates the sanctions for attempts, to substitute their targets and 
choose to act against more cautious victims, rather than against less cautious ones.47
To see the point more clearly, take the following example.  Imagine there are only two 
classes of victims depending on whether they have adopted a high or a low level of pre-
caution of the relevant, preventive kind.  If a criminal action is directed against a high-
precaution victim, probability of success is low (say, q = 0.3).  If, in turn, the same crimi-
nal action is addressed to a low-protection victim, chances that it ends up being an ac-
complished crime are high (say, q = 0.7).  Under a scheme of equal sanctions according 
47
 Ben-Shahar & Harel, ibid. at 336.
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to which both attempts and accomplished crimes are punished with equally severe sanc-
tions irrespective of the class the victim belongs to (say, fr = fa = 100), assuming that the 
probability of the sanction being imposed (p) is constant for every case,48 both actions 
will face the same expected punishment (i.e., Ef = 100p).49 In contrast, under a scheme of 
differential sanctions where attempts are punished more leniently than accomplished 
crimes (say, fr = 100, fa = 50), assuming again a constant probability of punishment being 
imposed, expected punishment will differ depending on the class the victim of the crime 
belongs to.  Particularly, crimes against low-protection victims will lead to higher ex-
pected punishment than those directed against high-protection victims, as it is shown in 
Table 1.50
48
 The argument depends on this assumption, and this is one of its weaknesses—see infra note 54.  How-
ever, I will not stress this point here.
49
 Expected punishment (Ef) is calculated by adding the expected sanction for the case the action accom-
plishes the crime (that is, the value of the sanction to be imposed in that case, fr, discounted by the prob-
ability of the action accomplishing the crime, q, and the probability of the offender being apprehended, 
convicted and sentenced, p) plus the expected sanction for the case the action fails (that is, the value of the 
sanction for the attempted crime, fa, discounted by the probability of the action failing to accomplish the 
intended crime, 1 – q, and p).  Formally, Ef = qpfr + (1 – q)pfa. Thus, in the example of the text, the 
offender targeting the high-protection victim faces an expected punishment of 0.3 x p x 100 + (1 – 0.3) x p 
x 100 = 100p; whereas the offender victimizing the low-protection victim faces 0.7 x p x 100 + (1 – 0.7) x p 
x 100 = 100p.
50
 The expected sanction for addressing low-protection victims (i.e., where q = 0.7) equals 0.7 x p x 100 + 
(1 – 0.7) x p x 50 = 85p.  In turn, offenders aiming at high-protection victims (i.e., whose q = 0.3) face an 
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One implication of these differences in expected punishment is that under the scheme 
of differential sanctions (Scheme D) more crimes will be committed than under the 
scheme of equal sanctions (Scheme E).  For the decrease in the severity of the sanctions
for attempts leads to an overall decrease in the expected sanction—that is, offenders tar-
geting any  victim face reduced expected sanctions relative to those they would face under 
the competing scheme of equal sanctions.  The second and crucial implication is that the 
distribution of crimes between the two classes of victims will differ from one scheme to 
the other.  Indeed, Scheme D offers offenders an incentive for selecting high-precaution 
victims—an incentive that is absent under Scheme E.  Scheme D offers, as it were, a 20p
discount in expected punishment for targeting high-precaution victims instead of low-
precaution ones.  Granted, offenders still have independent incentives for targeting low-
precaution victims—for regardless of the costs imposed by the criminal law, targeting 
high-precaution victims is either more costly (i.e., overcoming the precautions involves 
more effort) or otherwise less beneficial (i.e., the same effort is more likely to fail) than 
targeting low-precaution victims, all other things being equal.  However, this change in 
expected punishment would make it the case that some offenders who would choose to 
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target low-precaution victims under the equal-sanctions scheme shift to targeting high-
precaution victims under the differential- sanctions scheme.
If the latter prediction is correct, then the move from Scheme E to Scheme D may af-
fect the relative victimization rate of low-precaution victims vis-à-vis high-precaution 
victims, so that the former will be targeted relatively less often, and the latter relatively 
more often, than they would be under the equal-sanctions scheme.
On the other hand, by altering in such a way offenders’ incentives, the move from a 
scheme of equal sanctions to a scheme of differential sanctions would also affect poten-
tial victims’ incentives to invest in self-protective measures of the relevant preventive 
kind.  By reducing the expected sanction for crimes directed against high-protected vic-
tims, schemes of differential sanctions place a cost on the decision to adopt preventive 
self-protection (i.e., a higher victimization rate), which cost is absent under the corre-
sponding scheme of equal sanctions.  Therefore, it moves the individually optimal level 
of preventive self-protection to a lower point.  In other words, it gives potential victims 
an incentive to adopt a lower level of preventive self-protection—lower, that is to say, 
than that that they would adopt under the scheme of equal sanctions.  (Granted, even if 
the lower expected sanction perfectly offsets the individual deterrent value of preventive 
self-protection, this will still provide the potential victim with some benefit—namely, the 
reduced probability of success of the crimes directed against her.  Hence, even under such 
a scheme of sanctions, there may still be some positive level of preventive self-protec-
tion.)51
51 See Ben-Shahar & Harel, Blaming the Victim, supra note 15, at 449 (“A victim may prefer to forego the 
deterrent effect of the sanction and rely solely on his private prevention measures.  For example, a home-
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This completes the case for schemes of differential sanctions I am considering.  Given 
the inefficiencies associated with individual self-protection, we would thus have an 
efficiency-based reason to adopt a scheme of differential sanctions and to reject a scheme 
of equal sanctions.  For any scheme of differential sanctions would have the felicitous 
advantage (over an otherwise equivalent scheme of equal sanctions) of bringing about an 
incentive for potential victims to reduce their (socially inefficient) investment in 
preventive self-protection.
Let me state now why I think the argument is mistaken. My first point against it 
addresses the fertility of the victim-centered approach to the discussion of the relative 
severity of punishment for successful and unsuccessful offenses.  To the extent that such 
an approach endorses the proposition that it is a desirable feature of a scheme of criminal 
sanctions that it provides potential victims with global incentives to reduce their 
investments in preventive self-precaution, it adds nothing to traditional, offender-centered 
models of optimal deterrence.52 For any scheme of sanctions that complies with the 
owner may elect to build an impenetrable fortress, even if the consequence of the reduced sanction leads to 
more attempts on the part of criminals to enter the house.”).  
52
 Of course, my point is not that criminal-law theorists and policy makers should not pay attention to 
criminal law consequences on potential victims’ behavior, or that a victim-centered perspective is generally 
fruitless, or mistaken.  Indeed, for example, it might be the case that we should adopt something like the 
contributory fault doctrine Ben Shahar and Harel advocate for in Blaming the Victim (supra note 15, pas-
sim) in order to provide potential victims with incentives (not) to adopt particular self-protective measures.  
The point I make here is simply that to the extent it yields the prescription of setting criminal sanctions so 
that potential victims eventually reduce their investments in preventive self-precaution, the approach is su-
perfluous.  
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prescriptions of traditional economic models of optimal deterrence will provide potential 
victims with the incentives Ben-Shahar and Harel advocate for.
As I claimed above, there are two traditional models of optimal deterrence for the 
criminal law:53 the Becker model—according to which criminal-law policies ought to be 
set so that offenders internalize the social loss their criminal behavior creates—and the 
Posner model—according to which criminal-law policies ought to be set so as to elimi-
nate offenders’ prospect of gain from criminal activity.  Both models yield the prescrip-
tion that criminal-law policies must be such that the expected punishment offenders face 
in performing criminal actions rises along with the probability of the actions causing 
harm to the victim. Now, the probability of an action causing harm to the victim is a par-
tial, decreasing function of the level of preventive self-precaution adopted by the victim: 
the higher the level of the victim’s self-precaution of the preventive kind, the lower the 
probability of the criminal action causing harm to the victim.  It follows, then, that under 
both models the lower the victim’s level of preventive self-precaution, the higher the 
optimal expected punishment.
Then, whatever the model one adopts, any scheme of criminal sanctions that conforms 
to the basic prescription of making expected punishment rise along with the probability of 
the action causing harm to the victim will have the felicitous byproduct of providing 
potential victims with incentives to reduce their expenditures in preventive self-protective 
measures.  Indeed, any scheme of sanctions that conforms to the basic prescription of 
making expected punishment rise with the probability of actions causing harm (and, by 
implication, inversely relate expected punishment to victims’ level of preventive self-
53 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
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precaution) will produce the same incentives as those produced by Scheme D in Ben-
Shahar and Harel’s argument.  That is, by making expected punishment rise with the 
probability of actions causing harm to the victim, a proper scheme of sanctions will give 
prospective offenders an incentive to choose high-precaution victims rather than low-
precaution victims.  Some offenders who would choose to victimize low-precaution 
victims under a scheme of sanctions that is not properly responsive to variations in q (like 
Scheme E in Table 1) are likely to shift to targeting high-precaution victims under a 
proper scheme of sanctions.  As a consequence, the relative victimization rate of high-
precaution victims will rise, thus placing an extra cost to preventive self-precaution.  
Accordingly, the individually optimal level of preventive self-protection will shift to a 
lower point—that is, prospective victims will have an incentive to invest less in self-
protection of the preventive kind.
My second, and crucial point against Ben-Shahar and Harel’s argument is that it is not 
a necessary feature of a scheme of equal sanctions that it yields the same expected sanc-
tion regardless of the criminal actions’ probability of success.  It certainly can be the case 
that a scheme of equal sanctions makes expected punishment rise along with the 
probability of actions causing harm to the victims—as any scheme of sanctions should do 
according to traditional models of optimal deterrence.  Therefore, it can be the case that a 
scheme of equal sanctions yields different expected sanctions depending on the self-pre-
caution class the victim belongs to—particularly, a higher expected sanction for targeting 
low-precaution victims, and a lower expected sanction for targeting high-precaution vic-
tims, thus setting proper incentives to potential victims.  Consequently, it is not a feature 
peculiar to schemes of differential sanctions that of providing potential victims with in-
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centives to reduce expenditures in preventive self-precaution—for any scheme of equal 
sanctions that complies with the prescriptions of traditional models of optimal deterrence 
will offer equivalent incentives.  In other words, the need to provide potential victims 
with the right set of incentives gives a reason to adopt either a scheme of differential 
sanctions or a proper scheme of equal sanctions—which amounts to saying that, contrary 
to Ben-Shahar and Harel’s claims, schemes of differential sanctions have no advantage 
over proper schemes of equal sanctions as incentive devices to reduce victims’ expendi-
tures in preventive, self-protective measures against crime.
Ben-Shahar and Harel build their case for a scheme of differential sanctions (like 
Scheme D) by opposing it to a particular scheme of equal sanctions, Scheme E.  Under 
Scheme E, expected punishment does not vary with the probability of actions causing 
harm to their victims.  Hence, Scheme E does not counteract offenders’ incentives to tar-
get low-precaution victims rather than high-precaution ones—and consequently, does not 
counteract potential victims’ incentives to invest in preventive self-precaution.  Scheme 
D is, thus, superior to Scheme E, for the latter is unresponsive to variations in criminal 
actions’ probability of success (q), while Scheme D is responsive to variations in q in the 
required direction.
In fact, if the probability of sanctions being imposed on offenders (p) is constant what-
ever the criminal actions’ outcome—whether failed attempts or accomplished crimes—
every scheme of differential sanctions will yield higher expected sanctions the higher the 
probability of actions causing harm to the victim—and correspondingly, higher expected 
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sanctions the lower the level of preventive self-precaution of the targeted victim.54 How-
ever, as Scheme E shows, not every scheme of equal sanctions will meet an equivalent 
expected punishment schedule where expected punishment is an increasing function of 
the probability of actions causing harm to the victim.  Yet, any expected punishment 
schedule can be met by a scheme of equal sanctions simply by manipulating the amount 
of sanctions to be imposed depending on the probability of actions causing harm.  Table 2 
shows an example of a scheme of equal sanctions (Scheme E*) as superior to Scheme E 
as Scheme D is.  In effect, Scheme E* yields exactly the same expected sanctions as 
Scheme D.55 So, qua incentive devices for both offenders and potential victims, Scheme 
D and Scheme E* must be equivalent.  
54 As Ben-Shahar and Harel point out, this felicitous property of schemes of differential sanctions do not 
necessarily obtain if the probability of sanctions being imposed, p, is not constant across types of crime 
outcomes (i.e., failure or completion).  If p is lower for attempts than for accomplished crimes, then even 
Scheme E would yield the required incentives to potential victims: “[T]he lower probability of detecting 
attempts is itself a force that makes high-precaution victims more attractive to criminals” (Ben-Shahar & 
Harel, Victim-Centered Perspective, supra note 15, at 343).  If, on the contrary, p is higher for attempts 
than for accomplished crimes, not every scheme of differential sanctions will be superior to Scheme E: 
“[T]he higher probability for detecting attempts is a consideration that makes high-precaution victims less 
attractive to criminals: with the greater probability of failure there is a greater probability of detection, and 
higher expected sanction” (ibid.  at 344).  
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 Again, expected sanctions are calculated with the formula Ef = qpfr + (1 – q)pfa (see supra note 49).  
Scheme E* sets sanctions of 85 for targeting low-precaution victims, and of 65 for victimizing high-pre-
caution ones.  Thus, under Scheme E*, the offender who targets a high-protection victim faces an expected 
punishment of 0.3 x p x 65 + (1 – 0.3) x p x 65 = 65p, whereas the offender who victimizes a low-protec-
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The contrast between Scheme D and Scheme E* exemplifies the proposition, which I 
defended above,56 that any given level of expected punishment can be effectuated either 
by a scheme of differential sanctions or by a scheme of equal sanctions.  Therefore, any 
expected punishment schedule could be met either by schemes of differential sanctions or 
by schemes of equal sanctions—or, by the way, by combinations thereof.  As I showed, 
Ben-Shahar and Harel’s finding is not, strictly read, that schemes of differential sanctions 
are needed in order to provide potential victims with incentives to reduce preventive self-
precaution.  Rather, the mechanism that does the job is a proper schedule of expected 
punishment, where expected sanctions increase with the probability of criminal actions 
causing harm to the victim—and, consequently, are higher the lower the level of the vic-
tims’ preventive self-precaution.  Such a schedule, I have just argued, may be achieved 
not only through schemes of differential sanctions, but also through schemes of equal 
sanctions.  Consequently, Ben-Shahar and Harel’s argument fails to demonstrate the 
conclusion they openly endorse, that is, that we ought to adopt schemes of differential 
sanctions rather than schemes of equal sanctions.  Their findings, that is to say, do not 
56 See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
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warrant such a conclusion.  What they may conclude from their findings might be stated 
in the following points:
(i) It is a desirable feature of a scheme of criminal sanctions that it provides potential 
victims with global incentives to reduce their investments in self-precaution (preventive 
or otherwise)—for victim self-precaution tend to be excessive from a social point of 
view.
(ii) If expected punishment rises with the probability of actions causing harm to the 
victim, offenders have an incentive to target victims with higher levels of preventive self-
precaution, and potential victims, in turn, have an incentive to decrease their level of pre-
ventive self-precaution.  
(iii) In virtue of the latter outcome, schemes of sanctions under which expected 
punishment rises with the probability of actions causing harm to the victim are, therefore, 
desirable.
(iv) Schemes of differential sanctions may have the property of making expected pun-
ishment rise with the probability of actions causing harm to the victim.  (Indeed, if prob-
ability of sanctions being imposed on offenders is constant whatever the crime outcome, 
schemes of differential sanctions always have that property.)
(v) Therefore, schemes of differential sanctions, to the extent that they have such a 
property, are desirable.
My first point against Ben-Shahar and Harel’s argument shows that proposition (iii) in 
itself is unoriginal.  The same prescription stems from traditional models of optimal 
deterrence.  Propositions (iv) and (v), in turn, are correct, but uninteresting for the discus-
sion of the relative merits of schemes of differential sanctions vis-à-vis schemes of equal 
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sanctions.  For, as I have claimed in my second point against Ben-Shahar and Harel’s ar-
gument, it is also true that
(vi) Schemes of equal sanctions may have the property of making expected 
punishment rise with the probability of actions causing harm to the victim.  And,
(vii) Therefore, schemes of equal sanctions, to the extent that they have such a 
property, are at least as desirable as schemes of differential sanctions.
II.  MORAL INTUITIONS
As my arguments in Part I show, traditional economic models of the criminal law lead 
to the conclusion that schemes of differential sanctions are not better than schemes of 
equal sanctions in terms of the incentives they create to avoid criminal behavior.  That is, 
the theory predicts that the move from one kind of scheme of sanctions to the other will 
not carry any significant change in people’s behavior.
Now, empirical studies on the criminal-law deterrence effects show that the predic-
tions based on the economic account of the criminal law do not comfortably fit the avail-
able data.57 In general the response to that fact is that the mechanisms through which the 
law may affect people’s behavior are far more complex than the simple story that backs 
traditional models of deterrence like the one I introduced in Part I.  Two sources of com-
plexity have been pointed out.58  On the one hand, legal sanctions and official law-en-
forcement share the stage with other social mechanisms of behavioral control, such as so-
cial norms, informal sanctions, peers’ esteem, etc.  Legal mechanisms interact with those 
informal mechanisms in ways that often significantly alter the behavioral outcomes that 
57 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 16.
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would otherwise obtain were the legal mechanisms to operate in isolation.  Theories that 
fail to properly take into account such possible interactions may yield inaccurate predic-
tions.  By the same token, the policy implications based on such predictions may well be 
defective. 
On the other hand, to the extent that legal sanctions and official law-enforcement do 
influence people’s behavior, the impact of such legally controlled variables is mediated 
by how people perceive those variables and process the perceived information.  Tradi-
tional economic models of the criminal law assume that there is no (or only negligible) 
noise between the relevant criminal-law variables and what individuals perceive of 
them.59 However, people’s perceptions are often biased or otherwise mistaken.  Rela-
tively recent experimental research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics 
indicates that some kinds of biases or errors systematically (and therefore predictably) af-
fect perception and information processing.  Disregarding the mediation of these system-
atic cognitive and judgmental distortions, as traditional economic analysis of law does, 
may give rise to inaccurate predictions of the effects of the law on people’s behavior—
and again the policy implications such predictions yield may be flawed.
In the remainder of the article I explore the possibility of whether either of the pre-
ceding two sources of complexity (i.e., the interaction of legal rules with existing social 
practices, and the mediation of systematic biases in people’s perceptions of legal prac-
58 See supra notes 18 & 19 for references.
59 See Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 1272, 1273 (1991) (arguing that 
“[t]his literature assumes that [individuals’ perceived probability of punishment] is an exogenous parameter 
to the individual, and typically makes the much stronger assumptions that all individuals have identical and 
exogenously given perceptions and that these are the same as the reality.”)
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tices) makes it the case that schemes of differential sanctions are better than schemes of 
equal sanctions in terms of the predictable consequences of one and the other scheme.  In 
this Part, after discussing a related argument by Paul Robinson and John Darley, I will ar-
gue that the consequences of the adoption of a particular scheme of sanctions may be af-
fected by the consistency between the legal scheme of sanctions and people’s moral in-
tuitions regarding how crimes should be punished.  Then, in Part III, I will turn to the 
likely effects of cognitive and judgmental biases.
A.  Diminished Moral Credibility
Considering their experimental findings that people tend to endorse harsher punish-
ment for successful offenses than for unsuccessful offenses,60 Paul Robinson and John 
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 The findings are reported in Paul H.  Robinson & John M.  Darley, Justice, Liability & Blame—Commu-
nity Views and the Criminal Law (1995)—see Study 1, at 14-28, and Study 17, at 181-9, for findings 
indicating subjects’ tendency to endorse differential punitive judgments for successful and unsuccessful 
offenses.  Study 1 was later replicated with similar results—see John M.  Darley, Catherine A.  Sanderson, 
& Peter S.  LaMantia, Community Standards for Defining Attempt: Inconsistencies with the Model Penal 
Code, 39 Am.  Behav.  Scientist 405 (1996).  Findings in similar direction have also been reported by 
Norman Finkel—see Norman J.  Finkel, Stephen T.  Maloney, Monique Z.  Valbuena & Jennifer L.  
Groscup, Lay Perspectives on Legal Conundrums—Impossible and Mistaken Act Cases, 19 Law & Hum.  
Behav.  593 (1995); and Norman J.  Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and Punishment, 28 Hofstra 
L.  Rev.  669, 683-6 (2000).  Robinson and Darley’s experiments confronted groups of lay subjects with 
hypothetical scenarios and asked them to give their views on the appropriate liability to assign to the per-
sons in the scenarios.  Subjects chose different degrees of liability from a thirteen-level scale, ordering 
sentencing possibilities by degree of seriousness, from “no liability,” to “death.” Thus, in one of the sce-
narios relevant for the discussion of differential punishment, subjects chose, on average, a sentence of 
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Darley make an interesting argument against the adoption of schemes of equal sanc-
tions.61 Their argument is best understood as signaling a source of negative side effects 
on people’s willingness to comply with the law, stemming from the clash between crimi-
nal-law policies and people’s moral intuitions.  In brief, they predict that the adoption by 
the criminal law of schemes of equal sanctions for successful and unsuccessful crimes 
would risk a decline in people’s general willingness to abide by the law.  
Robinson and Darley’s argument against schemes of equal sanctions is a derivation of 
their more general argument that community views of responsibility and punishment 
ought to guide the formulation of criminal-law rules and doctrines, on the one hand, 
together with their inference that the findings of people’s tendency to favor harsher pen-
alties for successful crimes than for (all else equal) unsuccessful crimes bespeak people’s 
strong endorsement of differential punishment, on the other.  The argument that 
community views of responsibility and punishment ought to guide the formulation of 
criminal-law rules and doctrines, in turn, is predicated on the following premises.62 First, 
slightly less than life imprisonment when confronted with a case in which the agent, with the intention of 
killing her victim, stabbed her in the chest, killing her instantly; and a sentence of 9.4 years of imprison-
ment in a case where the same agent, with equivalent intentions and motives, shot the victim through a
window but missed her.  For a critical assessment of the chosen methodology, see Christopher Slobogin, Is 
Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substantive Criminal Law, 87 J.  Crim.  L.  & Criminology 
315, 327-32 (1996).
61 See supra note 60, at 206 (arguing that criminal codes “ought to distinguish and punish more severely in-
stances where the prohibited harm actually occurs or the prohibited conduct is actually consummated, as 
compared to instances where the harm or evil is only intended (but not carried to completion)”).
62 See ibid., at 5-7, 201-3 (outlining the essentials of the argument); the argument was further elaborated in 
Robinson & Darley, supra note 6. 
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most people refrain from criminal activity not because they are deterred by the threat of 
punishment, but primarily on moral grounds, that is, because they believe that is the right 
thing to do.  Among the many possible social sources of moral insight, people tend to 
take the criminal law as a valid source of moral authority, often deferring to its judgment 
about what is wrong.  These propositions seem to have fairly good empirical evidence in 
their support.63
Secondly, any criminal-law rule (or principle, or official judgment based on it) may 
clash with a moral belief of an individual.  When a clash of this sort occurs, the individual 
might stick with her belief, disregarding the moral validity of the official rule, or she 
might somehow revise her initial judgment.64 If the individual sticks with her initial judg-
ment, she will thereby lack a reason to obey the legal rule she morally objects or dis-
agrees with.  That is not to say that she will not have any reason to observe the rule; for 
she may find other reasons to comply with it—e.g., she may be deterred from violating 
the rule by the threat of legal punishment.  The point is that she will be less inclined to 
obey the rule than she would be if the rule did not clash with her moral beliefs.  Further-
more, Robinson and Darley speculate that moral rejections of that sort may have deeper 
effects.  For the dissenting individual, the very “moral credibility” of the criminal law as 
a valid source of moral authority may be undermined—the individual may believe, that is 
to say, that as this rule is morally mistaken, others might be as well; and, thus, the indi-
vidual may be less likely to defer to the criminal law as a source of moral authority in cir-
63 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 6 at 468-77, and references therein.
64
 For a plausible account of how this change in the individual’s beliefs may happen, see Alex Geisinger, 
A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 Iowa L.  Rev.  35, 55-72 (2002).
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cumstances where legal rules other than the one she objects are to guide her conduct—a 
process Robinson and Darley call “generalization of disrespect.”65
Thirdly, the previous two points suggest that some discrepancies between the contents 
of the criminal law and people’s independently held moral beliefs may lead to a less mor-
ally credible criminal law.  In turn, a less morally credible criminal law would secure less 
compliance than a more credible one.  If the criminal law is to be devised so as to reduce 
noncompliance, it should then be formulated so as to minimize the chances of relevant 
disagreement.
Now, for Robinson and Darley’s conclusion that criminal codes ought to punish more 
severely successful crimes than unsuccessful crimes to be warranted, more is required 
than the previous general argument and the findings that people normally favor harsher 
sanctions in successful crime cases than in (all else equal) unsuccessful crime cases.  In a 
word, Robinson and Darley should show—as they do not—that the adoption of schemes 
65
 Robinson & Darley, supra note 6 at 483-5.  A recent experiment with 98 undergraduate students offers 
some evidence for this hypothesis—see Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law: Does Perceived Injustice Provoke 
General Non-Compliance? (April 2002) (Northwestern University School of Law, Law and Economics 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.  02-9, available at the Social Science Research Network 
Electronic Paper Collection).  The participants that had been exposed to information about the adoption of 
laws they would likely perceive as unjust reported to be slightly more likely to engage in a variety of illegal 
behaviors (such as drunk driving, speeding, shoplifting, and the like) than those who had been exposed to 
information regarding the adoption of laws they would likely perceive as just.  See, however, Jeremy A.  
Blumenthal, Who Decides? Privileging Public Sentiment about Justice and the Substantive Law, 72 UMKC 
L.  Rev.  1, 16-7 & n.104 (2003) (expressing skepticism as regards the hypothesis of generalization of 
disrespect, and stressing an important limitation of Nadler’s experiment, namely, the uncertain connection 
between participants’ self-reported attitudes towards their future behavior, and their actual future behavior).
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of equal sanctions would trigger the dynamics of generalization of disrespect so affecting 
people’s willingness to comply with the law.  If for whatever reasons the chances that the 
legal adoption of schemes of equal sanctions affect people’s general tendency to abide by 
the law were not significant, Robinson and Darley’s argument, though perhaps decisive 
as regards other rules, would not serve the purpose of adjudicating the issue of differen-
tial punishment versus equal punishment. In the remainder of this Part, I raise some 
doubts as regards the plausibility of the prediction that the adoption of schemes of equal 
sanctions would affect compliance with the law through the mechanism of generalization 
of disrespect.
As I noted before, Robinson and Darley’s claim that the law’s moral credibility facili-
tates compliance with its demands is partially based on social science research indicating 
that people typically refrain from criminal activity on moral grounds, rather than for fear 
of being sanctioned.66 However, as this literature also reveals, those moral grounds com-
prise judgments of, at least, two different kinds: on the one hand, judgments about the 
propriety of legal rules’ content (e.g., I observe the legal rule that prohibits that I kill my 
neighbor because I believe on moral grounds that I ought not to kill her even in the ab-
sence of a legal prohibition), and, on the other hand, judgments about the authorities’ le-
gitimacy for enacting and enforcing those rules (e.g., I observe the legal prohibition not to 
kill my neighbor because I believe that the law should be obeyed whatever its content).  
In other words, people’s moral grounds for compliance with a particular legal rule do not 
necessarily involve the belief that its content is morally adequate.  For they also find 
66
 Perhaps the best example of this literature is Tom R.  Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990) (reporting 
a study involving a sample of 1,575 Chicago citizens, and reviewing previous studies).
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moral grounds for compliance with a legal rule when they believe that the legal authori-
ties who have enacted it, or are enforcing it, are legitimate authorities.67
The same literature also indicates two other crucial facts.  On the one hand, even 
though the multiplicity of factors influencing people’s judgments about authorities’ le-
gitimacy has proven difficult to capture, social scientists have nevertheless found that le-
gitimacy assessments are strongly connected to evaluations of the fairness of the proce-
dures through which the authorities make decisions—and not, or not so much, to the par-
ticular contents of their decisions.68
On the other hand, evidence also shows that in cases of conflict between legitimacy-
based reasons and reasons based on the morality of rules’ content, the former normally 
dominate people’s behavior—that is, when individuals feel that authorities are legitimate 
(or that a legal rule has been legitimately enacted and enforced), they tend to comply with 
the law (or legal rule), even if they disagree with it (that is, even if they believe their 
contents to be morally objectionable).69
67 See Tyler, ibid., at 3-4 (“This normative commitment [as opposed to commitment based on calculations 
of punishment risk] can involve personal morality or legitimacy.  Normative commitment through personal 
morality means obeying a law because one feels the law is just; normative commitment through legitimacy 
means obeying a law because one feels that the authority enforcing the law has the right to dictate behav-
ior”), 19-68.  See also, Tom R.  Tyler & John M.  Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public 
Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account when Formulating Substantive 
Law, 28 Hofstra L.  Rev.  707 (2000) (reviewing available research and drawing implications for law-
making).
68 See Tyler, supra note 66, 71-157; also, Tyler & Darley, supra note 67, at 722-4.
69 See Tyler, supra note 66, 57-68 (reporting at 63: “Respondents are almost equally likely to comply with 
the law because they view it as legitimate whether they think the likelihood of their being caught is high or 
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In light of these facts, then, the prediction that disagreement with a particular legal 
rule, or official decision may trigger generalization of disrespect seems unsupported.  In-
deed, the available evidence suggests that, provided that the rule is adopted, or the deci-
sion made, in fair ways, disagreement with it will not affect compliance.  Granted, one 
can conceive of cases where substantive disagreement with an official decision—like the 
adoption or enforcement of a legal rule—is such that the dissenter’s assessment of the 
whole legitimacy of the legal system may be put at risk, or even collapse.  There is no re-
liable evidence of this kind of effect; only a couple of anecdotal examples are advanced.  
Take the following example regarding the behavior of a group of radical supporters of the 
“pro-life” position, in the wake of Roe v.  Wade:
This group is one of many within the anti-abortion community.  Believing that abortion is 
murder, this group’s members originally organized protests designed to be nonviolent, fol-
lowing the model of the civil rights movement.  They felt that their principled opposition to 
abortion would lead society to change its laws.  However, they failed to achieve this objec-
low, whether or not they think their peers would disapprove of law breaking, and whether or not they think 
law breaking is morally wrong.” And concluding, at 64-5: “People generally feel that law breaking is mor-
ally wrong, and that they have a strong obligation to obey laws even if they disagree with them .  .  .  Law 
breaking is viewed both as morally wrong and as a violation of an obligation owed to authorities.  This high 
level of normative commitment to obeying the law offers an important basis for the effective exercise of 
authority by legal officials.  People clearly have a strong predisposition toward following the law.  If 
authorities can tap into such feelings, their decisions will be more widely followed”).  See also, Herbert C.  
Kelman & V.  Lee Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and 
Responsibility 89-90 (1989) (arguing that “[o]nce a demand is categorized as legitimate, the person to 
whom it is addressed enters a situation where his personal preferences become more or less irrelevant as 
determinants of behavior”); also, Tyler & Darley, supra note 67, at 735-6 (discussing further evidence).
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tive, and eventually began to engage in increasingly violent actions, such as blocking the en-
trances to clinics as an act of civil disobedience.  These acts were still within the framework 
of the law, since group members accepted arrest and jail time/fines as a consequence of their 
actions.  As time went by, and abortion laws were not changed, this group increasingly en-
gaged in acts of sabotage against clinics.  At first, such acts were carefully timed to avoid 
harm to people.  However, over time, the group’s acts escalated into hunting and assassinat-
ing doctors who perform abortions.  What this shows is how, over time, the group’s view that 
the law and legal authorities were legitimate and trustworthy declined, as did their respect for 
the rule of law.  The driving force for this decline was their inability to change the law to be 
more consistent with their own moral views.70
It is hard to tell what is the significance of examples like this one.  They do suggest 
that it is possible that an individual infers, from the finding that one or more legal rules or 
official decisions are morally erroneous, that the legal system is not a reliable source of 
moral insight, and that is not as fair as to be entitled to her obedience.  Yet, they do not 
tell much about what are the conditions under which a non-negligible number of indi-
viduals may draw such inference.  
It is nonetheless plausible to suppose that it would take more than any perceived 
moral mistake for minimally reasonable individuals to infer that the criminal law is not a 
reliable source of moral guidance.  Similarly, provided they are reasonable enough as to 
concede that even the fairest decision-making procedures may yield erroneous decisions, 
individuals would not be inclined to discredit legal authorities’ legitimacy on the grounds 
that they have committed a moral error of any sort.  There must be something in the kind
70
 Tyler & Darley, supra note 67, 730-1 (footnotes omitted).  Reference to this case is also present in 
Robinson & Darley, supra note 6, at.  482-3.
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of moral mistake, something, moreover, that, from the point of view of the dissenting in-
dividuals, makes it incompatible with a legal system being legitimate or morally trustwor-
thy.  Consider, again, the events of the quoted example.  Perhaps, as it has been sug-
gested,71 these radical “pro-lifers” cannot refrain from seeing early fetuses as persons, 
which may make them particularly immune to moral argument to the contrary.  Seeing 
early fetuses as persons, they believe them as entitled to full legal protection as any other 
person, including, of course, protection against intentional killing.  Accordingly, they 
may conclude that the law permitting abortion is morally unacceptable.  Now, to make 
sense of their alleged inference that the criminal law in general is no longer a trustworthy 
source of moral guidance, one needs to assume that these individuals also entertain the 
belief that, say, no authority that asserts that it is permissible to treat some persons like 
things might be a reliable source of moral insight.  Likewise, their alleged discredit of the 
legal authorities’ general legitimacy may involve the belief that, say, no legal system that 
grants some persons the legal status of mere things—and that persists in so doing even 
against argument to the contrary—may be legitimately entitled to obedience.
 What are the implications, if any, of these remarks for the issue of the adoption of 
schemes of equal punishment for unsuccessful and successful crimes? Certainly none if 
people’s moral commitments do not lead (a non-negligible number of) them to the con-
clusion that the legal adoption of such schemes of sanctions is morally unacceptable.  As-
suming that a relevant number of people would find those schemes of sanctions morally 
intolerable—an assumption I challenge later on—its adoption will not affect compliance 
71 See Paul M.  Churchland, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the 
Brain 147-8 (1995).
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unless it triggers the mechanism of generalization of disrespect in a non-negligible num-
ber of individuals.  To that extent, the adoption of a scheme of equal sanctions is rele-
vantly different from the adoption of a rule criminalizing a type of action as yet legally 
permissible.  In the latter case, the adoption of the new rule alters the distribution of what 
is legally permissible and what is not; thus, any individual who finds the newly criminal-
ized type of action morally admissible will lack content-related moral grounds for com-
pliance with the new rule.  In contrast, the adoption of a scheme of equal sanctions sim-
ply disposes of the punitive discount for unsuccessful offenders (or the extra charge for 
successful ones), without altering the moral guidance that the criminal law is expected to 
offer, in terms of signaling which conducts are prohibited, mandatory, or permissible.  
So, if its adoption is to affect compliance, it must be by undermining the law’s general 
moral credibility.  Anyway, since people’s willingness to comply is normally not affected 
by disagreement with legal rules’ content, unless they believe that the authorities enacting 
and enforcing them are illegitimate, it seems fair to suppose that, provided the adoption 
of schemes of equal sanctions does not affect people’s perception of the authorities le-
gitimacy, it will have no negative impact on compliance.
Of course, as it was the case with the radical pro-lifers of the example, there could be 
some individuals whose peculiar beliefs make them infer, from the fact that the criminal 
law adopts schemes of equal sanctions, that the legal authorities are such as not to be en-
titled to obedience.  Like the radical pro-lifers of the example, these hypothetical, radical 
supporters of differential punishment should be particularly immune to counterargu-
ment—that is, they should strongly endorse differential punishment as a matter of princi-
ple—and should entertain the belief that no legitimate authority may approve of a scheme 
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of sanctions under which accomplished and attempted crimes are punished with the same 
penalties.  Conceding, for the sake of argument, that some individuals do endorse the 
principle of differential punishment in such a strong way, is it plausible to suppose that a 
relevant number of people would condition authorities’ legitimacy to their support of 
schemes of differential sanctions in the criminal law? I am prepared to believe that there 
is a relevant number of people who believe that no legal system that denies human beings 
the legal status of persons (as opposed to mere things) is a legitimate legal system—after 
all, history has witnessed wars and revolutions made in the name of such idea.72 How-
ever, I simply see no reason why anyone would be inclined to link evaluations of legiti-
macy to the observance of the principle of differential punishment.  In the absence of a 
convincing story, the prediction that the adoption of schemes of equal sanctions will risk 
generalization of disrespect—even conceding that people strongly endorse differential 
punishment as a matter of principle—strikes me as a gross overstatement.
Be that as it may, such a prediction necessitates that a relevant number of people are 
prepared to object the legal adoption of schemes of equal sanctions—that is, that they en-
dorse differential punishment as a matter of principle, and that upon reflection they would 
stick with this principle against the law.  Robinson and Darley infer this strong endorse-
ment from the fact, suggested by their findings, that people tend to favor harsher sanc-
tions in accomplished crime cases, and more lenient ones in all-else-equal attempted 
crime cases. Yet, the inferential path from such findings to the conclusion that people 
72
 If some of these individuals also have the strong conviction that early fetuses are as human beings as you 
and I, then the adoption of a policy making abortion permissible might trigger, for these individuals, the 
mechanism of generalization of disrespect.  Still, the exceptionality of the example suggests that the 
number of individuals in which these two beliefs coincide is not as large as to be taken into account.
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strongly endorse differential punishment as a matter of principle is paved with obstacles 
Robinson and Darley seem to overlook.  Certainly, if people strongly endorsed 
differential punishment as a matter of principle, they would favor harsher sentences in 
accomplished crime cases than in attempted crime cases, all other things being equal.  
The findings thus show just that people tend to express punitive judgments in 
hypothetical cases as though they endorsed that principle.73 But that behavioral 
coincidence is not enough as to warrant the claim that the adoption of a scheme of equal 
sanctions will risk generalization of disrespect.  
To begin with, the findings do not warrant the inference that people’s intuitions that 
successful offenses ought to be punished more severely than unsuccessful offenses are 
held independently of the law—and therefore may serve as the basis for criticizing the 
law.  Consider the following study conducted with New Jersey citizens by John Darley, 
Catherine Sanderson and Peter LaMantia.74 Following the same methodology of the 
Robinson and Darley studies, respondents in this study were asked to propose appropriate 
sentences for hypothetical cases of accomplished and attempted murder, and accom-
plished and attempted robbery.  As expected, respondents proposed substantially more se-
vere sentences in the accomplished crime cases than those they proposed in the attempted 
73
 A methodological limitation not peculiar to Robinson and Darley’s study—see Norman J.  Finkel, Com-
monsense Justice, Psychology, and the Law: Prototypes that are Common, Senseful, and Not, 3 Psychol.  
Pub.  Pol’y & L.  461, 469 (1997) (arguing that studies reporting the outcomes of jurors’ or mock jurors’ 
decisions “only tell[] us what jurors did, not why they did what they did, let alone telling us what they un-
derstood or how they applied that understanding”).
74
 Darley, Sanderson, & LaMantia, supra note 60.
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crime cases.75 The study also tested participants’ perceptions of the relevant criminal law 
rules in force in New Jersey at the time of the experiment.  The evidence showed that par-
ticipants erro neously believed, for the two tested types of crimes (murder and robbery), 
that New Jersey criminal statutes punished accomplished crimes substantially more se-
verely than attempted crimes, when the code actually made no difference in punishment 
between accomplished and attempted robberies, and only a slight difference between ac-
complished and attempted murders.76 Darley, Sanderson and LaMantia interpret these 
findings as follows:
[M]ost citizens hold the (erroneous) belief that the legal code matches their moral intuitions 
about the liability levels that should be assigned to various attempts.  We interpret that asso-
ciation to mean that the subjects have clear intuitions about how attempts are [ought to be?] 
judged, are unaware of the real content of the code, and think that the code is morally appro-
priate and thus must agree with their judgments.77
Though possible, that interpretation is not warranted by the evidence.  It may also be 
the case that, uncertain about what is the right principle from which to derive their judg-
ments, participants are willing to defer to the law—as they normally would do, according 
to Robinson and Darley.78 Given that they are unaware of the precise contents of New 
Jersey applicable statutes, they make an educated guess, based on whatever experience 
they might have—and they are rather accurate, considering variations across jurisdic-
75 Ibid., at 411-4.
76 Ibid., at 414-6 (showing that “[p]articipants’ own liability assignments for both murder and robbery cases 
are almost identical to their perceptions of the actual New Jersey codes”) .
77 Ibid., at 419.
78 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 6, at 471-7.
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tions, and over time: the Model Penal Code trend, which the New Jersey statutes in force 
at the time of the study followed, is a recent, and rather exceptional trend.79 They then 
conform their responses to the (erroneous) view of the criminal law contents that their 
educated guess yields.
That is not to say that in the absence of a perceived legal practice of differential pun-
ishment respondents would tend to hold equal punitive judgments.  Indeed, for reasons I 
will deploy later on,80 I think that our intuitive punitive judgments in such cases do tend 
to be differential, rather than equal, independently of the law.  For, as I will suggest, our 
moral intuitions regarding wrongdoing that revolves around the causation of harm are 
dominated by paradigm cases of accomplished offenses.  In pairs of all-else-equal 
accomplished and attempted crime cases, the accomplished crime case will be more close 
to the relevant paradigm case than the attempted crime case, which will determine a less 
extreme intuitive response for the latter than for the former. Still, our intuitive responses 
to actual or hypothetical cases are just that, that is, intuitive responses.  What we believe 
on intuition is often proven to be mistaken by those better informed than we are.  Thus, 
the fact that we believe that the criminal law mirrors our intuitive judgments would 
reinforce our intuitive beliefs, making us more confident in holding them, and in acting 
on the basis of them, than we would otherwise be.  My point here is just that insofar as 
79
 For references, see Paul H.  Robinson, Fundamentals of Criminal Law 488-9 (1988) (listing 38 jurisdic -
tions where attempts are always punished less severely than accomplished crimes); also, Paul H.  Robinson, 
The Role of Harm and Evil in Criminal Law: A Study in Legislative Deception?, 5 J.  Contemp.  Legal Is-
sues 299, 305 nn.18 & 20 (1994) (distinguishing jurisdictions that generally adopted the Model Penal 
Code).
80 See infra text accompanying notes 102-118.
70
this reinforcing effects are not somehow neutralized, the findings in studies such as 
Robinson and Darley’s may not reflect the participants independent commitment to 
differential punishment, and therefore may not serve as the basis to infer what their 
position would be if they knew that the criminal law observes the counterintuitive 
principle of equal punishment.  
Furthermore, as I will argue in Part III, the findings of differential punitive judgments 
in pairs of all-else-equal accomplished and attempted crime cases may also be 
importantly magnified by the impact of robust cognitive and judgmental biases.  As I will 
show, these biases, which I name “result biases,” affect the perception and evaluation of 
descriptive properties of the cases other than the actual (non)occurrence of the crime 
result, which in turn may affect the intuitive responses to the cases based on those 
misperceived properties.  In particular, available psychological research strongly suggests 
that, due to the interplay of three convergent mechanisms, actions that actually cause 
harm tend to be perceived as more dangerous than otherwise equal actions that fail to 
cause harm.81  Since intuitive punitive judgments are likely to be responsive to the 
actions’ perceived dangerousness—so that, all other things being equal, the more 
dangerous the action is, the harsher the punitive response—then the findings of 
differential punitive judgments may in part be due to the misperception of the actions’ 
dangerousness, rather than to commitment to the principle of differential punishment.  
Put another way, an individual who believed that, all other things being equal, unsuccess-
ful offenses should be punished as severely as successful offenses would still hold differ-
ential punitive responses to pairs of all-else-equal accomplished and attempted crime 
81 See infra text accompanying notes 118-131.
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cases if she is normally affected by result biases—for these biases would prevent her 
from finding out that the cases are equal in all their properties other than the actual (non) 
occurrence of the crime result.  
Again, that is not to say that in the absence of those result biases people would tend to 
have equal punitive responses to all-else-equal accomplished and attempted crime cases.  
My point is just that were the impact of the result biases somehow neutralized, the re-
sulting differential punitive judgments may be significantly attenuated.
Let me sum up.  Robinson and Darley’s argument that general compliance with the 
law is a partial function of the law’s perceived moral credibility, together with the fact 
that people’s punitive intuitive judgments tend to follow a pattern consistent with the 
principle of differential punishment yield an argument against the legal adoption of 
schemes of equal sanctions.  The argument depends crucially on the following two propo-
sitions.  First, the findings that people normally hold differential punitive intuitive judg-
ments indicate that people would disapprove of a criminal law that includes schemes of 
equal sanctions.  And secondly, given the first proposition, the adoption of schemes of 
equal sanctions may affect the law’s perceived moral credibility, and thus reduce people’s 
willingness to abide by the law through the mechanism of generalization of disrespect.  
Hence, all other things being equal, schemes of differential sanctions are better than 
schemes of equal sanctions because under the latter people’s willingness to abide by the 
law in general is lower than under the former.
I began my discussion of such argument by challenging the plausibility of the argu-
ment’s second proposition—i.e., that given the first proposition, the adoption of schemes 
of equal sanctions may trigger the mechanism of generalization of disrespect.  I argued 
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that even though under some peculiar conditions the fact that a relevant number of people 
disapprove of a particular criminal law rule might trigger the mechanism of generaliza-
tion of disrespect for this group of people, there is nothing suggesting that disapproval of 
the practice of equal punishment might be accompanied by such peculiar conditions.  
Then I went on and challenged the plausibility of the first proposition—i.e., that the 
findings that people normally hold differential punitive intuitive judgments for successful 
and unsuccessful offenses indicate that people would disapprove of a criminal law that 
observes the principle of equal punishment.  What these findings may warrant is the pre-
diction that people would find the practice of equal punishment counterintuitive.  But 
there is a long way from finding a legal practice counterintuitive to disapproving of it on 
moral reasons, and even more to disapproving of it as strongly as to be immune to coun-
terargument—let alone to conditioning the very legitimacy of the authorities on the re-
jection of such practice.  Moreover, I also stressed that the available findings of people’s 
tendency to hold differential punitive judgments may overstate people’s intuitive com-
mitment to differential punishment—reinforcing effects stemming from people’s belief 
that the law mirrors their intuitions, and cognitive and judgmental result biases may ex-
aggerate the differentiation, polarizing responses that would otherwise be more ambigu-
ous.  
To conclude, the case in favor of schemes of differential sanctions grounded in the hy-
pothesis that the adoption of schemes of equal sanctions would undermine the criminal 
law’s moral credibility so as to significantly diminish people’s general willingness to 
abide by the law ultimately depends on empirical evidence as yet unavailable.  The ex-
perimental evidence showing that people’s punitive responses to pairs of all-else-equal 
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accomplished and attempted crime cases tend to follow a pattern consistent with the 
principle of differential punishment does not suffice.  In the absence of such empirical 
evidence, however, we may reasonably surmise that the hypothesis upon which the 
argument is based seems unlikely.  That is, the prediction that the adoption of schemes of 
equal sanctions risks generalization of disrespect for a significant number of individuals 
appears as a gross overstatement.
B.  Enforcement Propensities
The economic analysis of the criminal law assumes that there are two relevant policy 
variables, variables whose manipulation is available for the policy-maker to achieve the 
goal of optimal deterrence.  The first variable is sanction severity, which comprises not 
only the level of disutility to be imposed on offenders but also the kind of treatment that 
is to cause the required level of disutility.  The second variable is the probability of sanc-
tions being imposed on offenders, which nests several probabilities: essentially, the prob-
ability of an individual being apprehended if she commits a crime, the probability of be-
ing prosecuted if apprehended, the probability of being convicted if prosecuted, and the 
probability of a particular sentence being entered if convicted.  The probability that this 
chain of probabilities yield—the probability of a sanction being imposed—is convention-
ally assumed to be a function of the resources devoted to public enforcement of the law.82
The more the resources devoted to that task—i.e., the more police officers, prosecutors, 
clerks, courts, scientific experts, computers, electricity, time, etc.—provided they are ef-
ficiently allocated, the higher the probability of sanctions being imposed on offenders. 
82 See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 13.
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Though true, this assumption is only part of the story. Indeed, the probability of offenders 
being effectively sanctioned is a measure of the level of law enforcement present in a 
community—as the height of a column of mercury in a thermometer is a measure of 
temperature.  Any level of law enforcement is the result of the convergent behavior of a 
plurality of actors—victims and witnesses, police officers, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys, judges, scientific experts, jurors, etc.  Certainly, law enforcement level is an 
increasing function of the level of resources devoted to enforcement tasks, as it is 
commonly assumed.  However, facts other than the allocation of material resources may 
systematically influence the relevant conduct of the actors whose convergent behavior 
makes the resulting enforcement level.  As I argue in this section, individuals’ intuitive 
agreement with the legal sanction to be enforced is one of such facts.  As a consequence, 
policy-makers could not choose a level of sanction severity without thereby affecting the 
corresponding level of law enforcement.  I show that, under some realistic conditions, 
this finding gives rise to an argument against the adoption of schemes of equal sanctions, 
and in favor of a scheme of differential sanctions—though not any.  The argument that so 
results is related to that upon which the American Law Institute (ALI) appeared to have 
grounded the MPC scheme of differential sanctions for first-degree felonies.83 The ALI 
Commentaries to the MPC offer, however, a rather imprecise account:
How far the penal law ought to attribute importance in the grading of offenses to the actual 
result of conduct, as opposed to results attempted or threatened, presents a significant and dif-
83
 MPC § 5.05 (1): “Except as otherwise provided in this Section, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are 
crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense that is attempted or solicited or is an object 
of the conspiracy.  An attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit [a capital crime or a] felony of the first 
degree is a felony of the second degree”.
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ficult issue.  Distinctions of this sort are essential, at least when severe sanctions are involved, 
for it cannot be expected that jurors will lightly return verdicts leading to severe sentences in 
the absence of the resentment aroused by the infliction of serious injuries.  Whatever abstract 
logic may suggest, a prudent legislator cannot disregard these facts in the enactment of a pe-
nal code.84
The argument I develop, then, may also be seen as an attempt to make sense of these 
vague terms qua argument against the adoption of schemes of equal sanctions.85
84
 Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 2.03, Comment at 257 (1985).  The claim had been previously 
made by Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler in their 1937 study on the law of homicide, where they 
wrote: “[P]opular indignation is inevitably aroused by the actual occurrence of a wrong, with the result that 
death and other very severe penalties are more likely to be tolerated when homicidal behavior has resulted 
fatally than when it has not”—see Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of 
Homicide II, 37 Colum.  L.  Rev.  1261, at 1295 (1937).
85
 Stephen Schulhofer evaluated long ago the argument against the adoption of schemes of equal sanctions 
that arises from the quoted paragraph—see Schulhofer, supra note 2.  He focused on the reliability of the 
factual claim that juries would not be willing “to lightly return guilty verdicts” under a scheme of sanctions 
whereby attempts are punished as severely as accomplished crimes—see ibid., at 1524-33.  His conclusion 
was that the available (though indirect) scientific evidence gave only weak support to the ALI’s prediction, 
and only with respect to some unintentional crimes, on the one hand, and with respect to the imposition of 
the death penalty, on the other.  With respect to other types of crimes, and other kinds of penalties, Schul-
hofer found no reliable empirical support—ibid., at 1533 (“This analysis of nullification suggests that the 
problem is not likely to arise with any significant frequency in certain important situations, notably prose-
cutions for unsuccessful attempts, and the likelihood of nullification seems particularly small where the 
completed crime would not involve serious physical injury in any event.  On the other hand, the nullifica-
tion danger does appear serious in cases not involving major harm, if the crime is based on recklessness or 
negligence, or if the crime is subject to the death penalty”).  For the reasons I deploy below, I still believe 
that there is some truth in the ALI’s factual claim.  Still, be that as it may, the focus of my inquiry lies on 
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1.  Background
It is a fact that individuals have views about what the appropriate punitive responses to 
crime should be.86 For any particular criminal act, it is likely that some individuals will 
approve of the act and object its criminalization, others will find the existing legal sanc-
tion too lenient, others that it is too harsh, etc.  When they face tasks relevant to law en-
forcement—acting as witnesses, judges, police officers, prosecutors, jurors, etc.—these 
beliefs may play a role.  It is reasonable to speculate that there is some correlation 
between individuals’ willingness to enforce the law in a particular case, and their beliefs 
in the correctness of the legal treatment for that case; particularly, that individuals’ 
willingness to enforce the law in any particular case is a (partial) function of their 
agreement with the law, so that the more they agree with the legal solution for the case, 
the more ready they are to enforce it—that is, people are more willing to cooperate with 
law-enforcement authorities, police officers are more willing to apprehend offenders, 
prosecutors more willing to press charges against them, jurors are more willing to return 
the propriety of the inference according to which schemes of differential sanctions are superior to schemes 
of equal sanctions provided jurors—and the rest of the relevant actors within the law enforcement 
venture—are more willing to enforce the former than the latter.  
86 See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 60 (reporting experimental findings of people’s intuitive solu-
tions to hypothetical criminal cases); and Julian V.  Roberts & Loretta J.  Stalans, Public Opinion, Crime, 
and Criminal Justice (2000) (reviewing research on public opinion).
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guilty verdicts, etc.  The intensity of this (un)willingness to enforce the law I call en-
forcement propensity.87
People’s agreement with the legal response to a particular action, and their 
corresponding propensity to enforce it, may be conceptualized—as Dan Kahan has pro-
posed88—as a function of the severity of the legal response, in the following terms.  As 
the legal response to a particular action moves away from what an individual considers 
the proper response to the action, the individual’s agreement decreases and, correspond-
ingly, her willingness to enforce that legal response—or her individual enforcement pro-
pensity—decreases as well.  In other words, people’s enforcement propensity with re-
spect to a particular law reaches its maximal level when the law is in perfect agreement 
with their personal views about how the law should be.  Drawn in a graph, this enforce-
ment propensity function is represented by a single-peaked curve, as it is shown in Figure 
1.
[Figure 1 about here. (See Appendix)]
The curve e(f) represents the variations in an individual’s willingness to enforce a 
legal response for a particular action (or class of actions) as the legal response for it 
moves from 0, or no criminal-law response, toward increasing levels of sanction severity.  
The enforcement propensity function represented in Figure 1 shows an individual (or 
group of individuals) who approves of a policy of criminalization for the action in 
question—which is expressed by her enforcement propensity being zero when there is no 
87
 I borrow the concept from Dan M.  Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs.  Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms 
Problem, 67 U.  Chi.  L.  Rev.  607, 611 (2000) (also arguing that individual enforcement propensity is a 
function of individuals’ agreement with the law to be enforced—see ibid., at 611-3).
88 See ibid., at 611-8.
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criminal-law response—but for whom there is also an excessive legal sanction, one which 
she is unwilling to enforce—that is, her enforcement propensity becomes null if the 
sanction severity is fm or higher.  Finally, fn is the sanction severity the individual of the 
example regards as appropriate, and so, that is the legal response she is most willing to 
enforce—at that point, then, her enforcement propensity reaches its maximal level, or 
emax.
The aggregate enforcement propensity function for a legal response to a type of action 
must have, then, the same single-peaked shape, which implies that for every type of ac-
tion there is a sanction level, equal or higher than zero, at which aggregate enforcement 
propensity is at its maximal level.  This finding leads to the following implication.  The 
probability of offenders being effectively sanctioned depends not only on the resources 
devoted to enforcement tasks—as it is commonly assumed—but also on the severity of 
the legal response to be enforced.89 For this probability is the resultant of the convergent 
behavior of all the relevant actors, each of whose individual contributions to the public 
enforcement venture is influenced (in part) by their agreement with the legal response 
they are expected to enforce.  So, at any given level of resources efficiently allocated to 
the public enforcement of the criminal law, it will be the case that the resultant probabil-
ity of offenders being effectively sanctioned for having performed actions of a particular 
type varies with the relevant actors’ enforcement propensity, as it is illustrated in the ex-
ample of Figure 2.  
[Figure 2 about here. (See Appendix)]
89
 The possibility of this relation between sanction severity and probability of sanction imposition had been 
anticipated by Becker’s 1968 piece on the economics of criminal law—see Becker, supra note 13 at 184.
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The crucial features of this fact are that, for any given level of resources devoted to 
public enforcement tasks, there is a level of sanction severity at which the probability of 
sanctions being imposed reaches its maximal level—the point (pmax, fn) in the example of 
Figure 2—and that policy-makers cannot choose a sanction severity level without thereby 
affecting the probability of sanctions being imposed on offenders.  This constraint on 
criminal-law policy-making, together with people’s tendency to favor harsher punishment 
for successful offenses than for unsuccessful offenses, may give rise to an argument 
against the adoption of schemes of equal sanctions.
In effect, according to available evidence, people normally believe that the sanction 
for accomplished crimes ought to be more severe than the sanction for attempted crimes, 
all other things being equal.90 This fact suggests that the corresponding enforcement 
propensity functions may differ depending on the crime outcomes (success or failure).  
Indeed, if my previous analysis is correct, the fact that people typically regard differential 
punishment as the appropriate punitive response indicates that people’s enforcement pro-
pensity for the accomplished instances of a type of crime, and their corresponding en-
forcement propensity for the failed instances of the same type of crime peak at different 
levels of sanction severity—the former higher than the latter.  That is to say, people’s en-
forcement propensity curves for each crime outcome—and the resulting p(f) curves—are 
not perfectly coextensive.  This leaves two possibilities open, which the examples of Fig-
ures 3 and 4 illustrate.
[Figure 3 about here. (See Appendix)]
90 See supra note 60.
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The curves named pa(f) represent the variation in the probability of punishment for the 
performance of failed attempts of a particular type of crime.  The curves pr(f), in turn, 
represent the variation in the probability of punishment for the commission of accom-
plished instances of the same type of crime.  (For simplicity’s sake, it is assumed that 
both curves have similar shape and only differ in the sanction severity level at which each 
of them peak.) Figure 3 shows a community where both curves overlap—particularly, the 
enforcement propensities displayed in Figure 3 indicate that people are most willing to 
enforce a sanction of severity f2 for the unsuccessful instances of the crime in question, 
and a sanction of severity f3 for its successful instances.  Any other sanction they would 
be less willing to enforce, and in the extreme, their enforcement propensity would be-
come null: for instance, all of them would refuse to enforce any legal sanction higher than 
f4 for failed instances of the crime in question, and any legal sanction higher than f5 for 
the accomplished instances of it.  What is peculiar to Figure 3, as an example of overlap-
ping enforcement propensity curves, is that there are some common possible sanctions for 
attempts and for accomplished crimes that a non-negligible number of individuals are 
willing to enforce.
In contrast, Figure 4 shows a community where people are also most willing to en-
force f2 sanctions for attempts and f3 sanctions for accomplished crimes, but where there 
is no possible common sanction for attempts and for accomplished crimes that a non-
negligible number of individuals would be willing to enforce.  Hence, the non-coexten-
sive enforcement propensity curves in Figure 4 do not overlap each other.  
[Figure 4 about here. (See Appendix)]
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To the extent that both curves overlap—as they do in the example of Figure 3—a 
scheme of equal sanctions is possible, with p > 0 for both successful and unsuccessful 
crimes, and a common sanction, fn, lying anywhere within the overlapping range (i.e., in 
Figure 3, f1 < fn < f4).
In contrast, if the curves do not overlap, as in the example of Figure 4, then schemes of 
equal sanctions are unavailable, for in every case of this sort, there is no sanction severity 
level with p > 0 for both attempts and accomplished crimes.  If, for instance, a scheme of 
equal sanctions is legally adopted whereby both attempts and accomplished crimes are 
threatened with a sanction of, say, f3, and the relevant probability functions are as shown 
in Figure 4, no failed attempt will ever be punished.  For at that level of sanction severity 
the relevant actors (i.e., victims, witnesses, police officers, prosecutors, judges, jurors, 
etc.) are by hypothesis unwilling to enforce the law.  Consequently, the legally adopted 
scheme of sanctions would not in effect be a scheme of equal sanctions, but an extreme 
scheme of differential sanctions whereby only accomplished crimes are punished.
2.  The Argument
a.  The (im)possibility of a scheme of equal sanctions.  So far I have argued, first, that 
due to the contribution of people’s personal judgments to the law enforcement venture, 
the probability of offenders being effectively sanctioned for the commission of any crime 
depends not only on the resources devoted to public enforcement tasks, but also on the 
severity of the sanction set up in the law for that crime.  As a consequence, for any crime 
there is a level of sanction severity that maximizes the probability of the sanction being 
imposed on those who commit such crime.  Secondly, I have claimed that people’s intui-
tive judgments about the appropriate punitive responses for successful and unsuccessful 
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crimes suggest that the levels of sanction severity at which the probability of sanction 
imposition becomes maximal may be (and, perhaps, typically are) different for either 
kind of crime outcome—failure or success.  
Those two propositions do not entail by themselves a prescription favoring the adop-
tion of a scheme of differential sanctions and rejecting schemes of equal sanctions.  Still, 
as I have shown, the following conditional is true: If the corresponding enforcement pro-
pensity curves are such that there is no sanction severity common to both the successful 
and the unsuccessful instances of a type of crime that a non-negligible number of the 
relevant actors are willing to enforce—as in the example of Figure 4—then a scheme of 
equal sanctions for that type of crime is as a matter of fact unavailable.  Put another way, 
if the condition of the differential but non-overlapping enforcement propensity curves 
obtains, then only schemes of differential sanctions are available to the policy-maker.  
This already amounts to an argument against the adoption of schemes of equal sanctions, 
for if it is the case that policy-makers cannot implement a scheme of equal sanctions, then 
it is not the case that they ought to implement it.  The scope of the argument is, of course, 
as broad as the actual obtaining of the condition upon which it depends—namely, that the 
standing enforcement propensities are such that they form differential, non-overlapping 
curves.
To be sure, the mere fact that people endorse differential punishments for successful 
and unsuccessful offenses does not allow the inference that there is no common sanction 
for both types of crime outcome that a non-negligible number of relevant actors are will-
ing to enforce.  Such a fact does not warrant, that is to say, the conclusion that the condi-
tion of the differential but non-overlapping enforcement propensity curves obtains.  
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Therefore, such a fact by itself, together with what I have so far argued, does not account 
for the conclusion that policy-makers ought to adopt a scheme of differential sanctions, 
rather than a scheme of equal sanctions for the crime in question.  For it might be the case 
that both enforcement propensity curves, though certainly differential, do overlap each 
other (as in the example of Figure 3), in which case the possibility of schemes of equal 
sanctions (with a less than maximal enforcement level) will not be ruled out—and hence 
neither will be the possibility that policy-makers ought to adopt any of them.91
What is, then, the relative desirability of schemes of differential sanctions and schemes 
of equal sanctions when both are possible—particularly, when the corresponding en-
forcement propensity curves overlap each other? My answer to this question starts as 
follows: given the constraints placed by the existence of differential but overlapping en-
forcement propensities curves, deterrence is maximized by a scheme of differential sanc-
tions.
b.  Deterrence-maximizing schemes of sanctions.  Any combination of enforcement 
level (as measured by the probability of sanctions being imposed on offenders) and sanc-
91
 Similarly, the fact that no one (or only a negligible number of relevant actors) would be willing to en-
force a particular sanction for the attempted instances of a crime, while a sufficiently high number of actors 
would be ready to enforce that sanction in accomplished instances of the same crime—as in the ALI’s 
claim that “it cannot be expected that jurors will lightly return verdicts leading to severe sentences in the 
absence of the resentment aroused by the infliction of serious injuries” (see supra note 84)—does not war-
rant the conclusion that the condition of the differential but non-overlapping enforcement propensity curves 
obtains for that crime; and therefore it is insufficient to build a case against the adoption of any scheme of 
equal sanction—though it is sufficient to reject the possibility of a scheme of equal sanctions whereby both 
accomplished and attempted crimes are punished with the particular sanction enforcers refuse to apply.
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tion severity yields a particular level of deterrence.  Any particular level of deterrence, in 
turn, may be achieved by different combinations of sanction probability and severity.  All 
these combinations are equivalent from the point of view of deterrence, for under all of 
them deterrence is constant.  Thus, for instance, each of the three downward-sloping 
curves (D1, D2, and D3) shown in Figure 5 represents different combinations of sanction 
probability and severity that generate equivalent deterrence effects.  Along each of these 
lines—or deterrence isoquants92—changes on the probability axis are offset by changes 
on the severity axis, and vice versa.  The exact amounts of the tradeoffs, and the corre-
sponding shape of the curves, depend on the relative elasticity of the supply of offenses 
with respect to the probability of sanctions being imposed, on the one hand, and to the 
sanction severity, on the other.93 In turn, the move from any point on a deterrence iso-
quant (e.g., D1) to any point on a higher deterrence isoquant (e.g., D2) involves an in-
crease in deterrence effects—that is to say, all other things being equal, less crimes will 
be committed under any combination of sanction probability and severity lying on D3, 
than under any combination lying on lower constant-deterrence curves (e.g., D1 and D2).
[Figure 5 about here. (See Appendix)]
Figure 5 illustrates the proposition that, among all the feasible combinations of sanc-
tion probability and sanction severity—where their feasibility is due to there being a non-
negligible number of relevant actors willing to enforce the legal sanction for the crime in 
92 See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics 446-7 (3d ed., 2000).
93
 Thus, in the extremes, were offenders unresponsive to changes on the severity axis, the constant-deter-
rence lines would be horizontal; and, in turn, they would be vertical, if offenders were only responsive to 
changes on the severity axis.  The D1, D2 and D3 curves in Figure 5 represent a somewhat intermediate 
point between those two extremes.
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question—there is one at which deterrence is maximized.  This combination corresponds 
to the point at which the curve p(f) is tangent to the highest deterrence isoquant—which 
occurs, on the curve p(f)1 at point (p1, f1), on the curve p(f)2 at point (p2, f2), and on the 
curve p(f)3 at point (p3, f3).  Curves p(f)1, p(f)2, and p(f)3 represent the variations in the en-
forcement level with respect to the severity of the legal sanction to be enforced, for a 
same group of actors (victims, witnesses, police officers, prosecutors, judges, jurors, etc.) 
at three increasing amounts of resources devoted to enforcement tasks.  Thus, whatever 
the amount of resources devoted to enforcement tasks, there is one combination of sanc-
tion probability and sanction severity at which deterrence is maximized.
Now, if deterrence of a type of criminal action is to be achieved by imposing sanctions 
both in the event of failure and in the event of success in causing the crime result, the ac-
tual level of deterrence is determined by the interplay of the combinations of sanction 
probability and sanction severity for the event of failure, on the one hand, and for the 
event of success, on the other.  This results from the fact that when offenders perform an 
instance of the criminal action, they face a probability, q, of succeeding in causing the 
crime result, and the complementary probability (1 – q) of failing.  Therefore, their deci-
sion to commit the criminal action in question will be influenced by both the expected 
punishment for the accomplished crime (discounted by the probability q) and the ex-
pected punishment for the attempted crime (discounted by the probability [1 – q]).94 So, a 
policy-maker willing to maximize deterrence should favor the adoption of a scheme of 
sanctions such that, for each type of crime outcome (failure and success), the combination 
of sanction probability and sanction severity corresponds to the point at which the rele-
94 See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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vant p(f) curve is tangent to the highest deterrence isoquant.  In settings where the work-
ing enforcement propensity curves for attempts and accomplished crimes are not coexten-
sive, such a scheme will be a scheme of differential sanctions.
Figures 6 (a) and (b) illustrate this point in a setting with differential but overlapping 
enforcement propensity curves and a fixed amount of resources devoted to enforcement 
tasks.
[Figures 6 (a) and (b) about here. (See Appendix)]
Given the shape of the resulting p(f) curves, and of the deterrence isoquants, deter-
rence is maximized by setting a sanction of a severity level of f1 for attempts, and a sanc-
tion of a severity level of f3 for accomplished crimes (see Figure 6 (a)).  The actual deter-
rence level this scheme is to achieve is represented by deterrence isoquant Ddif, which lies 
somewhere between isoquants D2 and D4, depending on the probability of actions causing 
the crime result, or q.95 There is no other scheme of (equal or differential) sanctions that 
could achieve, given the constraints placed by the standing p(f) curves, a deterrence effect 
as high as Ddif.  For any other feasible scheme of sanctions would involve the adoption of 
at least one combination of sanction probability and sanction severity at which deterrence 
is not maximized.  A fortiori, any feasible scheme of equal sanctions—e.g., the one repre-
sented in Figure 6 (b), which sets a common sanction of a severity level of f2 for both at-
95
 As q approaches 1, the impact of the sanction for the event of failure on the offender’s decision to com-
mit the crime vanishes, and so the deterrent job is done only by the sanction set up for the accomplished 
crime.  Consequently, as q approaches 1, the deterrence effect approaches D4.  On the contrary, as the prob-
ability of the actions causing the crime result approaches zero, the deterrent job is done by the sanction set 
up for the attempt.  The deterrence effect for this kind of actions will then approach D2.  
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tempts and accomplished crimes, or any other—will be inferior to the deterrence-maxi-
mizing scheme of differential sanctions from the point of view of deterrence.
In sum, in settings where enforcement propensities for attempts and accomplished 
crimes are not coextensive, the deterrence-maximizing scheme of sanctions is a scheme 
of differential sanctions.96 This finding would amount to an argument against schemes of 
equal sanctions, if it were the case that policy-makers ought to maximize deterrence.  
Yet, assuming that it is the case that policy-makers ought to maximize deterrence, the 
resulting argument against the adoption of schemes of equal sanctions is also an argument 
against the adoption of any under-deterring scheme of differential sanctions—that is, any 
feasible scheme of differential sanctions other than the deterrence-maximizing scheme.  
In other words, the argument against schemes of equal sanctions grounded on the fact that 
people are less willing to enforce equal than differential sanctions necessitates embracing 
the maximization of deterrence as the prevailing goal of criminal-law policy-making.  If 
one rejects this goal, there is no reason not to choose any scheme of equal sanction in-
stead of the deterrence-maximizing scheme of differential sanctions.  Now, if one em-
braces the goal of maximizing deterrence, this commitment should lead not only to the 
rejection of schemes of equal sanctions, but also to the rejection of any under-deterring 
scheme of differential sanctions—for any scheme of sanctions other than the deterrence-
maximizing scheme is, from this point of view, as objectionable as any feasible scheme 
of equal sanctions.  
96
 Notice that, by the same token, in settings where enforcement propensities for attempts and accomplished 
crimes are perfectly coextensive, the deterrence-maximizing scheme of sanctions is a scheme of equal
sanctions!
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3.  Two Qualifications
My analysis shows that for people’s tendency to favor differential punishment to give 
rise to an argument against the adoption of schemes of equal sanctions one need embrace 
the maximization of deterrence as the prevailing goal of criminal-law policy-making.  
Still, the argument that so arises is a rather peculiar one: for such a rejection of schemes 
of equal sanctions also leads to the rejection of any scheme of differential sanctions other 
than the unique, deterrence-maximizing scheme of (differential) sanctions.  The appeal 
this argument might have diminishes as soon as one takes account of the following two 
qualifications.
a.  The argument’s limited scope.  Assume that policy-makers ought to adopt deter-
rence-maximizing schemes of sanctions for every type of criminal behavior.  Under such 
an assumption, then, policy-makers ought to implement a scheme of differential sanc-
tions—though not any scheme of differential sanctions—if and only if people’s enforce-
ment propensities for the attempted and accomplished instances of the crime in question 
form non-coextensive curves, whether overlapping or otherwise.
Now, to the extent that the argument may warrant the prescription that policy-makers 
ought not to implement schemes of equal sanctions—but a (particular) scheme of differ-
ential sanctions—it does so only with respect to the types of crimes for which people’s 
enforcement propensities have the required properties of forming non-coextensive curves.  
The argument is, thus, crime-specific.  In other words, the argument by itself does not 
necessarily warrant the prescription of adopting an across the board policy of punishing 
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successful crimes more harshly than unsuccessful crimes, unless it is true, for every type 
of crime, that people’s enforcement propensities have the required properties.97
The available evidence suggests that people normally regard differential punishment 
as the appropriate punitive response for a number of central crime types, such as homi-
cides and robberies.98 As I claimed earlier, such a tendency may indicate the presence of 
differential enforcement propensities—i.e., curves that peak at different levels of sanction 
severity depending on the crime outcome—for those crime types, in which case it will be 
true that the deterrence-maximizing scheme of sanctions is not a scheme of equal sanc-
tions, but a scheme of differential sanctions.  However, it may still be possible that, for 
other crime types, the same community has differently shaped enforcement propensities.  
For instance, the MPC drafters appeared to believe that the presence of differential en-
forcement propensities was correlated with crime types involving the causation of serious 
bodily injuries,99 so that enforcement of crime types involving other kinds of crime re-
sults—such as bribery, or tax evasion—would face no such constraints.100
97
 Still, it is worth stressing that even if it is true that, for every type of crime, people’s enforcement propen-
sities have the required properties, the argument does not support the adoption of any across the board 
scheme of differential sanctions, but only a schedule comprising the deterrence-maximizing schemes of dif-
ferential sanctions for each type of crime.
98 See supra note 60.
99 See supra text accompanying note 84.
100
 A point also underscored by Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 1526 (“The danger [of under-enforcement] 
seems remote where the statutory harm required for the completed crime does not prompt the emotional re-
sponse associated with death or bodily injury; an attempt to bribe, for example, might well arouse as much 
public resentment as successful bribery later discovered.  Moreover, in the case of crimes involving serious 
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In sum, being crime-specific, the argument is unlikely to offer a sufficient explanation 
of a general, across the board policy of treating successful crimes tougher than unsuccess-
ful crimes.  Still, the argument does warrant (under the assumption of the duty to maxi-
mize deterrence) the rejection of an across the board policy of equal sanctions for accom-
plished and attempted crimes, if it is true—as it seems—that for some type(s) of crime(s), 
people’s enforcement propensities form non-coextensive curves.
b.  Deterrence maximization.  In accordance with what I have so far argued, policy-
makers ought to implement a particular scheme of differential sanctions—i.e., the deter-
rence-maximizing scheme of differential sanctions—for a particular type of crime (call it 
O) if the following two conditions hold: (i) aggregate enforcement propensities for the 
accomplished instances of O and for its attempted instances form differential (i.e., non-
coextensive), single-peaked curves; and (ii) deterrence of O ought to be maximized.
The argument’s second qualification stems from the limited fertility of the goal of de-
terrence-maximization as a source of normative power.  It is obviously true that, all other 
things being equal, a lower crime rate is better than a higher crime rate.  However, since 
producing deterrence involves costs, it is not necessarily the case that its production must 
be maximal.101 Thus, efficiency mandates that society achieve deterrence up to the level 
where the marginal costs of producing additional deterrence equal the marginal benefits 
of a reduced crime rate.
moral fault, the defendant’s culpability alone may arouse sufficient resentment to permit imposition of most 
non-capital penalties”).
101
 A point every deterrence advocate must concede.  See Bentham, supra note 13 (arguing, at ch.  XIII § i, 
that “punishment ought not to be inflicted . . . [w]here it is unprofitable, or too expensive; where the mis-
chief it would produce would be greater than what it prevented.” See also ch.  XIII § iv).  
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Accordingly, from the point of view of efficiency, the deterrence-maximizing scheme 
of sanctions is superior to any other under-deterring scheme of sanctions if and only if the 
net costs of crime are lower under the former than under the latter—where “costs of 
crime” comprise both the direct costs offenders impose on their victims, and the en-
forcement costs.  Now, the move from any under-deterring scheme of sanctions to the de-
terrence-maximizing scheme of sanctions involves a reduction in the number of offenses 
and, therefore, a reduction in the direct costs of crimes.  Yet, it is a purely empirical mat-
ter whether such a reduction comes at a cost worth paying.  Adjudicating the issue re-
quires information as to the precise intensity of the crime reduction, the relative number 
of offenders prosecuted, tried, convicted, and actually punished, and the relative costs of 
the sentences actually administered under one and the other scheme.  
Since a scheme of sanctions that maximizes deterrence given the constraints placed by 
the standing enforcement propensities may or may not be an efficient alternative over 
other feasible schemes, the mere fact that there is a deterrence-maximizing scheme of 
sanctions does not provide policy-makers with efficiency-based reasons to favor it.  It re-
mains, then, an open question—one which is to be adjudicated on the basis of empirical 
data—which among the feasible schemes of (equal and differential) sanctions is the effi-
cient choice.
C. Conclusion
The legal adoption of a scheme of sanctions takes place in a social environment in 
which legal measures interplay with other informal factors of behavior control, like social 
norms, or intuitive moral commitments.  I have focused in this Part on two arguments that 
assert that the fact that a scheme of legal sanctions operate on a normative landscape such 
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that people have moral intuitions in the direction of differential punishment may make 
schemes of differential sanctions a better alternative to schemes of equal sanctions.
I argued that Robinson and Darley’s argument based on the criminal law’s moral 
credibility seems unreliable.  For it crucially depends on the implausible claim that 
schemes of equal sanctions may risk generalization of disrespect for a relevant number of 
individuals.  The argument I proposed, based on the idea of differential enforcement pro-
pensities, seems better supported by the findings on the impact of moral intuitions on le-
gally regulated behavior.  Still, as Robinson and Darley’s, my argument is also contingent 
on empirical evidence as yet unavailable.  Hence, it may only warrant the proposition that 
there may be after all reasons for adopting schemes of differential sanctions rather than 
schemes of equal sanctions.
I began this Part by pointing out that there are two distinct sources of complexity that 
may render the prescriptions made by traditional deterrence analysis unreliable.  My 
discussion in this Part has revolved around the first of those sources of complexity.  I 
must now turn to the second.
III.  BIASES
I will now argue that schemes of differential sanctions may be better than schemes of 
equal sanctions in virtue of people’s perceptions of relevant criminal-law policies under 
one and the other kind of scheme of sanctions.  I shall contend that a number of system-
atic cognitive and judgmental biases may affect what people perceive about relevant 
criminal-law variables in a way that makes schemes of differential sanctions better policy 
instruments to effect deterrence goals than schemes of equal sanctions—either because 
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they facilitate the perception of important facts about criminal-law policies, or because 
they otherwise optimize the allocation of law-enforcement expenditures.
The cognitive and judgmental biases upon which my argument is built reveal them-
selves as one seeks an explanation for the fact that we tend to believe on intuition that 
successful offenses should be punished more severely than their unsuccessful counter-
parts.  I offer such explanation in section A.  Our pervasive tendency to hold intuitive 
judgments in accordance with the practice of differential punishment, I will argue, is ex-
plained in part by the effects of those biases.  I then devote section B to develop the pol-
icy implications that may emerge from taking into account the existence of such biases as 
regards the issue of differential punishment versus equal punishment.  
A.  The Psychology of Differential Judgments
If we face pairs of all-else-equal accomplished and attempted crime cases we 
typically feel that the agent in the accomplished crime case should receive harsher 
punishment than the agent in the attempted crime case.  Now, why do we feel this way? 
In this section, putting together available empirical and experimental research, I sketch an 
account of the mechanisms that may underlie our tendency to hold intuitive punitive 
judgments consistent with the practice of differential punishment.  
1.  The model of pattern recognition
Evidence seems clear in indicating that, in expressing their punitive preferences for 
particular cases, people use punishment primarily as a language to convey moral condem-
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nation,102 rather than as a tool to effect policy goals regarding the regulation of behavior.  
That is, individuals seem primarily responsive to desert-related factors rather than to 
teleological or deterrence-related factors—such as probability of recidivism, 
“demonstration effects,”103 and the like.104 Upon this background, then, people’s 
tendency to favor different amounts of punishment for successful and unsuccessful 
crimes is best understood as revealing primarily (and perhaps only) people’s expression 
of moral condemnation of different degrees or strength.  
Research has also shown that, despite behaving as, say, intuitive retributivists, people 
often rate deterrent goals as more compelling than retributive goals.105 The finding is less 
surprising than it may appear at first sight.  Psychologists have found in many areas a 
systematic tendency among people to erroneously report the real determinants of their in-
ferences.106 The explanation of this tendency, according to psychologists Nisbett and Wil-
son, is that “when people are asked to report how a particular stimulus influenced a par-
102
 As Joel Feinberg has famously argued, punishment is the language we have got to express moral 
condemnation—see Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 The Monist 397 (1965)
103
 I take the expression “demonstration effect” from Lester Thurow: “If there is a demonstration effect, one 
crime causes others to commit crimes”—see Lester C.  Thurow, Equity versus Efficiency in Law Enforce-
ment, in The Economics of Crime 85, 89 (Ralph Andreano & John J.  Siegfried eds., 1980).
104 See Roberts & Stalans, supra note 86 at 200-2 (discussing public opinion research); also, Jonathan 
Baron, Nonconsequentialist Decisions, 17 Behav.  & Brain Sci.  1 (1994), reprinted in Judgment and Deci-
sion Making 712 (Terry Connolly, Hal R.  Arkes & Kenneth R.  Hammond eds., 2d ed.  2000) (discussing 
experimental findings).
105 See Roberts & Stalans, supra note 86, at 201-2.
106 See Richard E.  Nisbett & Timothy Decamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports 
on Mental Processes, 84 Psychol.  Rev.  231 (1977) (reviewing and discussing relevant literature).
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ticular response, they do not do so by consulting a memory of the mediating process, but 
by applying or generating causal theories about the effects of that type of stimulus on that 
type of response.”107 The fact that individuals primarily react to desert-related factors, 
while reporting being predominantly responsive to deterrence-related reasons seems to 
be, then, another instance of that well-documented tendency—as some have suggested.108
Those two findings—i.e., that people behave as intuitive retributivists, but report be-
ing primarily responsive to deterrent-related reasons—and the explanation they call for 
suggest that the working mechanism underlying people’s particular punitive judgments 
may be a spontaneous, automatic process (as opposed to a consciously controlled proc-
ess).  This spontaneity or automaticity is a commonplace feature of current psychological 
models in the field of perception, cognition, information processing and judgment forma-
107 Ibid., at 248.
108 See, e.g., Roberts & Stalans, supra note 86, at 200-1; see also, Gerald Dworkin, Unprincipled Ethics, 20 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 224, 236-8 (1995) (applying the same account to the general domain of 
particular moral judgments).  On the other hand, the fact that individuals tend to choose deterrence as the 
theory they point to as guiding their judgments is no surprise.  Nisbett and Wilson (supra note 106) propose 
that the theories individuals appeal to in explaining their past behavior are somehow culturally determined.  
Deterrence, in turn, as Dan Kahan has argued, is the prevailing language in our society for public discus-
sion of criminal law issues—the reason being, mainly, that the language of deterrence is the one appearing 
not to violate social norms against public moralizing.  As Kahan puts it, “[w]e resort to the culturally ecu-
menical idiom of deterrence to avoid a style of public moralizing that principle, interest, and etiquette all 
condemn”—see Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 477 (1999).
Any other choice would, then, be surprising.
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tion, including social inferences and appraisals.109 Among those models stands out what 
psychologists call pattern recognition—a model that has fruitfully been applied to the 
explanation of moral and legal decision-making.110 The basics of this model, as applied to 
the formation of judgments of appropriate sentences for particular criminal cases, may go 
like this.  At the center of the model of pattern recognition lies a repertory of complex im-
agery inventoried in our minds as a hierarchy of prototypes, or exemplars, of wrongful or 
criminal behavior and the “normal” responses they warrant. As the relevant prototypes in 
any other domain of cognition and information processing, crime prototypes, and more 
generally moral prototypes, comprise unique patterns of perceptual variables or dimen-
sions.111 When facing a particular case, we perceive a particular pattern of those variables 
or dimensions, which we match to those stored prototypes.  This preverbal matching 
process situates, as it were, the perceived pattern in a distance-relation to the relevant 
109 See Denise R.  Beike & Steven J.  Sherman, Social Inference: Inductions, Deductions, and Analogies, in 
1 Handbook of Social Cognition 209, 263-73 (Robert S.  Wyer, Jr., & Thomas K.  Srull eds., 2d.  ed., 1994) 
(discussing automaticity in different kinds of social inferences); also, Ira J.  Roseman & Craig A.  Smith, 
Appraisal Theory—Overview, Assumptions, Varieties, Controversies, in Appraisal Processes in Emotion—
Theory, Methods, Research 3, 7 (Klaus R.  Sherer, Angela Schorr & Tom Johnstone eds., 2001) (reviewing 
recent research on the psychology of emotions).
110 See, generally, Gerald Dworkin, supra note 108 (applying pattern recognition model to the making of 
particular moral judgments); Dan M.  Kahan, Lay Perceptions of Justice vs.  Criminal Law Doctrine: A 
False Dichotomy?, 28 Hofstra L.  Rev.  793 (2000) (applying pattern recognition to legal decision-making); 
Churchland, supra note 71 at 123-50 (including pattern recognition in a comprehensive theory of the brain 
and mental processes).  
111 See Churchland, supra note 71, at 21-55, for simple examples of pattern recognition, from the simplest 
ones (e.g., recognition of tastes and colors), to more complex ones (e.g., the recognition of faces).
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stored prototype(s).  The degree of closeness to the relevant prototype(s) determines, 
then, the kind and strength of the associated response.112 The response such a process 
yields, finally, is best conceptualized as an emotional reaction, both hostile and retro-
spective—call it reprobation, contempt, resentment, etc.113—which we express, through 
the conventional language of moral condemnation, in terms of amounts of punishment.
The precise richness of the prototype patterns—i.e., the identity and value of each of 
their constituting variables—is perhaps doomed to lie beyond the reach of our linguistic 
capacity.114 Nonetheless, notwithstanding methodological limitations,115 we may infer 
112
 The spatial metaphor is drawn from Churchland, ibid., who conceptualizes the perceptual patterns as 
unique patterns of vectors.  Each vector corresponds to one of the multiple variables into which the per-
ceived object is coded.  Thus, each pattern yields a point in a space with as many dimensions as variables 
into which the perceived object is coded.  
113
 The characterization of the relevant kind of emotion is a dubious matter—see, for a comprehensive re-
view of current psychological typologies, Gerald L.  Clore, Norbert Schwartz, & Michael Conway, Affec-
tive Causes and Consequences of Social Information Processing, in 1 Handbook of Social Cognition 323, 
337-63 (Robert S.  Wyer, Jr., & Thomas K.  Srull eds., 2d.  ed., 1994).  In the philosophical literature, the 
identification of resentment as the emotion “most immediately and directly” related to punishment may be 
traced back to Adam Smith’s theory of the moral sentiments—see Adam Smith, The Theory of the Moral 
Sentiments 94-6 (Prometheus Books, 2000) (1759).  Joel Feinberg proposed to use the term “condemna-
tion” to refer to the attitude normally expressed through punishment, in order to capture the fact that such 
attitude have aspects of the two allegedly distinct attitudes we refer to as resentment and reprobation—see 
Feinberg, supra note 102, at 403-4.  For a distinction between resentment and contempt, see Michelle Ma-
son, Contempt as a Moral Attitude, 113 Ethics 234, 246-50 (2003).
114
 Our inability to capture in language our working prototype patterns is well-documented in several set-
tings, such as recognition of tastes, colors, sounds, faces, and even in the intuitive categorization of natural 
kinds—see, e.g., Churchland, supra note 71, at 144-5, for an example of intuitive categorization of some-
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from the relevant behavior at least some salient features of our working prototypes.  In-
deed, the persistent tendency to favor harsher punitive responses to successful crime 
cases than to unsuccessful crime cases suggests that the working prototypes are result-
laden: if the working prototype of, say, murder comprises the victim’s actual death (or a 
perceptual feature the victim’s actual death is a proxy of), the pattern recognition process 
will leave an accomplished murder case closer to the prototype than an (all else equal) 
attempted murder case—which would lead to different responses for each case, so fitting 
the available findings of differential punitive judgments.
Besides the fact of the evident tendency of people to hold differential punitive judg-
ments, there is good reason to think that, at least for a number of core crimes, the proto-
types of criminal behavior we have are laden with the actual occurrence of harmful re-
sults.  The reason is that, to the extent that our moral notions of wrongfulness revolve 
around the avoidance of harm to others, actions that actually cause harm have a logical 
priority in our thinking about wrongfulness over otherwise equal actions that fail to cause 
harm.  Let me explain.  If I ought to avoid harming others and want to abide by this norm, 
I need to know which of my possible actions may cause harm to others.  Now, for me to 
believe that a given action of mine (call it xi) may bring about harm to others, I need 
bring to mind at least one instance of an action that actually causes harm (call this imag-
ined or recalled action xr) without being able to find any relevant difference between that 
thing as a cat; see also, Gerald Dworkin, supra note 108, at 232-3 (reviewing studies regarding the use of 
categories such as “bird” and “lie”).
115 See Norman J.  Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Psychology, and the Law: Prototypes that are Common, 
Senseful, and Not, 3 Psychol.  Pub.  Pol’y & L.  461 (1997) (discussing methodological problems in ascer-
taining working prototypes in legal decision making).
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imagined or recalled action (xr) and xi.  Thus I would be able to grasp that by doing xi I 
may cause harm to others—that is, that my doing xi may end up being like xr—and there-
fore that I ought not to do xi.  Without finding an instance of an action that actually 
causes harm such that it stands to xi in such a relation, I would have no reason to think 
that by doing xi I may cause harm to others, and therefore that I ought not to do xi.  This is 
what I mean by the logical priority of actually harmful actions (xr in my example) in our 
thinking about wrongfulness.  That is, we cannot grasp what makes a particular action 
wrongful—in the sense of wrongfulness that has to do with actions’ harmfulness—
without bearing in mind a proper instance of an action that actually causes harm.
This logical priority that actually harmful instances have in our moral thinking about 
harmful behavior is consistent with, and perhaps even suggests, the development of re-
sult-laden prototypes of immoral and criminal behavior.  Indeed, it is claimed that a cru-
cial factor in the generation of moral prototypes is the exposure to examples of the rele-
vant moral kinds—such as examples of moral and immoral behavior, virtuous and vicious 
attitudes, etc.116 The logical priority argument tells us why we should select (and may in 
fact select) actually harmful instances of generally harmful types of behavior as appropri-
ate examples of wrongdoing.
On the other hand, the relatively higher salience of actually harmful behavior (vis-à-
vis actually harmless instances of the same types of behavior), the greater vividness of its 
harmful nature, as well as the emotionally engaging nature of actual injuries117 may con-
116 See Churchland, supra note 71, at 146.
117
 On the role of relative salience due to vividness and emotional effects in the assessment of actually 
harmful behavior vis-à-vis (all else equal) actually harmless behavior, see infra text accompanying notes 
125-131.
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tribute to reinforce the development of result-laden prototypes of crimes and moral 
wrongdoing.  For example, such properties of actually harmful behavior may explain the 
kinds of cases the media focus on, which, in turn, is usually advanced as an explanation 
of the empirical evidence that indicates that when people think of general sentencing is-
sues—like when they are asked by pollsters whether they believe courts are too lenient at 
sentencing—they normally bring to mind “worst case scenarios,” such as intentional, ac-
complished homicides committed on heinous motives and by abhorrent means.118
If my speculations are sound, it is plausible to assume that the pattern recognition 
mechanism is dominated by result-laden prototypes of criminal behavior, and so, to the 
extent that it may serve as the description of what goes on in our minds when making in-
tuitive judgments about appropriate sentences in particular criminal cases, pattern recog-
nition will yield behavior consistent with the practice of differential punishment—i.e., 
support of harsher sanctions in accomplished crime cases, and more lenient sanctions in 
attempted crime cases, all other things being equal.  In other words, under this account 
our inclination to experience more intense punitive reactions against successful offenses 
than against unsuccessful offenses would be due to the fact that our punitive reactions are 
a function of the similarity between the cases we face and our relevant prototypes of 
criminal behavior, and that our relevant prototypes of criminal behavior are successful 
crimes rather than unsuccessful ones.
2.  Result biases
Besides the account based on pattern recognition and result-laden prototypes of crimi-
nal behavior, there is another psychological mechanism that may explain our tendency to 
118 See Roberts & Stalans, supra note 86, at 207-9.
101
hold differential punitive judgments.  According to this alternative account, when we are 
exposed to risk imposing actions, our perception and appraisal of important features of 
the actions is significantly affected by the fact of whether the actions actually cause harm 
or not.  Due to mental processes for which there is reliable psychological evidence, the 
actual causation of harm thus biases our perception and evaluation of those features of the 
criminal actions we are exposed to in a way that may eventually lead to our holding 
differential punitive judgments even in pairs of all-else-equal accomplished and 
attempted crime cases, where all the features of the cases other than the actual causation 
of harm are held constant.  I will use the expression “result biases” to refer to the mental 
processes that produce this tendency to misperceive and erroneously assess some 
properties of the criminal actions we face depending on whether they result in harm or 
not.
The operation of these result biases may reinforce and magnify our tendency to be-
lieve on intuition that successful offenses call for harsher punishment than unsuccessful 
offenses, all other things being equal.  Indeed, to the extent that we are affected by these 
result biases, we will perceive things as never being equal.  As a consequence of working 
result biases, two otherwise equal actions, one of which results in actual harm while the 
other does not, will be misperceived as instantiating different properties—other than the 
actual causation of harm.  At least some of those properties will be relevant for the re-
sulting punitive response.  In particular, due to the mediation of result biases, people will 
overestimate such properties in successful crime cases, and underestimate them in unsuc-
cessful crime cases.  Therefore, the resulting punitive responses, which are a function of 
102
these perceived properties, will be more intense in successful crime cases than in their 
unsuccessful counterparts.
Notice, however, that the account based on result biases is independent of my previous 
account based on pattern recognition.  For the effects of result biases may lead to our 
holding differential punitive judgments even if my account based on pattern recognition 
were false;119 or, more likely, even when we do not rely on our bare intuitions for select-
ing punitive responses to criminal cases.120
119
 For instance, if it were the case that our intuitions, independently of how we perceive criminal cases, are 
consistent with the practice of differential punishment, we would still be inclined to favor differential puni-
tive judgments in virtue of our biased perception of the cases’ properties other than the actual 
(non)occurrence of harm.
120
 Indeed, the model of pattern recognition is not proposed as the whole story of what goes on, or may go 
on, in our minds in our arriving to intuitive evaluations of sentencing alternatives.  The theory posits, first, 
that the stated preverbal mechanism does take place when we make judgments of the sort I am discussing, 
as it does in innumerable other settings; and, secondly, that such preverbal mechanism has priority over any 
other verbal scheme to which we may also, and perhaps simultaneously, appeal.  (See Churchland, supra
note 71, at 144.) The theory does not deny, then, that something else may go on in our minds that may 
influence the outcome judgment.  In fact, psychological research in judgment formation and information 
processing has showed that our mental processes vary along a continuum ranging from automatic, uncon-
scious mechanisms (such as pattern recognition) to conscious reasoning processes (such as controlled de-
ductions from principles or rules), depending on many factors, such as availability of judgmental resources 
(including opportunity, time, mental abilities, etc.) and motivation.  See, e.g., Beike & Sherman, supra note 
109, at 264: “Rather than conceptualizing cognitive processes as either entirely automated or entirely con-
trolled, most researchers consider cognitive processes to lie somewhere on a continuum between auto-
maticity and control.” For a review of the findings regarding the factors upon which automaticity depends, 
see John A.  Bargh, The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and Control in 
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Let me now turn to the findings that support my account.  Research on cognitive psy-
chology has found robust evidence of a consistent and systematic tendency to overesti-
mate the likelihood and foreseeability of a past event once we have learnt that the event 
in fact occurred—a tendency that psychologists have named “hindsight bias.” Psycho-
logical research on this phenomenon started in the early 1970s by the work of Baruch 
Fischhoff: 
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight.  
They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but also to view it as 
having appeared “relatively inevitable” before it happened.  People believe that others should 
have been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case.  They even misre-
member their own predictions so as to exaggerate in hindsight what they knew in foresight.  .  
.  It appears that when we receive outcome knowledge, we immediately make sense out of it 
by integrating it into what we already know about the subject.  Having made this interpreta-
tion, the reported outcome now seems a more or less inevitable outgrowth of the reinterpreted 
situation.  “Making sense” out of what we are told about the past is, in turn, so natural that we 
may be unaware that outcome knowledge has had any effect on us.  Even if we are aware of 
there having been an effect, we may still be unaware of exactly what it was.  In trying to re-
construct our foresightful state of mind, we will remain anchored in our hindsightful perspec-
tive, leaving the reported outcome too likely looking.121
Social Cognition, in 1 Handbook of Social Cognition 1 (Robert S.  Wyer, Jr., & Thomas K.  Srull eds., 2d.  
ed., 1994).
121
 Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in Judg-
ment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 335, 341, 343 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos 
Tversky eds., 1982).
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After thirty years of research, robust hindsight bias effects have been invariably found 
in a diverse variety of settings, including the prediction and postdiction of historical and 
social events, general knowledge questions, outcomes of political elections, results of 
psychological experiments, medical and psychological diagnoses, jurors’ decisions, 
etc.122 In view of the generality of these findings, one could safely assume that the hind-
sight bias systematically affects people’s perceptions and assessments of criminal cases.  
In particular, according to the psychological research on hindsight bias, individuals af-
fected by the hindsight bias would perceive a criminal action that they know actually 
caused harm as bearing a significantly higher probability of causing harm than the action 
actually bore, and would regard the fact that the action did cause harm in the way it did as 
being far more foreseeable for the agent than it actually was.  To simplify, I shall use the 
122
 The first studies on hindsight bias were conducted by Baruch Fischhoff in the early 1970’s—see Baruch 
Fischhoff, Hindsight  Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment under Uncertainty, 1 J.  
Experimental Psychol.: Hum.  Perception & Performance 288 (1975); also, Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth 
Beyth, “I Knew it Would Happen”—Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 Organizational 
Behav.  & Hum.  Performance 1 (1975).  For reviews of subsequent research on the hindsight bias, see 
Scott A.  Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events after the Outcomes are 
Known, 107 Psychol.  Bull.  311, 312 (1990); Jay J.  Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, 
The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 Organizational Behav.  & Hum.  Decision Processes 147, 147-8 
(1991); Doris M.  Dehn & Edgar Erdfelder, What Kind of Bias is Hindsight Bias?, 61 Psychol.  Res.  135, 
135-7 (1998); and Jeffrey J.  Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in Be-
havioral Law & Economics 95, 95-8 (Cass R.  Sunstein ed., 2000).  The robustness of the hindsight bias is 
indicated by the persistent failures in trying to overcome its ef fects—see Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in 
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 422, 427-31 (Daniel Kahnemann, Paul Slovic & Amos 
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term “dangerousness” to refer to those two properties of criminal actions whose percep-
tion the hindsight bias would affect (i.e., the probability of the action causing harm, and 
the foreseeability of the produced outcome).  So, in hindsight, actions that are seen to 
have caused the crime results they risked would be regarded as significantly more dan-
gerous than they actually were.  In turn, individuals affected by the hindsight bias would 
perceive actions that fail to bring about the crime results they risk as being significantly 
less dangerous than they actually were.
These biased perceptions would manifest themselves in experiments like Robinson 
and Darley’s, leading individuals to hold differential punitive reactions in pairs of all-
else-equal accomplished and attempted crime cases, even if (unlikely enough) they were 
committed to the principle of equal punishment, and (more likely) reinforcing and 
magnifying the differential punitive judgments they would hold on intuition if they were 
not affected by hindsight bias effects.  Indeed, through the lens of the hindsight bias, all-
else-equal accomplished and attempted crime cases look different in properties other than 
the actual (non)occurrence of the crime result.  For the action in the accomplished crime 
case would be perceived as more dangerous than the action in the attempted crime case.  
The differential punitive responses that researchers obtain may be (at least in part) 
responsive to these misperceived differences in the actions’ dangerousness rather than to 
the (non)occurrence of harm.  Of course, this would not be the case if people were not 
likely to react to differences in perceived dangerousness.  But it seems reasonable to 
expect that differential perceived dangerousness would in fact lead to differential punitive 
Tversky eds., 1982) (reviewing a long series of studies both finding strong hindsight bias effects, and fail-
ing to achieve “debiasing” through most of the possible debiasing strategies).
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responses.  On the one hand, actions’ probability to cause harm is straightforwardly 
relevant for punishment under both retributive and deterrence perspectives, and in either 
case in virtue of quite simple and highly intuitive arguments.123  On the other hand, 
findings of foreseeability of the outcome a criminal action actually produces would likely 
affect the judgments of the offender’s mental state regarding the action’s result.  For 
instance, in accomplished crime cases, where according to the hindsight bias research 
people would tend to believe that the occurrence of the crime result was highly 
foreseeable, they would more readily find that the agent intended to bring it about.  
Whereas, in attempted crime cases, where people would tend to believe that the harmless 
outcome was highly foreseeable, they would more readily find the agent as having merely 
foreseen the occurrence of the crime result as an unlikely side effect of whatever other 
intentions she might have had.  Since there is evidence that people’s intuitive judgments 
of crime cases are sensitive to offenders’ mental states,124 these differential assessments 
of foreseeability of the occurrence of the crime result may likely bias the punitive 
judgments individuals hold in all-else-equal accomplished and attempted crime cases.
123
 According to a retributive perspective under which punishment reflects in part the degree of 
wrongfulness of the punished action, the higher the probability of an action causing harm, the more 
wrongful the action is, all other things being equal. In turn, under a deterrence approach, the higher the 
probability of an action causing harm, the higher the threat of punishment required to deter the agent from 
performing it.
124 See Norman J.  Finkel, Stephen T.  Maloney, Monique Z.  Valbuena & Jennifer L.  Groscup, Lay 
Perspectives on Legal Conundrums—Impossible and Mistaken Act Cases, 19 L.  & Hum.  Behav.  593 
(1995) (reporting mock jury experiments).
107
In addition to the robust effects of the hindsight bias, psychological research has 
shown that in judgment and information processing we tend to be subject to what psy-
chologists call vividness effects—i.e., generally, targets that are more vivid have a 
stronger impact on our evaluations of them than less vivid (but otherwise equal) targets—
as well as influenced by the affective state we are in when making the judgment or 
processing the target information.  These findings, and the psychological theories 
elaborated to account for them, suggest that crime results may impact strongly (and in the 
direction of differential punishment) on people’s evaluations of crime cases, either 
directly by conferring vividness to the relevant features of the evaluated cases, or 
indirectly through the emotional states they trigger.  In particular, the greater vividness, 
and stronger emotions arguably associated with accomplished crimes vis-à-vis (all else 
equal) attempted crimes may lead people to misperceive the former as more dangerous 
than the latter—so reinforcing and magnifying the hindsight bias effects.125
Consider, first, the effects of emotions.  The current state of the psychological empiri-
cal research consistently indicates that even minor differences in the affective states we 
are in may exert a pronounced influence on a number of our cognitive processes—from 
selective attention to encoding of information, from retrieval of information from 
125
 Unlike hindsight-bias effects, vividness effects and affective influence may also affect the assessment of 
properties other than the action’s dangerousness (e.g., agent’s motives, attitudes, and character traits), 
which may also be regarded as relevant for punitive responses.  However, for the sake of simplicity, I will 
focus only on the assessment of the action’s dangerousness.
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memory to selection of processing strategies—leading to “affect-induced biases.”126 The 
differential emotional responses typically triggered by accomplished crime cases and (all 
else equal) attempted crime cases may thus lead to differential perceptions or evaluations 
of the properties equally instantiated in each kind of case.  Let me illustrate this 
hypothesis with one of the robust findings of the field, namely, the impact of affect on 
processing strategies.  Despite the complexity of the empirical evidence, and the variety 
of the theoretical models developed to account for it, it is an overwhelmingly documented 
fact that affective states of negative valence normally foster detail-oriented and 
systematic styles of information processing, whereas individuals in positive affective 
states tend to adopt more flexible processing strategies, normally based on heuristics, 
stereotypes or scripts.127 As regards the assessment of dangerousness of accomplished 
crimes vis-à-vis (all else equal) attempts, these different processing strategies would thus 
favor more reliance on mental shortcuts, like those leading to hindsight bias effects, in the 
assessment of unsuccessful attempt cases than in accomplished crime cases, ultimately 
yielding, again, different sentencing judgments in the direction of differential 
punishment.
Similar effects are suggested by the research on the impact of vividness on informa-
tion processing.  It has been shown that when facing a piece of information presented in a 
126
 For recent comprehensive reviews, see Clore, Schwarz & Conway, supra note 113, at 369-403; also, Jo-
seph P.  Forgas, Affect and Social Judgments: An Introductory Review, in Emotion & Social Judgments 3 
(Joseph P.  Forgas ed., 1991).
127
 For a review of the relevant findings, and a thorough account of the diversity of theoretical elaborations 
of them, see the essays collected in Theories of Mood and Cognition (Leonard L.  Martin & Gerald L.  
Clore eds., 2001).
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vivid way, individuals’ processing responses differ from those obtained when facing 
similar information presented in more pallid or abstract ways.128 As recent research has 
made clear, vividness normally enhances message persuasiveness when the vivid pieces 
of the information presented are congruent with the message’s content.129 The implica-
tions of this research to the evaluation of the dangerousness of particular actions in ac-
complished crime cases vis-à-vis attempted crime cases may go like this.  In both accom-
128
 According to psychologists Nisbett and Ross, a target’s vividness depends on its being “likely to attract 
and hold our attention and to excite the imagination to the extent that it is (a) emotionally interesting, (b) 
concrete and imagery provoking, and (c) proximate in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way”—see Richard 
Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment 44-5 (1980).  For 
empirical evidence of the vividness effect, see R.  M.  Reyes, W.  C.  Thompson & G.  H.  Bower, Judg-
mental Biases Resulting From Differing Availabilities of Arguments, 39 J.  Personality & Soc.  Psychol.  2 
(1980) (generally acknowledged as showing clear evidence of a vividness effect); see also, Jonathan Shed-
ler & Melvin Manis, Can the Availability Heuristic Explain Vividness Effects?, 51 J.  Personality & Soc.  
Psychol.  26 (1986) (reporting studies indicating direct impact of vividness on information processing, un-
mediated by its effects on memory availability).
129 See, e.g., K.  P.  Frey & A.  H.  Eagly, Vividness Can Undermine the Persuasiveness of Messages, 65 J.  
Personality & Soc.  Psychol.  32 (1993) (reporting studies challenging the view that vividness, by capturing 
individuals attention, enhances message persuasiveness); also, Stephen M.  Smith & David R.  Shaffer, 
Vividness Can Undermine or Enhance Message Processing: The Moderating Role of Vividness Congru-
ency, 26 Personality & Soc.  Psychol.  Bull.  769 (2000) (reporting studies supporting their hypothesis on 
the moderating role of congruency between vivid aspects of a message and its content: “Highly congruent 
imagery should have a facilitative effect on message processing because it can both grab attention and 
prime relevant information stored in memory, whereas message-incongruent imagery is likely to undermine 
message processing by priming thoughts that are irrelevant to the message content or by undermining moti-
vation to think about message content.”)
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plished and attempted crime cases, the proposition that the action is dangerous requires 
rather abstract information—namely, the action is dangerous because it belongs to a class 
of actions some of whose members did, or will, actually cause harm.  However, in 
accomplished crime cases the fact that the dangerous action did in fact cause harm con-
fers vividness to the proposition that the action is dangerous: the actual harm at hand is a 
piece of concrete and highly congruent evidence of the action’s dangerousness.  In con-
trast, in unsuccessful attempt cases, the proposition that the action is dangerous may only
be supported in the less concrete fashion—the action did not cause harm, but it could 
have caused it.  In the latter case, then, the information regarding the action’s dangerous-
ness may only involve reference to possible, counterfactual harms, general categories, 
and distant (as opposed to proximate) instances of actual harm—all factors psychologists 
associate with low degrees of vividness.130 The effects of vividness detected in persuasion 
settings should manifest themselves also here, at least in terms of different degrees of 
confidence in the findings of dangerousness in one and the other case.  These differences 
in confidence should, in turn, lead to more extreme evaluations of dangerousness in the 
accomplished crime cases, and to more moderate evaluations in the attempted crime 
cases.131 As noted before, these differences in the evaluation of dangerousness will ulti-
130 See Nisbett & Ross, supra note 128, at 44-55, esp.  48-9 (arguing that information involving possible, 
but non-occurred facts is less concrete, and therefore less vivid, than information involving actual facts).
131 See David M.  Sanbonmatsu, Sharon Shavitt & Bryan D.  Gibson, Salience, Set Size, and Illusory 
Correlation: Making Moderate Assumptions About Extreme Targets, 66 J.  Personality & Soc.  Psychol.  
1020 (1994) (reporting studies indicating correlation between confidence on perceived information, and the 
extremeness of evaluation).  
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mately yield judgments of appropriate sentences in the direction of differential punish-
ment.  
Summing up, then, the reviewed psychological research in the domains of hindsight 
bias, affect-induced biases, and vividness effects give us good reason to think that the 
actual occurrence of results and its absence impact heavily on people’s perception and 
evaluation of features (other than actual harm) of the crimes they face.  Consequently, 
two otherwise identical actions, one of which causes harm while the other does not, will 
tend to be perceived as instantiating different features, some of which (e.g., the actions’ 
relative dangerousness) will certainly be regarded as relevant for punishment.  These dif-
ferences in the perception and evaluation of factual features will lead to differential judg -
ments about the appropriate sentences for one and the other case, fitting the tendency of 
people to hold punitive responses following a pattern of differential punishment.
3.  Conclusion
My guess is that the account based on the mechanism of pattern recognition and the 
priority of result-laden prototypes of criminal behavior, on the one hand, and the account 
based on the mediation of result-related cognitive and judgmental biases, on the other, 
pretty much exhaust the explanation of the findings of people’s tendency to support dif-
ferential punitive judgments when exposed to all-else-equal accomplished and attempted 
crime cases.  Many, and perhaps most, of our particular judgments may be grounded in 
the spontaneous process of pattern recognition, without calling for any deeper reflection, 
defense or justification.  In the cases in which, for whatever reasons, reflective scrutiny is
called for, the mediation of result biases will prevent the very question of the independent 
relevance of results from arising: why would people care about what to do when “all 
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other things are equal,” if such a scenario never obtains—that is, if accomplished crimes 
are always relevantly different from attempted crimes in aspects other than the actual oc-
currence of harm? If I am right, the plausibility of an argument such as the one made by 
Paul Robinson and John Darley, which I discussed above in Part II,132 is severely dimin-
ished.  For the findings of people’s tendency to support differential punitive judgments do 
not straightforwardly allow the inference that they would be committed to defend the 
practice of differential punishment as a matter of principle.  But the central point of this 
Part is not to contest such an argument.  Rather, it is to explore the possible implications 
of the mediating result biases for the formulation of deterrence-oriented criminal-law 
policies.  To this task I now turn.
B.  Result Biases and Deterrence
I have argued in Part I that, insofar as deterrence is concerned, schemes of equal sanc-
tions and schemes of differential sanctions are, all other things being equal, equivalent 
alternatives.  The argument, briefly stated, went like this.  The deterrent mechanism the 
theory relies upon hinges on the expected punishment agents face in deciding to commit a 
crime.  When the crime at stake is subject to criminal liability both in the event of success 
and failure—i.e., when there is both accomplished crime liability and attempted crime 
liability—the value of the expected punishment results from the sum of the value of the 
sanction for the event the action causes harm, discounted by the probability of the action 
causing harm and the probability of such sanction being imposed on the agent, on the one 
hand, and the value of the sanction for the event the action fails, discounted by the 
132 Supra text accompanying notes 60-82.
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probability of the action not causing harm and the probability of this sanction being 
imposed on the agent, on the other.  Consequently, for any probability of the action 
causing harm, and any probability of sanctions being imposed, equal values of expected 
punishment may be met by different pairs of sanctions—either equal sanctions 
irrespective of the outcome, or different sanctions depending on the crime’s actual result.  
To the extent that deterrence is concerned, all those pairs are equivalent—for they yield 
the same expected punishment.
Now, as it is commonplace in the economic literature on punishment, the foregoing 
analysis assumes that there is no noise between the relevant criminal-law policies and 
individuals’ perceptions of them.133 But, is this a realistic assumption?
Social research has shown that deterrence effects are mediated by people’s perceptions 
of criminal-law policies; however, there is still little knowledge as to how those percep-
tions are shaped.134 Still, there is some empirical support for the view that among the fac-
tors influencing individuals’ perceptions of criminal-law policies, their own personal ex-
133 See Sah, supra note 59 at 1273.
134
 For a recent, thorough review of the relevant findings and open issues in the perceptual deterrence litera-
ture, see Daniel S.  Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 1, 12-23 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (stating, at 15: “The percep-
tual deterrence literature was motivated by skepticism that perceived and actual sanction threats were 
tightly linked.  Thus it is curious that perceptual deterrence researchers have given only modest attention to 
the factors influencing risk perceptions and to the dynamic processes by which they are formed”).
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perience as victims, witnesses or offenders, and the corresponding experience of their ac-
quaintances loom large.135
My discussion in the previous section has brought to light psychological evidence sug-
gesting the existence of result-related cognitive and judgmental biases that may affect 
people’s perception and evaluation of past crimes.  I hypothesize that these biases must 
also play a role in the formation of people’s experience regarding the criminal-law deter-
rence variables—namely, sanction severity and probability of conviction.  In this section, 
I explore what this impact may be, and particularly whether the mediation of these biases 
could tip the balance in favor of the adoption of a scheme of differential sanctions.  
1.  Marginal deterrence and hindsight bias 
In order to produce marginal deterrence, a scheme of sanctions must be so devised as 
to provide individuals who have already decided to engage in criminal activity with in-
centives to minimize the harmful effects of their criminal actions.136 One of the implica-
tions of this general idea of marginal deterrence is that, for any given level of the prob-
ability of sanctions being imposed, the higher the probability of an action causing harm, 
the harsher the sanction its perpetrator is to receive, all other things being equal.  More 
135 See Jerry Parker & Harold G.  Grasmick, Linking Actual and Perceived Certainty of Punishment, 17 
Criminology 366 (1979) (focusing on respondents’ reports of past victimization of both respondents and 
their acquaintances, and their reports of arrests in connection with those cases); Julie Horney & Ineke Haen 
Marshall, Risk Perceptions Among Serious Offenders: The Role of Crime and Punishment, 30 Criminology 
575 (1992) (focusing on respondents’ reports of crimes committed by respondents, and their reports of ar-
rests in connection with those crimes); also, Nagin, supra note 134, at 15-9 (reviewing other studies), and 
Sah, supra  note 59, at 1273-81 (accounting for similar findings in a model of individual criminal choice).
136 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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specifically, the expected punishment the agent faces in performing the criminal action 
must rise with the probability of the action causing harm.  Thus, as noted before, the 
choice of a particular scheme of relative sanctions for successful and unsuccessful 
crimes—i.e., either a scheme of differential sanctions, or a scheme of equal sanctions—
will make no difference insofar as the resulting expected punishment equally rises with 
the probability of actions causing harm.  Being aware of this feature of the applicable 
sanctioning scheme—as they are under the assumption of no (or only negligible) noise 
between the relevant criminal-law policies and individuals’ perceptions of them—indi-
viduals willing to engage in harmful activity will have a reason to minimize the probabil-
ity of their actions causing harm.
Now, according to the available research on perceptual deterrence,137 individuals learn 
about the contents of criminal-law policies through their direct experience and the corre-
sponding experience of their acquaintances.  So, if the criminal-law schedule of sanctions 
is such that expected punishment increases with the probability of actions causing harm, 
individuals will learn about this fact primarily from contrasting the crimes they have been 
exposed to, directly or through their acquaintances’ experience, and the punishment their 
perpetrators have received.
The findings regarding the effects of the hindsight bias (and the other result biases that 
reinforce it) I reviewed above138 strongly suggest that people will have distorted percep-
tions of the crimes they are exposed to depending on whether they are successful or un-
successful crimes.  In particular, the hindsight bias research supports the prediction that 
137 See supra note 135, and accompanying text.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 119-131.
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actions bearing identical probabilities of causing harm will normally be misperceived as 
bearing different probabilities depending on their actual outcome (harm or non-harm).  
Generally, then, successful crimes will be perceived as bearing higher probability of the 
action causing harm than (all else equal) unsuccessful crimes.
Such misperceptions of the probability of actions causing harm will distort the percep-
tions of the criminal-law policy of making expected punishment vary with the actual (i.e., 
unbiasedly assessed) probability of actions causing harm.  Especially, if the policy is ef-
fected through schemes of equal sanctions—under which actions bearing the same actual 
probability of causing a crime result are punished with the same penalty independently of 
whether they succeed or fail—then the effects of the hindsight bias may completely blur 
the intended policy of providing marginal incentives against marginal increases in the 
probability of actions causing harm.  For, due to hindsight bias effects, schemes of equal 
sanctions may be seen as systematically affording equal punitive treatment to offenders 
who perform actions that are perceived as significantly differing in their probability of 
causing harm.  
However, if the criminal-law policy of making expected punishment vary with the 
actual probability of actions causing harm is effected through schemes of differential 
sanctions, such undesirable consequence of the mismatch between the actual policy and 
people’s perception of it may not arise.  For under schemes of differential sanctions, ac-
tions that are perceived as bearing higher probabilities of causing harm (i.e., those that 
succeed in causing harm) are correlated with more severe actual sanctions than actions 
perceived as bearing lower probabilities of causing harm (i.e., those that fail to cause 
harm).  
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To see the point more clearly, consider the following example.  Suppose that acting so 
as to cause the harmful state of affairs R is a crime, and that it is punishable either if it 
does or does not bring about R—i.e., there is both accomplished crime liability and at-
tempted crime liability.  Suppose further that every action that risks R falls into one of 
two types, A or B, on account of the probability of the action causing R—so that actions 
carrying a high probability of causing R fall into type A, and actions carrying a low prob-
ability fall into type B.  Certainly, both types of actions may either succeed or fail in 
bringing about R—Ar and Br denote the class of instances of each type that actually 
caused R, and Aa and Ba the corresponding failed attempts.  Although these eventual out-
comes will not alter the probabilities the actions bore—which remain high or low irre-
spective of the outcome—people affected by the hindsight bias will have a different im-
pression.  From their biased perspective, they will systematically overestimate the prob-
ability of actions bringing about the state of affairs that they indeed brought about.  For 
simplicity’s sake, let me assume that, when assessed through the lenses of the hindsight 
bias, actions otherwise carrying a high probability of causing R will be perceived as hav-
ing borne a very high probability if they did in fact cause R, and only a low probability if 
they failed to bring it about.  In turn, actions otherwise carrying a low probability of 
causing R, will be perceived as having borne a high probability if they did in fact cause R, 











Ar High Very high Severe Very severe
Aa High Low Severe Lenient
Br Low High Lenient Severe
Ba Low Very low Lenient Very lenient
Now, imagine that a scheme of equal sanctions like the one described in the fourth col-
umn of Table 3 (Scheme E) is in force.  If people’s experience of past crimes and their 
criminal-law responses is rich enough as to grasp the complete schedule of sanctions, 
they will learn that actions falling into the Ar and Aa categories risk severe sanctions, and 
those falling into the Br and Ba categories risk lenient sanctions.  Individuals unaffected 
by the hindsight bias may easily infer that the shift from lenient to severe sanctions is cor-
related with the increase from low to high probability of actions causing R.  Were they 
willing to produce R, this inference should lead them to find a reason to opt for a course 
of action carrying a low probability of causing R rather than an alternative course carry-
ing a high probability.
However, hindsight bias effects will prevent some individuals from drawing that infer-
ence.  In fact, these hindsight-biased individuals will have the impression that past crimes 
fall into four categories, depending on whether they have borne very high, high, low, or 
very low probability of causing R.  As well, experience will teach them that the criminal 
law observes an idiosyncratic pattern according to which actions carrying a high prob-
ability of causing R, as well as those carrying a very low probability, risk lenient sanc-
tions, whereas actions leading to a low probability of causing R, as well as those bearing 
a very high probability, risk severe sanctions.  With this information in mind, were they 
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willing to cause R, they would rather choose a course of action with a high probability of 
causing R, instead of an alternative course of action carrying a low probability.  Indeed, 
assessing in foresight their own prospects of bringing about R, they would find possible 
alternative courses of action falling at most into two types, that is, courses of action 
bearing either a high or a low probability of causing R—for by hypothesis every action is 
either A or B, and the hindsight bias does not prevent individuals from so concluding 
when assessing actions in foresight.  Nevertheless, since the hindsight bias effects do taint 
the information about past crimes, these individuals would mistakenly believe that by 
choosing the low probability course of action they would risk a severe sanction, whereas 
by choosing the high probability course they would only risk lenient punishment.
Certainly, if, as predicted, hindsight-biased individuals choose high probability ac-
tions, they will receive severe sanctions—rather than the lenient sanctions they expect—
whether they succeed or fail in bringing about R.  Yet, by that time they will already 
know what the outcome of the criminal action was, and will accordingly view their own 
past action as having borne either a very high or a low probability of causing R, depend-
ing on whether it did, or did not, bring about R, correspondingly.  As psychological re-
search has shown, they will even misremember their own foresight assessments, believ-
ing that they “knew it all along” that things would turn out as they did,139 which will in 
139
 Indeed, the hindsight bias effects on memory (i.e., the incapability to reconstruct or retrieve from mem-
ory the prediction actually made after having learnt the actual outcome of the predicted event) are the as-
pects of this phenomenon that have most attracted the attention of the psychological research on the hind-
sight bias.  For early experiments see, e.g., Fischhoff & Beyth, supra note 122; also, Gordon Wood, The 
Knew-It-All-Along Effect, 4 J.  Experimental Psychol.: Hum.  Perception & Performance 345 (1978); for 
recent experiments, see, e.g., Dehn & Erdfelder, supra note 122 (also reviewing relevant literature).
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turn allow them to maintain their biased perception of the criminal law pattern even 
against their own experience.  
In contrast, a scheme of differential sanctions like the one described in the fifth col-
umn of Table 3 (Scheme D) may prevent those perverse effects from occurring.  By hy-
pothesis, Scheme D yields the same expected punishment for each type of action, A and 
B, as Scheme E.  Thus, for individuals unaffected by the hindsight bias—who will learn 
that high probability actions risk very severe or lenient sanctions depending on whether 
they result in R or not, and that low probability actions risk severe or very lenient sanc-
tions contingent on their causing R or not—the move from Scheme E to Scheme D will 
make no difference.  However, for individuals subject to the hindsight bias it will.  In ef-
fect, under Scheme D hindsight-biased individuals will learn from past cases that low 
probability actions are correlated with lenient sanctions, while high probability actions 
are correlated with severe penalties.  Then, with this information in mind they will have 
an incentive not to opt for a prospective course of action bearing a high probability of 
causing R, if they have an alternative course that they associate with a low probability.  
The foregoing discussion suggests that the goal of marginal deterrence may offer a 
reason to choose a scheme of differential sanctions over a scheme of equal sanctions, 
once hindsight bias effects are taken into account.  The reason is that, all other things be-
ing equal, less individuals will engage in activity of the A type (and proportionally more 
will engage in activity of the B type) under the former scheme than under the latter 
scheme.  If the number of crimes is large enough, these differences will manifest them-
selves in a larger number of instances of R under the scheme of equal sanctions than un-
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der the scheme of differential sanctions.  Provided the minimization of R is what moti-
vates criminalization, the scheme of differential sanctions should then be preferred.
The real world is much more complex than my oversimplified example, which makes 
it much more difficult for individuals to grasp the complete pattern of crimes and crimi-
nal-law responses that would allow them to infer that punishment risk rises with the 
probability of actions causing crime results.  In such a noisy environment, the widespread 
presence of the robust hindsight bias that cognitive psychologists have found may be a 
felicitous advantage.  If successful crimes are typically seen, though mistakenly, as in-
volving actions making it very likely that harm occurs, while unsuccessful crimes are 
typically seen as involving actions carrying low probabilities of causing harm, then a 
consistent and across the board scheme of sanctions punishing successful crimes more se-
verely than unsuccessful crimes may be an easy device to communicate, though very 
coarsely, that more dangerous courses of action risk harsher sanctions than less dangerous 
ones.  Granted, those coarse effects are far from an ideal model of marginal deterrence.  
Yet, in a noisy environment plagued with the effects of the hindsight bias, they are per-
haps the best we can achieve.140
2.  Perceived crime and punishment frequencies
I argued before that the fact that a criminal action actually causes a harmful result con-
fers congruent vividness to the action’s dangerousness, as well as it triggers emotional re-
140
 Note, by the way, that for those who can avoid the distortions of the hindsight bias and gather enough 
information, the scheme of differential sanctions may still provide adequate incentives to minimize the 
probability of actions causing harm—insofar as the sum of the expected sanctions for the event of failure 
and for the event of success in causing harm proportionally rises with the probability of the action causing 
harm.
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actions normally absent (or present only to a lesser extent) when harm does not obtain.  I 
also showed that these two phenomena make individuals who are assessing past criminal 
cases to adopt different information-processing strategies when the case at hand involves 
the actual occurrence of a harmful result, and when it does not.141 The same two phenom-
ena, I will now claim, have an impact on people’s attention to the criminal cases they are 
exposed to, and on their retrieval from memory of instances of past crimes and the crimi-
nal-law responses they have led to, so that, generally, accomplished crime cases are more 
attention-grabbing and are better remembered over time, whereas attempted crime cases 
are less attention-grabbing and more easily forgotten.142  I will then argue that in 
designing deterrence-oriented criminal-law policies, policy-makers should generally take 
into account the existence of differences in salience and availability among types of 
crimes, for they would impact on people’s perception of relevant variables—i.e., the 
frequency of crimes being committed, and the frequency of crimes being actually 
punished.  Finally, I will defend that the policy implications that emerge from properly 
paying heed to differences in salience and availability may inform the decision as to the 
adoption of schemes of differential sanctions vis-à-vis schemes of equal sanctions.  
a.  Differential salience and availability.  There is clear evidence that in everyday life, 
where innumerable stimuli compete for attention, vivid targets capture more attention 
141 See supra text accompanying notes 125-131.
142
 In accordance with the relevant psychological literature, I will use the terms “salience” to refer to the 
capacity of a target to grab attention, and “availability” to refer to the capacity of a piece of information to 
be retrieved from memory.
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than non-vivid ones.143 Though well supported in theory, evidence that vivid information 
is more likely to be held in memory and retrieved over time is somewhat thinner, but still 
available.144 Research on the influence of emotions on memory, in turn, shows that emo-
tional states also bias attention and subsequent retrieval, which results in the tendency of 
emotional targets to be better remembered than unemotional ones, in improved memory 
for details when encoding takes place under the influence of intense emotions, etc.145 As 
these findings suggest, due to the effects on attention, vivid and emotionally charged tar-
gets are more salient than pallid and unemotional ones; in turn, due to the effects on 
memory, stored information regarding vivid and emotionally charged targets is more 
available than that regarding pallid and unemotional targets.  These findings are general 
143 See S.  E.  Taylor & S.  C.  Thompson, Stalking the Elusive “Vividness” Effect, 89 Psychol.  Rev.  155 
(1982) (reviewing studies that had failed to find vividness effects, and arguing that their laboratory condi-
tions failed to simulate “noisy” real world conditions).
144
 For evidence supporting the hypothesized memorial advantage of vivid information, see, e.g., R.  L.  
Collins, S.  E.  Taylor, J.  V.  Wood & S.  C.  Thompson, The Vividness Effect: Elusive or Illusory?, 24 J.  
Experimental Soc.  Psychol.  1 (1988).
145 See, e.g., W.  Revelle & D.  A.  Loftus, Individual Differences and Arousal: Implications for the Study 
of Mood and Memory, 4 Cognition & Emotion 209 (1990) (reviewing literature finding correlation between 
emotional content and better recall); F.  Heuer & D.  Reisberg, Emotion, Arousal, and Memory for Detail, 
in The Handbook of Emotion and Memory: Research and Theory 151 (S.-A.  Christianson ed., 1992) (re-
porting studies linking intense emotional states at the encoding stage, and subsequent improved detailed-
oriented memory).  The vast psychological literature on emotions and memory suggests many other effects, 
and a complex field of supporting data—for a thorough review and discussion of open issues, see W.  Ger-
rod Parrott & Matthew P.  Spackman, Emotion and Memory, in Handbook of Emotions 476 (Michael 
Lewis & Jeannette M.  Haviland-Jones eds., 2d ed., 2000).  Yet, as far as my argument is concerned, noth-
ing beyond the general findings I report in the text are called for.
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enough as to allow room for hypothesizing that these differences in salience and avail-
ability must also manifest themselves when the targets at issue are criminal cases.  Given 
that the actual causation of harm confers vividness to the crime’s instantiation of relevant 
properties such as dangerousness, and normally triggers stronger emotional reactions, it is 
plausible to suppose that ceteris paribus successful crimes are more salient than 
unsuccessful crimes, and that information about the former is subsequently more 
available than that concerning the latter.  Now, what are the implications that the deter-
rence policy-maker should draw from these facts?
b.  General policy implications.  It is a well documented fact that, under normal con-
ditions of limited information and processing capacity, people’s estimations of frequency 
are mediated by availability—that is, the frequency with which a class of events has oc-
curred is estimated by the ease with which instances of such class could be retrieved from 
memory—a judgmental strategy that psychologists call “availability heuristic.”146 When 
factors unrelated to the actual frequency determine increased availability (e.g., vividness 
and emotionality), reliance on this availability heuristic yields biased estimations of fre-
quency: more available events are believed to be more frequent, though they are not nec-
essarily so.147
146 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probabil-
ity, 4 Cognitive Psychol.  207 (1973), reprinted in Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 163 
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (introducing the phenomenon and discussing 
several studies).
147
 For some examples regarding social judgments, see Shelly E.  Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social 
Perception and Interaction, in Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 190 (Daniel Kahneman, 
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
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Suppose, for simplicity’s sake, that every instance of a given type of crime falls into 
one of two categories, A or B¸ depending on whether it is highly salient and available 
over time—in which case it falls into category A—or less salient and poorly available 
over time—in which case it falls into category B.  If, under conditions of limited informa-
tion and processing capacity, an individual is to assess the overall frequency of crimes 
(A’s and B’s) during a given period of time, research on the availability heuristic predicts 
that the A’s will bear a stronger impact in the individual’s outcome estimation—for she 
will be able to bring to mind instances of A more easily than instances of B.  In other 
words, for any given overall frequency of crimes (A’s and B’s), different distributions of 
A’s vis-à-vis B’s will lead to different estimations of the overall frequency of crimes—so 
that, in the extremes, a distribution of few A’s and many B’s will yield a lower perceived 
crime frequency than that a distribution of many A’s and a few B’s will.
There are, on the other hand, good reasons to believe that people’s decisions to engage 
in crime are partly influenced by their perceptions of others’ behavior regarding crime.  
Particularly, individuals seem to be much more likely to engage in criminal activity when 
they perceive that crime is widespread—the most extreme example of which is given by 
“mob” offenses, such as looting or lynching.148 This suggests that higher perceived crime 
rates would be associated with people being more likely to commit crimes.  Which, in 
turn, gives rise to the following general policy implication (PI).
148 See Dan M.  Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va.  L.  Rev.  349, 352-61 
(1997) (reviewing abundant empirical evidence, and advancing several mechanisms through which social 
influence may determine higher willingness to engage in criminal activity).
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PI (1): For any given level of resources devoted to crime prevention, more re-
sources should be allocated to prevent instances of A, and less to prevent instances 
of B.
In other words, crime prevention should put more emphasis on A’s than on B’s.  For, 
as noted, a reduction in the number of A’s would impact more strongly in people’s esti-
mations of the overall crime frequency than a similar reduction in the number of B’s.  
Along with the effects on the estimation of crime rates, differences in crimes’ salience 
and subsequent availability may also influence people’s estimations of the overall prob-
ability of offenders being caught, prosecuted, convicted and punished (simply, the overall 
probability of punishment).  Again, people’s assessments of the probability of punish-
ment would stem from their own, and their acquaintances’ experience.  In this estimation 
of the probability of punishment, the availability heuristic would mediate both the selec-
tion of the reference class of past crimes from which the frequency of sanction imposition 
will be assessed, and the estimation of the frequency of sanction imposition within the se-
lected reference class.  Provided that the fact that a crime is, or is not, punished does not 
affect crime salience and later availability,149 the estimation of the frequency of punish-
ment within the selected reference class, even if mediated by the availability heuristic, 
149
 This assumption may or may not be sound as a matter of fact.  It is however necessary to build in ceteris 
paribus conditions—for my argument aims at determining the implications of differences in salience and 
availability due to features of crimes other than their being punished or not (i.e., in particular, the fact that 
they caused harm, or not).
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need not be biased.150 However, differences in salience and availability among crimes 
will affect the conformation of the reference class of remembered crimes from which the 
frequency of sanction imposition is assessed.  Particularly, the A’s will tend to be over-
represented in the reference class of remembered crimes, whereas the poor availability of 
the B’s will make them to be under-represented.  These over- and under-representations 
will thus result in the conformation of a biased reference class, comprising a dispropor-
tionately high number of A’s and a disproportionately low number of B’s.  A reference 
class of remembered crimes thus biased may lead to distorted representations of the ac-
tual overall frequency of crimes (A’s and B’s) being punished, if the actual partial fre-
quencies of A’s being punished, on the one hand, and B’s being punished, on the other, 
are not even.  Particularly, for any given actual overall frequency of crimes (A’s and B’s) 
being punished, any uneven distribution of partial frequencies under which A’s are pun-
ished more often, and B’s are punished proportionately less often will yield a higher per-
ceived overall frequency of crimes being punished than an even distribution, or an un-
even one under which B’s are punished more often than A’s.
Accordingly, if higher perceived overall probability of punishment is desirable, and 
this, as hypothesized, is formed by people’s experience regarding past crimes and the fre-
quency with which they have led to the imposition of punishment, the mediation of the 
availability heuristic gives rise to the following general policy implication.
PI (2): For any given amount of resources devoted to the apprehension, prosecution 
and conviction of offenders, the allocation of them should be such that crimes fal-
150 See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 146, at 164 (“Availability is an ecologically valid clue for 
the judgment of frequency because, in general, frequent events are easier to recall or imagine than infre-
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ling into the A category are more often punished, whereas those falling into the B
category are punished proportionately less often.
There are, in fact, deterrent-related reasons to prefer a policy that leads to perceptions 
of higher overall probability of punishment than another leading to perceptions of lower 
overall probability, all other things being equal.  Deterrence theory models of criminal 
choice typically assume that prospective offenders’ perceptions of the relevant deterrence 
variables are crime-specific—so that, f or instance, an increase in the probability of pun-
ishment regarding one type of crime may lead to a decrease in the number of crimes of 
that type, and a proportional increase of the number of crimes of another type.151 In my 
example of A’s and B’s, this assumption would imply that prospective offenders will take 
into account the partial frequency of either A’s or B’s being punished, and not the overall 
frequency of crimes (A’s and B’s) being punished—so that, if an individual is certain that 
her crime will fall into the A category, she will consider only the probability of punish-
ment attached to this type of case; if, in turn, she is uncertain, she will estimate the prob-
ability of it falling into that category, and the probability of it falling into the B category, 
and so she will calculate the probability of punishment by taking into account the specific 
probabilities of punishment attached to each category.  However, as some have sug-
gested, prospective offenders’ perceptions of the probability of punishment may be influ-
enced by broader estimations of the government’s efficacy in apprehending and convict-
ing criminals in general, or with respect to inclusive, cross-type crime categories—as op-
quent ones”).
151 See, e.g., Steven D.  Levitt, Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence, 
Incapacitation or Measurement Error?, 36 Econ.  Inquiry 353, 361 (1998).  
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posed to crime-specific estimations.152 In accordance with this suggestion, prospective of-
fenders may form their relevant perceptions of the probability of punishment by assessing 
the overall frequency of crimes (A’s and B’s) being punished—in which case, a higher 
perceived overall probability of punishment will directly contribute to deterrence.
Be that as it may, it seems plausible to suppose that evaluations of this overall prob-
ability of crimes being punished are at play in people’s judgments of the govern ment’s 
efficacy in prosecuting and punishing criminal offenders.  These judgments, in turn, 
influence people’s disposition to cooperate with law enforcement institutions in the 
prosecution of criminal offenders.  It has been argued that the lower the perceived prob-
ability of offenders being caught and punished, the lower the willingness of law-abiding 
citizens to cooperate with the authorities in fighting crime.  The argument is that the 
lower the perceived probability of conviction, the lower the expected benefit of individual 
acts of cooperation.153 This relationship, in turn, leads to perverse dynamics: a low per-
ceived probability of conviction leads to a low level of cooperation, which leads to a 
lower probability of punishment, and so on and so forth.154
In sum, either because the perceived overall probability of punishment directly affects 
deterrence, or because it does so indirectly by influencing people’s incentives to cooper-
ate with law enforcement agencies, there is reason to prefer a policy leading to a higher 
perceived overall probability of punishment rather than an alternative policy leading to a 
lower perceived overall probability, all other things being equal.  So, again, the differen-
tial impact of past crimes on people’s estimations of the overall probability of punishment 
152 See Nagin, supra note 134, at 18.
153 See Kahan, supra note 148, at 380-1.
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depending on crimes’ salience and availability over time favors the allocation of limited 
resources for apprehension, prosecution and conviction of offenders, so that crimes being 
more salient and available are punished more often, and those crimes being less salient 
and available are punished proportionately less often.
c.  Punishment for results.  The variety of possible sources of salience and availability 
makes it difficult to translate the general policy implications PI (1) and PI (2) of focusing 
crime prevention resources primarily on more salient and available crimes into more spe-
cific prescriptions.  I have pointed out, however, that the actual causation of harm both 
confers vividness to the crime’s instantiation of relevant properties such as dangerous-
ness, and normally triggers stronger emotional reactions.  So, I argued, all other things
being equal, accomplished crimes are more salient than attempted crimes, and informa-
tion about the former is subsequently more available than that concerning the latter.  Such 
point about the relative salience and later availability of successful and unsuccessful 
crimes suggests that the issue of the relative punishment of successful and unsuccessful 
crimes may be a realm where the two general policy implications PI (1) and PI (2) may 
be applied.  Yet, a closer scrutiny reveals that only PI (2) may have some bearing on the 
issue of the relative punishment of successful and unsuccessful crimes—PI (1) has there 
no application.  
According to PI (1), for any type of offense O, policy-makers should allocate limited 
crime prevention resources so that more salient and available instances of O are more ef-
fectively prevented than less salient and available instances of O.  Under some condi-
tions, such prescription may be achieved by punishing the more salient and available in-
154 Ibid., at 381-2.
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stances of O more severely, and the less salient and available instances of it proportion-
ally less severely.  Thus, individuals willing to commit an instance of O would have an 
incentive to choose the less salient and available course of action rather than the more sa-
lient and available one—an incentive that they would not have were both courses of ac-
tion punished with equal severity.  Since, all other things being equal, successful in-
stances of a type of crime are more salient and available than unsuccessful instances of it, 
one might thus feel inclined to believe that, according to PI (1), successful offenses 
should be punished more severely, and unsuccessful offenses proportionally less se-
verely.  But that belief is mistaken.  Indeed, the argument that by punishing the more sali-
ent and available instances of O more severely than the less salient and available in-
stances of it may give prospective offenders an incentive to choose the latter rather than 
the former presupposes that offenders may substitute one course of action for the other as 
a consequence of the relative punishment of one and the other course of action.  And this 
is not the case as regards successful and unsuccessful instances of a given type of crime.  
For, realistically, agents cannot tell in advance whether the criminal actions they choose 
to perform will end up causing harm or not.  They can only choose among different 
courses of action bearing different probabilities of causing harm.  But for any probability 
of an action causing harm, the action may end up actually causing harm or not.  So, an of-
fender’s decision to perform that action would be affected by both the sanction she would 
receive if the action actually causes harm, and the sanction she would receive if the action 
fails to cause harm.  Expressed in technical terms, the relevant expected punishment 
would result from the sum of the expected sanction for the event of success plus the ex-
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pected sanction for the event of failure.155 Consequently, to the extent that the resulting 
expected punishment remains constant, different distributions of punishment between the 
successful outcome and the unsuccessful one would make no difference for the offender’s 
decision to commit the crime.  
Notice, however, that the point is just that, for any given probability of actions causing 
harm, successful crimes may not be reduced at the expense of allowing a larger number 
of unsuccessful crimes.  Yet, successful crimes may indeed be reduced at the expense of 
allowing a larger number of unsuccessful crimes by devising a schedule of sanctions such 
that expected punishment rises with the probability of actions causing harm.  For, if ex-
pected punishment increases as the probability of actions causing harm augments, indi-
viduals willing to commit a crime will have an incentive to minimize the probability of 
their criminal actions causing harm.  If so, on aggregate, more instances of actions carry-
ing lower probabilities of causing harm will be committed, and proportionally less in-
stances of actions carrying higher probabilities of causing harm, than it would be the case 
were punishment not responsive to differences in the probability of actions causing harm.  
Since such a schedule of sanctions minimizes the aggregate probability of actions causing 
harm, fewer instances of successful offenses would obtain under such arrangement than 
under a competing arrangement whereby expected punishment is not thus responsive to 
variations in the probability of actions causing harm.  As I argued above156, schemes of 
differential sanctions may help to convey that the schedule of sanctions has this property 
to an audience systematically affected by hindsight bias effects.  Now, if this is the only 
155 See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 136-140.
133
prescription that PI (1) may yield for the issue of the relative punishment of successful 
and unsuccessful offenses, then to that extent PI (1) is superfluous—that is, the same pre-
scription would hold were PI (1) not true.  That is why I claimed that PI (1) has no bear-
ing on the issue of the relative punishment of successful and unsuccessful crimes.
Let me turn to PI (2)—i.e., the general prescription that limited law enforcement re-
sources should be allocated so that more salient and available crimes are more frequently 
punished than less salient and available crimes.  Together with the fact that successful 
crimes are ceteris paribus more salient and available than unsuccessful crimes, PI (2) 
yields the prescription that successful offenses should be punished more frequently than 
unsuccessful offenses.  More specifically, for any given amount of resources devoted to 
law enforcement, more resources should be allocated to the prosecution of successful 
offenses, and proportionally less to the prosecution of unsuccessful offenses, all other 
things being equal.  It does not follow from this that when unsuccessful crimes are to be 
punished, they should be punished with less severe sanctions than the comparable 
successful crimes.  The point is just that, since punishment of successful offenses impacts 
more strongly on people’s perception of the overall frequency of crimes being punished, 
the distribution of sanctions between successful and unsuccessful offenses that 
maximizes the perceived overall frequency of crimes being punished is one where 
successful offenses are punished more frequently than unsuccessful offenses.  The 
institutional arrangements through which this goal could be achieved may involve rules 
requiring law-enforcement authorities to give priority to the prosecution of successful 
crimes over unsuccessful crimes, or favoring prosecutorial discretion in attempted crime 
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cases,157 but not rules establishing the actual sanctions to be imposed in successful and 
unsuccessful crime cases.
However, it might be the case that, in the absence of harm actually caused, instances 
of a given type of crime are normally as poorly salient and easily forgotten as to make 
punishment for unsuccessful instances of that type of crime worthless—for imposing 
punishment in such cases, that is to say, would make no relevant contribution to people’s 
perception of the probability of crimes of that type being punished.  Whether there are in 
fact types of crimes whose unsuccessful instances are thus normally insufficiently salient 
and available is, of course, an empirical matter.  But if there are, it may be sensible to 
adopt for those types of crimes extreme schemes of differential sanctions whereby only 
successful instances are punished, whereas unsuccessful instances are not punished at all.  
For instance, actions that amount to crimes of negligence as serious as involuntary man-
slaughter are often actions whose dangerousness would remain unnoticed in the absence 
of harm.158 If so, the practice of punishing criminal negligence only when it causes harm, 
157
 Among the A.B.A.  standards for the prosecution function there is an example of regulation of the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion that allows prosecutors to select cases for prosecution in virtue of the actual 
harm the crime has brought about—see A.B.A.  Standards for Criminal Justice: The Prosecution Function § 
3.9(b) (1992) (“.  .  .  The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the 
public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would sup-
port a conviction.  Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his or 
her discretion are: .  .  .  (ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense .  .  .”).  My account of the relative 
impact of successful and unsuccessful offenses on the perceived frequency of crimes being punished may 
make sense of this regulation.
158
 Consider, e.g., Commonwealth v.  Welansky, 55 N.E.2d.  383 (1944).  The defendant, in charge of a 
night club in Boston, was found guilty on numerous counts of involuntary manslaughter.  His negligent be-
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and to the extent of the harm actually caused,159 may be partly accounted for as an impli-
cation of PI (2) as I have just suggested.
C. Conclusion
I began this Part by offering a plausible account of why we tend to believe on intuition 
that successful offenses call for harsher punishment than their unsuccessful counterparts.  
This tendency is partly explained, I argued, by the effects of a number of result-related 
cognitive and judgmental biases that make us misperceive and erroneously assess factual 
properties of the criminal actions we are exposed to.  I then explored the ways in which 
such result biases may be included in a deterrence model, with an eye put on whether 
such move could give a reason for adopting a scheme of differential sanctions under 
which accomplished crimes are punished more severely than attempted crimes, all other 
things being equal.  My discussion showed, first, that people’s reliance on the hindsight 
bias when assessing past crimes’ dangerousness, together with the need to provide mar-
ginal deterrence by making expected punishment rise with the probability of criminal ac-
tions causing harm, and the assumption that people learn about the relevant deterrence 
havior had basically consisted in keeping the night club with highly flammable decorations and defective 
emergency exits.  His negligence resulted in the death of some of the night club’s employees and a great 
number of its patrons who could not escape from a fire—which started (and spread rapidly) as a conse-
quence of the flammable decorations—due to the defective emergency exits.  The facts that made We-
lansky’s behavior dangerous may not have been very salient before the fire for the more than one thousand 
patrons that overcrowded his club the night of the fire—ibid.  at 907.  
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variables from their own experience, may offer a reason to prefer a scheme of differential 
sanctions over a scheme of equal sanctions, all other things being equal.
Secondly, I showed that the relative salience and availability from memory of accom-
plished and attempted crimes should also be taken into account for deterrence purposes.  
This phenomenon, however, has no implication for the issue of the relative severity of the 
sanctions for successful and unsuccessful crimes.  The higher relative salience and avail-
ability of successful crimes makes it advisable to allocate limited crime prevention re-
sources so that successful crimes bear a higher probability of punishment, at the expense 
of a lower probability of punishment for unsuccessful crimes, all other things being equal.  
Yet, under some extreme conditions, the best policy may be one under which unsuccess-
ful crimes are never punished.  
CONCLUSION
What is puzzling about the legal practice of differential punishment is that we think 
on intuition that it is right, though we cannot find a conclusive argument that fully 
captures our intuitions. My arguments in this article show that under some likely 
conditions there may be consequentialist, deterrence-based reasons for punishing 
successful offenders more harshly than their unsuccessful counterparts.  If 
consequentialists about the criminal law are right, then it will follow from my arguments 
that there are in fact contexts in which we are right in adopting schemes of differential 
sanctions.
159 See, e.g., MPC §§ 5.01, 210.4, 211.1(b) (excluding negligence from attempt liability, making negli-
gently causing death a felony of the third degree, and negligently causing bodily injury with a deadly 
137
Although my arguments may thus show the practice of differential punishment to be 
supported by sound normative grounds, they may not remove the puzzling nature of 
differential punishment. For the reasons favoring differential punishment that my account 
highlights are certainly not the reasons driving our moral intuitions, as these intuitions 
appear to us.  If solving the puzzle of differential punishment involves advancing a 
coherent account that fully captures our moral intuitions as they appear to us, then my 
arguments would make no contribution whatsoever to that venture.  Be that as it may, that 
is not the task I pursued here.  My aim was just to find out whether our criminal-law prac-
tices of differential punishment are tenable on normative compelling grounds, even if 
such grounds are not those upon which we have actually decided to adopt such practices.  
And I found out that there may be such grounds, if it is the case that we ought to organize 
our criminal laws in accordance to deterrence-related goals, and to the extent that some 
likely social and psychological facts obtain.
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